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COMPENSABLE LIBERTY: A HISTORICAL AND
POLITICAL MODEL OF THE SEVENTH
AMENDMENT PUBLIC LAW JURY
GEORGE E. BUTLER II*
INTRODUCTION
These reflections about the jury relate to the erosion of
protection for economic liberties under the United States
Constitution. In that regard the 1930's represented a critical
and well-known watershed.. Where one day such interests as
the right to contract stood as all but inviolable under the Due
Process Clause, the next they were treated as merely a part of
the public domain.' As a result, legislatures received the nod
to regulate all intangible economic expectations at will-even
to the point of virtual destruction.2
What is less well known, and may indeed be fundamen-
tally misunderstood, is the precise operation of this historic
watershed. Understandably, the dramatic judicial about-face
* Assistant Professor of Law, Emory University. A.B., 1972, Univer-
sity of North Carolina; J.D., 1976, Yale University. In addition to the Lib-
erty Fund, retiring Dean Thomas D. Morgan and the Emory Law School
Research Fund provided needed support for this research project. Valua-
ble criticisms were received along the way from Emory colleagues Timothy
P. Terrell, William J. Carney, and Howard 0. Hunter and are gratefully
acknowledged.
1. Cf Epstein, Taxation, Regulation, and Confiscation, 20 Osgoode
Hall L.J. 433, 433 (1982). This shift away from active judicial review of
economic legislation is perhaps best captured by the trilogy of decisions in
Home Building and Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (uphold-
ing Minnesota's mortgage moratorium law), Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.
502 (1934) (upholding New York's milk price control regulations), and
West Court Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding Washington
State's minimum wage statute). In particular, Parrish appeared to represent
a dramatic reversal of the position taken by the Court the previous year in
Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936). See generally
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §8-5-8-7 (1978).
2. In relatively short order, the Supreme Court carried its new
doctrine of deferential review to the point of willingly inferring the neces-
sary "substantial" relationship between an economic regulation and legiti-
mate legislative ends based on the presumed existence of any hypothetical
state of facts, not demonstrably untrue, which would sustain the statute.
Compare United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) with
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). See note 4 infra.
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strikes some commentators as a wholesale abdication to the
legislative branch.3 In contrast this article contends that both
descriptively and normatively the due process revolution of
the '30's should be viewed as having contained the essential
elements of a practicable and principled due process compro-
mise, a compromise founded on a critical Taking Clause com-
ponent. Between the extremes of inviolable and negligible
general economic liberties lay the broad conceptual middle
ground actually, and properly, chosen by the Court: that of
"compensable" individual liberties.' As a result of that im-
plicit choice, the citizen was forced to surrender the right to
attack a statute as generally unconstitutional on its face. But
in exchange he was to enjoy an even more vigorous right' to
3. See, e.g., McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court:
An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 SuP. CT. REV. 34. Cf Gunther, Foreword:
In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 43 (1972).
4. In a similar philosophical vein, Professor Nozick rejects as a false
dichotomy the assertion that either the state has the right to regulate risk-
creating conduct (however de minimis the risk) or it does not-and if it
does, there is no need to compensate. Rather, he suggests, it may be the
state has a right to regulate some such conduct only if it provides compen-
sation. R. NozIcK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 83-87 (1974). In that way
Nozick correctly focuses on the fundamental equal protection component
of the principle of, "just compensation." Cf, e.g., Sax, Takings and the Police
Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 44-45 (1964); Sax, Takings, Private Property and Pub-
lic Right, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 169-71 (1971). The failure of government to
regulate all risk-creating conduct dictates that those forced to bear an un-
fair share of the actual regulatory burden receive compensation. Nozick,
supra, at 86-87. Cf Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on
the Ethical Foundations of 'Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165,
1201-02 n.77 (1967).
In that sense compensation may be viewed as a surrogate for the protec-
tion against discriminatory economic regulation once associated with the
Equal Protection Clause but now lost as part of the modern due process
revolution. Under current doctrine discriminatory legislative classifications
are deemed constitutionally justified by the tautology that "if the means
chosen burdens one group and benefits another, then the means perfectly
fits the end of burdening just those whom the law disadvantages and bene-
fitting just those whom it assists." Tribe, supra note 1, at § 16-2, 995.
It is for purposes of deciding what constitutes unfair regulatory sacrifice
that the public law jury, introduced in the title of the article, will be
utilized.
5. The posited vigor of the new inverse condemnation remedy for
de facto regulatory takings stems from the following, inter alia: (i) the fact
that liability standards for damage actions are properly less demanding
than those for injunctive relief, see text accompanying notes 79-82, infra,
and (ii) the fact that the inverse condemnation action functions as surro-
gate protection for the loss of any active "public purpose" or substantive
equal protection constraints on the frivolousness of legislative ends or the
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sue the state or its agents for just compensation on the basis
of any particularized unfairness and harm from its applica-
tion.6 The text for this pragmatic solution to the conflict be-
tween absolute economic liberties and political expediency
was the Court's earlier assertion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon that "if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as
a taking.""
Nonetheless, the current perception of abdication is cor-
rect, but not for the reasons generally credited. Economic lib-
erties have suffered largely because the Court has effectively
abandoned the compensation element of the posited compro-
mise. Having wisely repudiated the substantive economic due
process of Lochner v. New York, 8 it has incongruously failed to
cast aside the procedural due process doctrine of Murray's
Lessee9 which permits non-judicial, bureaucratic fact-finding
in the critical public law area. As a result, the legislature en-
discriminatoriness of legislative means.
6. One key factor that has contributed to the inference of abdica-
tion actually supports the present thesis. It is tempting to rationalize the
developments in the '30's as simply logical extensions to new areas of eco-
nomic liberty of the rent control and zoning decisions of the '20's. See
Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921) (rent control); Marcus Brown Holding
Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170 (1921) (rent control); Edgar A. Levy Leasing
Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242 (1922) (rent control); Village of Euclid v. Am-
bler Realty Co., 303 U.S. 365 (1926) (zoning). But those earlier cases do
not embody the precise proto-deferential philosophy assumed. In terms of
procedural posture, they were all facial attacks. Accordingly, they illustrate
important aspects of the compromise. For example, in Euclid the Court
justified its lax standard of review on the basis that the Appellee was seek-
ing injunctive relief against the zoning ordinance "as a whole," id. at 397,
on the "broad ground that the mere existence and threatened enforce-
ment" of the statute constituted a "present and irreparable injury," id. at
396, having never sought a building permit or a variance. Id. Brief for
Appellants (on Rehearing), at 3, id. (the basic argument on rehearing, be-
ing that Appellee had no "right, in the present case and procedure, to
bring into issue any question of reasonableness or unreasonableness of the
ordinance as it applies to its land," though it was free to attack "the basic
and per se unconstitutionality of the ordinance"). At the same time, the
Court affirmed its willingness to scrutinize with greater care any future
complaints detailing "a particular injury" from the "concretfe application
of the ordinance] to particular premises . .. or to particular circum-
stances." That promise was quickly made good in Nectow v. City of Cam-
bridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928). The next important step dictated by the com-
promise was for the Court to provide a federal forum for "as applied"
monetary, rather than injunctive, relief.
7. 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (Holmes, J.).
8. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
9. Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S.
(18 How.) 272, 284 (1856).
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joys the best of both worlds. While its economic enactments
receive a presumption of facial constitutionality, it is still free
to turn around and confer fact-finding authority, carrying a
similar presumption of "correctness," on whatever expert ad-
ministrative agency or special court it handpicks to adjudicate
fact-sensitive individual claims of as applied statutory unfair-
ness. Not surprisingly, the accredited fact-finders, imbued
with the sovereign immunity concerns that underlie Murray's
Lessee, tend to defer to the legislature's presumptive view that
no compensation is due."
While Justice Rehnquist" and Professor Epstein" would
10. After all, regulatory schemes seldom provide any mechanism for
awarding individualized compensation. Nonetheless, the posited compro-
mise requires courts to defer to the legislative judgment on the issue of the
facial reasonableness (or allocative efficiency) of such regulations, while pre-
serving as an independent judicial question their as applied reasonableness
(or distributive equity). True separation-of-powers principles require no
less:
It seems to have been contended that the legislature is competent
to determine whether [a statute necessitated by the public interest]
• . . will be injurious to other interests, and that it is to be pre-
sumed, after a legislative [enactment] . . ., "that there is no just
claim for resulting damage that has not been provided for." See
American Law Magazine, vol. 1, No. 1, April 1843, 58-60. This
assumes both the omniscience and omnipotence of the legislature.
Eaton v. Boston, C. & M.R.R., 51 N.H. 504, 517 (1872) (emphasis added).
See note 45 infra.
But the legislature is not omniscient. Because it cannot anticipate in any
detail the individual harms to be expected from its regulatory decrees, it
cannot accurately weight in advance their second-order distributive justice
effects. Yet even if it could, it is not omnipotent. Having already received
judicial deference at the general policy level where "legislative facts" are at
issue, the legislature cannot also demand to be trusted as an exclusive polit-
ical right to respond fairly and accurately to any disproportionate individ-
ual impact based on the relevant "adjudicative facts." Cf K. DAVIs, ADMIN-
IsTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § § 7.02-06 (1958). Rather it is the especial
"province and duty of the judiciary to pass upon the [as applied] constitu-
tionality of statutes." Eaton, 51 N.H. at 517. In keeping with the present
thesis, Professor Davis has described "adjudicative facts" as "roughly the
kind of facts that go to a jury in a jury case." Davis, The Requirement of a
Trial-Type Hearing, 70 HARV. L. REV. 193, 199 (1956).
11. In his dissent in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of
New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), Rehnquist, joined by Burger and Stevens,
argued that the existence of a regulatory taking should turn on three in-
quiries. First, is the affected expectational interest of the claimant suffi-
ciently reasonable to merit recognition as a "property" right. Id. at 14-43.
If so, and assuming the injury to the claimant's interest is substantial, id. at
150, the question arises whether the regulation is designed to prevent a
harm, in the sense of a "real and substantial" nuisance-like threat of injury
to the health, morals, or safety of the public, or to confer a benefit. Id. at
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rectify this situation through more stringent substantive rules
for compensable takings, this article advances a complemen-
tary procedural diagnosis and cure. It argues as a matter of
history and policy that the Seventh Amendment be inter-
preted to guarantee an ultimate right"3 to have a public law
jury both determine the substantive issue of whether a defacto
regulatory taking has occurred, based on the fairness of the
law as applied to the individual, and liquidate the resulting
harm, but only to the extent the subjective "too far" thresh-
old has been crossed. (Despite the conceptual impossibility of
bifurcating those two issues, 4 current federal practice in in-
verse condemnation cases allows for a jury, if at all,' 5 only on
144-46. Finally, if the regulation of a property interest is intended to con-
fer a benefit, the issue becomes whether or not the claimant has received
"an average reciprocity of advantage" from the imposition of the regula-
tion on other similarly situated individuals. Id. at 147-50. Otherwise, com-
pensation is due.
This article contends that Rehnquist's criteria are ideally suited for appli-
cation by a jury. For instance, what regulatory injuries are to be deemed
"substantial" enough to trigger taking clause protection and what eco-
nomic activities are to be deemed sufficiently "unneighborly" or "harmful"
to the public to warrant substantial uncompensated regulatory sacrifice are
certain to be in part a function of contemporary community standards, like
the definition of obscenity in the First Amendment area. See Miller v. Cali-
fornia, 415 U.S. 15 (1973). Plus, the use of a jury allows for the necessary
fluidity among categories. In practice, the degree of "harmfulness"
threatened would be subjectively balanced against the degree of "dispro-
portionate sacrifice" exacted. Professor Ellickson has suggested a somewhat
analogous analytical structure for private nuisance actions, in which the
jury discounts defendant's "unneighborliness" by plaintiff's degree of "hy-
persensitivity." Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules,
and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. Ci. L. REV. 681, 756-57 (1973).
12. Epstein, Not Deference But Doctrine: The Eminent Domain Clause,
1982 SuP. CT. REV. 351, 356.
13. Note that the contention is for an ultimate, not necessarily an
automatic, right to such a jury. Thus, an administrative hearing could be
provided in the first instance with a right to appeal from an unfavorable
determination to a de novo jury trial; moreover, that appeal could even be
conditioned on the claimant's willingness to pay the state's reasonable at-
torneys' fees and expenses if the jury verdict is no more favorable. Also,
the limitation of liability to claims of "substantial" harm will reduce the
potential volume of litigation.
14. That is, only the fact-finder which has determined under the in-
dividual circumstances of the case the "too far" point of unacceptable reg-
ulatory imposition is then in a position to quantify the specific harm caused
by the "unreasonable part" of the regulation. See, e.g., Developments in the
Law - Zoning, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1427, 1497-1501 (1978).
15. Never expressly holding that the Seventh Amendment is inap-
plicable to condemnation actions, the Court has repeatedly voiced that
opinion in unequivocal dicta. See, e.g., Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367,
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the issue of damages."6 ) It is conceded on all sides that in
theory the taking question concerns whether by contempo-
rary standards of "justice and fairness" the intangible harm
visited upon an individual exceeds his "fair share" of the cost
of the measure. And if so, the disproportionate element of
his sacrifice must be underwritten by the general public or by
those more directly benefitted. As a central premise, this
piece maintains that whatever appellate standards or guide-
lines are formulated to help structure that inquiry, an irre-
ducible element of subjectivity will necessarily and appropri-
ately remain in applying the open-ended equitable principle
of "disproportionate regulatory sacrifice."
Accordingly, the Seventh Amendment and our constitu-
tional heritage of the rule of law, properly conceived,'17 dictate
376 (1875), Crane v. Hahlo, 258 U.S. 142, 147 (1922), and United States
v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14 (1970). See generally 5 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
38.02 (1985). This perception is codified in Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 71A(h), which makes juries optional with the judge in condemnation
cases and reserves to the court all issues other than the amount of just
compensation.
But the history of Rule 71A(h) is a checkered one, full discussion of
which must be deferred to another time. Suffice it to say here that there is
little in the history of the rule that inspires one with confidence as to the
wisdom of the rule. See generally 7 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 7 IA. 03-
08 (1985).
16. The Supreme Court resolves the current conceptual paradox of
using separate fact-finders for each inquiry by awarding the condemnee an
all-or-nothing recovery based arbitrarily onfull diminution in the objective
fair market value of his property. See, e.g., United States v. 564.54 Acres of
Land, 441 U.S. 506 (1979). Cf Krier, The Regulation Machine, 1 Sup. CT. Ec.
REV. 1, 12-13 & n.74 (1982). But the generosity in this measure of recovery
is more apparent than real. For one, it makes the court commensurately
less willing to find a taking in the first instance. Secondly, it lets the court
prevent compensation jurors from awarding a recovery for actual subjec-
tive harm, which might serve indirectly to curb frivolous public or private
enterprises.
17. The two very different historical conceptions of the political
ideal called the rule of law support two different theories of the adjudica-
tive role of politio-ethical principles. See R. DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCI-
PLE 17-18 (1985). Professor Dworkin has termed the competing ideals the
"rule-book" and the "rights" approaches. In the former narrow sense, the
rule of law, while requiring that state coercive force be used only in accor-
dance with clearly promulgated rules, says nothing about the content of
the rules that may occupy the public rule book. In the latter sense, the
substantive justice of the rules themselves constitutes a part of the ideal of
the rule of law, since citizens are deemed to have "political rights against
the state as a whole":
It insists that these . . . political rights be recognized in positive
law so that they may be enforced upon the demand of individual
[Vol. I
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that such a discretionary standard of public justice be en-
trusted to the free and putatively unbiased administration of
a unanimous (or near unanimous) cross-sectional
jury-rather than to a single trial judge or to a majority of a
panel of unelected appellate judges or executive commission-
ers. Thus, the successful protection of economic liberties
under the Constitution may properly have less to do with the
Due Process Clause than with the interaction of two other
critical parts of the Constitution: the Taking Clause of the
Fifth Amendment and the jury trial guarantee of the Seventh
Amendment.
Yet the Supreme Court still tolerates Murray's Lessee.
And it does so because its members summarily dismiss the
idea that mandatory Article III fact-finding in important pub-
lic law actions can be preferred conceptually over fact-finding
done by a panel of agency experts, especially since the former
might entail a Seventh Amendment "lay" jury. This article
explores the distinct and ironic possibility that the Seventh
Amendment, in the eyes of its proponents, was designed to
serve a use opposite that to which the modern Court so effec-
tively puts it. In other words, the civil jury guarantee was in-
tended to protect against the spectre of public law decision-
making by what Blackstone had termed "new and arbitrary
[bureaucratic] methods of trial"" 8-not to be a tacit argu-
ment in favor of such decisionmaking in view of the ineffi-
cient Article III alternative. 9 It also briefly examines the
citizens through courts or other judicial institutions of the familiar
type, so far as this is practicable.
Id. at 11.
While the jury plays a self-evident historical role in implementing this
"ideal of rule by an accurate public conception of individual rights," id. at
11-12, its very propensity to bring its politico-ethical sensibilities to bear on
legal issues has made it anathema to partisans of the "rule-book" ideal.
18. IV BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES **349-50. Blackstone dismissed
as an irrelevancy the greater administrative costs associated with the decen-
tralized jury system:
And however convenient these [new methods of trial] appear at
first (as doubtless all arbitrary powers, well executed, are the most
convenient), yet let it be again remembered, that delays and little
inconveniences in the forms of justice, are the price that all free
nations must pay for their liberty in more substantial matters
Id.
19. Based on considerations of efficiency, the Court has given Con-
gress carte blanche to create administrative systems for adjudicating legal
issues, which would include damages from a regulatory taking. For pur-
poses of the Seventh Amendment, such legal issues are deemed equitable
19851
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more cynical possibility that behind this mix-up lies the
Court's desire to preserve the Article III toehold graciously
ceded by Congress in public law matters, which it might for-
feit by the ungrateful act of putting a blank check against the
fisc in the hands of an unpredictable lay jury. 0 And it argues
that behind this immunity concern lies a false dilemma, since
the justiciability of a claim against the fisc does not render its
collectability similarly justiciable. Within limits the latter can
and should remain a political question. 1 Hence, if necessary
on the basis of the inadequacy of the legal remedy; and the legal remedy is
deemed inadequate because of the blanket Seventh Amendment require-
ment of a costly jury. See, e.g., Atlas Roofing Co., Inc. v. OSHA, 430 U.S.
442 (1977). Cf Note, Congressional Provision for Nonjury Trial under the Sev-
enth Amendment, 83 YALE L.J 401, 415 (1973). Such specious circularity is
possible because Murray's Lessee has created the illusion that the civil jury
trial guarantee had no public law implications.
20. As developed within, it is for the court to exercise control over
the public law jury via motions for new trials and remittiturs.
21. James Wilson of the U.S. Supreme Court assumed in his cele-
brated Law Lectures that just compensation questions would ultimately
have to be decided - at least in terms of the decision to fund any
award-by the legislature or its agents. And he warned of the tyrannical
implications:
When questions-especially pecuniary questions-arise between a
state and a citizen-more especially still, when those questions are,
as they generally must be, submitted to the decision of those who
are not only parties and judges, but legislators also; the sacred im-
partiality of the second character, it must be owned, is too fre-
quently lost in the sordid interestedness of the first, and in the
arrogant power of the third. This, I repeat it, is tyranny: and tyr-
anny, though it may be more formidable and more oppressive, is
neither less odious nor less unjust-is neither less dishonorable to
the character of one party, nor less hostile to the rights of the
other, because it is proudly prefaced by the epithet-legislative.
He who refuses the payment of an honest demand upon the pub-
lic, because it is in his power to refuse it, would refuse the pay-
ment of his private debt, if he was equally protected in the refusal.
He who robs as a legislator, because he dares, would rob as a high-
wayman-if he dared.
II J. WILSON, THE WORKS OF JAMES W11SoN 285 (J. Andrews ed. 1896) (em-
phasis in original).
These sentiments help explain Wilson's later opinion in Chisholm v.
Georgia, 2 U.S. (DalI). 419 (1793), upholding Article III jurisdiction over a
suit in assumpsit by a South Carolina citizen against the State of Georgia.
They also suggest why he doubtless would have subscribed (along with
Chief Justice Marshall, see Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 412
(1821)) to the view that the Eleventh Amendment is addressed only to Ar-
ticle III jurisdiction based on party identity and that federal courts retain
Article III subject matter jurisdiction over constitutional claims against the
states and the federal government (not to mention party status jurisdiction
[Vol. I
COMPENSABLE LIBERTY
to effectuate the posited compromise, the Court should
boldly assert irrevocable jurisdiction via 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a)
over constitutional common law damage actions (in the na-
ture of inverse condemnation) against both the federal and
state governments-or at least against the officers who imple-
ment their allegedly confiscatory regulations.
Drawing on the history of the Seventh Amendment and
the political theory of the founding period, therefore, the ar-
ticle seeks to establish a plausible pedigree and philosophy for
the modern absurdity of an ultimate right to a jury in just
compensation actions. This reconstructed Seventh Amend-
ment public law jury is far from being a mere fact-finding lay
adjunct of the court, which federal judges are free to patron-
ize or munipulate, like the optional Rule 71A(h) jury em-
ployed in condemnation actions under the Tucker Act. De-
spite efforts by the Supreme Court to belittle the "lay" status
of jurors, Article III judicial power does not reside in profes-
sional Article III judges alone; rather it is in vested in Article
III courts, which happen also to be comprised of Seventh
Amendment jurors in appropriate cases."2 Hence the Seventh
Amendment public law jury, like its Sixth Amendment sib-
over the latter), save perhaps for the right to enforce monetary judgments.
That qualification is a product of the jealously guarded legislative preroga-
tive over the appropriation of tax monies and the added problem of get-
ting the executive branch to execute a judgment against itself in the case of
the federal government. It furnishes all the more reason for the judiciary
to encourage the legislature to provide "just compensation." For recent
articles advocating a return to a "party status" view of the Eleventh
Amendment and a general retrenchment of the principle of sovereign im-
munity, see, Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A
Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant ofJurisdiction Rather than a Prohi-
bition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033 (1983); Gibbons, The Elev-
enth Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM.
L. REV. 1889 (1983).
22. Precisely this point as to the compendious meaning of "court,"
when used to refer to the designated repository of federal judicial power
under Article III, was made by John Marshall in the Virginia ratifying con-
vention, 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADoP-
TION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 557-58 (1. Elliot ed. 1866) [hereinafter
cited as ELLIOT, DEBATES] ("Does the word court only mean the judges?
Does not the determination of a jury necessarily lead to the judgment of
the court?") and by Thomas Dawes in the Massachusetts convention, 2 Id.
at 113 (emphasis added):
The word court does not, either by popular or technical construc-
tion, exclude the use of a jury to try facts. When people, in com-
mon language, talk of a trial at the Court of Common Pleas, or the
Supreme Judicial Court, do they not include all the branches and
members of such court-the jurors as well as the judges?
19851
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ling, will be depicted as deserving a vital share of that Article
III power by virtue of its historic right to apply governing
legal standards to the facts at hand-and even to make equi-
table departures from those standards in favorem libertatis.
For example, long before First Amendment protection was
essentially absolutized,23 it was widely assumed that freedom
of speech and the press, practically speaking, lay in the fact
that an impartial jury made the crucial "common sense"
value judgment about how to weight and weigh the various
factors comprising what we now term "the "clear and present
danger" standard. 4
But the descriptive analysis employed should not camou-
flage the advertently normative or philosophical arguments
being interwoven with the historical plot line. They, too, sup-
port an expanded constitutional principle of individual equity
and a complementary institutional role for the public law jury
as ultimate arbiter of the as applied fairness or equity of regu-
latory measures. These normative arguments may well be
more important than any historical data contained in the Ar-
ticle. For if the Supreme Court ever accepts the proffered
pedigree of the public law jury, which is concededly a tenta-
tive effort and inconclusive as a matter of historical fact, pre-
sumably it will be on the considerable strength of the policies
and principles underlying the historical model.
Of the sections that follow, the first develops the asser-
23. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
24. Justice Story was neither the first nor last to link the substantive
definition of the necessarily non-absolute liberty of the press to the ad hoc
discretionary powers of the jury:
The noblest patriots of England, and the most distinguished
friends of liberty, both in parliament, and at the bar, have never
contended for a total exemption from responsibility, but have
asked only, that the guilt or innocence of the publication should
be ascertained by a trial by jury ....... .[T]he exercise of a
right is essentially different from an abuse of it. Common sense
here promulgates the broad doctrine, sic utere tuo, ut non alienum
laedas; so exercise your own freedom, as not to infringe the rights
of others, or the public peace and safety.
III J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§1879, 737, and §1882, 741 (1833) [hereinafter cited as STORY, COMMEN-
TARIES.] This article develops the general thesis that the sic utere tuo maxim
enjoys a public law status as well as a private law status and that in both
types of cases historic due process requires that the jury be the one to ap-
ply the maxim's open-ended principle of "neighborliness" or "reasonable-
ness under the circumstances" to differentiate between protected and un-
protected liberties. Specifically, it pursues the analogy between using the
jury to protect economic liberties and speech.
[Vol. I
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tion that the due process revolution of the 30's can be profit-
ably viewed as a compromise based on the idea of compensa-
ble liberties, but one which contained the seeds of its own
destruction due to the modern absence of an independent-
minded Seventh Amendment jury to implement it. The sec-
ond musters historical evidence to support the thesis that the
Seventh Amendment was intended to provide a jury in public
law actions and explores the form such an action might take
in the context of an as applied Taking Clause attack on a reg-
ulatory statute. The next section examines a broader aspect
of the thesis, namely, the assertion that the Seventh Amend-
ment public law jury, like its Sixth Amendment counterpart,
should be viewed as a dispenser of equity in cases pitting an
individual against the state. That section also explores in
depth the complex nineteenth century process by which all
such law-finding prerogatives of the jury were carefully
stripped away by the courts.
The final section brings us full circle. It suggests why the
demise of the law-finding jury may have been instrumental in
giving rise to the discredited doctrine of substantive eco-
nomic due process in the first place. Having dismantled the
one judicial institution that stood as a bulwark against gov-
ernment encoachment on individual liberties, due to its abil-
ity to dispense equity, the Supreme Court felt compelled to
step in and fill the void it had created-a task for which it
proved institutionally ill-suited. As a result, the Court has
since chosen the path of virtual judicial abdication, at least in
the area of economic liberties, with no thought to surrender-
ing the lead back to its Article III yokefellow, the Seventh
Amendment jury. Pointing out the irony that the earliest
American judicial review cases involved the appellate courts
in preserving the prerogatives of the jury, the article attrib-
utes the democratic "deviancy" of the modern American in-
stitution of judicial review 5 to subsequent appellate success
in alternately suppressing and supplanting the jury's historic
equitable powers. Some hopeful signs of a change in appel-
late attitude towards the jury are noted, however.
The Conclusion summarizes why, as a matter of constitu-
tional theory, the posited Seventh Amendment just compen-
sation jury (with its discretion over damages) could provide
especially important surrogate structural protection for indi-
vidual economic liberties otherwise left exposed to dispropor-
tionate legislative sacrifice by modern doctrinal
25. See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 18 (1962).
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changes-like the definitive demise of any true "public pur-
pose" limitation on exercises of eminent domain. 6
I. COMPENSABLE LIBERTY: THE LOST COMPROMISE
This hypothetical lost compromise, whose rightful mod-
ern architect was Justice Holmes,2 7 constituted an integral
part of the Holmesian institutional philosophy which in-
formed the anti-Lochner revolution. It implicit terms can
26. Any notion that either general principles of eminent domain or
the Fifth Amendment's specific guarantee of compensation for "private
property . . . taken for public use" (in itself or as applied to the states via
the Fourteenth Amendment) carries as a negative pregnant the right that
condemned property be devoted to actual public use has been supplanted
by the view that the scope of eminent domain is coterminous with the
"conceivable public purpose" (or advantage) limitation on the general po-
lice power. Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 104 S.Ct. 2321, 2329
(1983). See generally 2A NIcHoLs ON EMINENT DOMAIN §§7.01[3]-7.07
(1983). And of course the so-called "public purpose" limitation is no limita-
tion at all, given the lax "mere rationality" standard of modern due pro-
cess review. See Midkiff, 104 S.Ct. at 2330, citing inter alia Western & South-
ern Life Inc. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 671-72 (1981);
and note 2 supra.
To lament the demise of "public use" as a substantive due process limita-
tion on the power of eminent domain, see, e.g., Aranson,Judicial Control of
the Political Branches: Public Purpose and Public Law, 4 CATO J. 719, 722-30
(1985), however, is to discount the potential efficacy of Professor Hayek's
well-founded suggestion that this may be one political problem that con-
tains its own creative solution:
The chief purpose of the requirement of full compensation is in-
deed to act as a curb on . . . [unnecessary] infringements of the
private sphere and to provide a means of ascertaining whether the
particular purpose is important enough to justify an exception to
the principle on which the normal working of society rests. In
view of the difficulty of estimating the often intangible advantages
of public action and of the notorious tendency of the expert ad-
ministrator to overestimate the importance of the particular goal
of the moment, it would even seem desirable that the private
owner should always have the benefit of the doubt and that com-
pensation should be fixed as high as possible without opening the
door to outright abuse. This means, after all, no more than that
the public gain must clearly and substantially exceed the loss if an
exception to the normal rule is to be allowed.
F. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 217-18 (1960).
27. Perhaps the earliest suggestion that just compensation would
cure a legislative action otherwise invalid under a substantive guarantee
like the Due Process Clause came in Justice Story's dissent in Charles River
Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420, 638 (1837), regarding the Contract
Clause. Story's view was borne out by West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47
U.S. (6 How.) 506 (1848).
28. See L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at §8-7, 452-54 (1978).
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perhaps best be grasped by reference to the current eco-
nomic theory of property rights." To maximize efficiency
and fairness, the Court may be said to have decided simply to
switch remedies in safeguarding economic liberties or expec-
tations, substituting a post-deprivation damage remedy under
the Taking Clause for specific predeprivation relief under the
Due Process Clause. This change of tact represented a
straightforward, pragmatic solution to the Due Process/Con-
tract Clause crisis of the 30's. For at bottom that crisis had to
do with whether the legislature, in an'effort to protect "the
economic structure upon which the good of all depends,"30
could regulate certain individual affairs at all. In that fact lay
the ingredients of compromise. 1 On the one hand, Holmes
championed the prerogative of the majoritarian legislature to
experiment freely with the cure of social ills through general
statutes, adopting the strong judicial presumption that eco-
nomic measures were necessary and expedient for the gen-
eral advantage of the public. Ever the pragmatist, he denied
that the Court enjoyed any special institutional competence
or charter, despite its own formalistic constructs like "affecta-
tion with a public interest" or "public purpose,"3 " to second-
guess the quantum of publicness sufficient to justify regulatory
inroads on personal economic liberties.3 Given the profound
efficiency implications of underprotecting widely-shared pub-
lic interest, Holmes felt the legislature should be excused for
erring on the side of overprotection, even to the point of
making "life livable" for those of its citizens who may have
concluded that "the superfluous is the necessary. '
Besides-and this arguably was Holmes' critical percep-
tion-, if a regulation does go "too far," it can always be
harmlessly converted into a pro tanto exercise of the power of
29. See, e.g., Calabresi and Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
30. Home Building and Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 442.
31. The truth seems to me to be that, subject to compensation
when compensation is due, the legislature may forbid or restrict any
business when it has a sufficient force of public opinion behind it.
Tyson and Bro. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 446 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing) (emphasis added). Cf Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 435.
32. See, e.g., Hamilton, Affectation with a Public Interest, 39 YALE L. J.
1089 (1930); Scheiber, The Road to Munn: Eminent Domain and the Concept of
Public Purpose in the State Courts, in LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY, eds. D.
Fleming and B. Bailyn 329 (1971).
33. See, e.g., Tyson and Bro. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 445-46 (1927)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 447.
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eminent domain, since by hypothesis economic liberties and
expectations are fungible in dollar terms. 5 In other words,
certain intangible liberties are justly characterized as compen-
sable, not inviolable, so far as the police power is con-
cerned. 6 Writing for the majority in Mahon, therefore,
Holmes had taken the complementary step of repudiating the
formalistic "physical invasion" doctrine in order to create an
individual cause of action for excessive regulation arising
under the Taking Clause.3" Of course, the Holmesian com-
35. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415. Early exam-
ples of the compromise at work include Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135
(1921), a case involving that portion of a D.C. rent control statute which
gave tenants the controversial right to hold-over. Writing for the Court,
Holmes rejected the facial due process attack on that right, which focused
on the "public purpose" problem. In doing so, he emphasized the fact that
statutory -[m]achinery was provided to secure to the landlord a reasonable
rent" during the hold-over period. Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blais-
dell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934), involved an unsuccessful facial attack on the
1933 Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law as violative of the Contract
Clause based on similar grounds. Chief Justice Hughes stressed the impor-
tance to the result in Block and the other rent control cases of the statutory
provision of post-deprivation remedies assuring "fair and reasonable com-
pensation.," Id. at 440-42. Accordingly, he justified the regulatory impact
of the moratorium on the basis that the statute provided both that interest
would continue to accrue and that the mortgagor had to pay a reasonable
rental value as ascertained in judicial proceedings-so that the mortgagee was
"not left without compensation for the withholding of possession." Id. at
445. (emphasis added). That the claimants pursued facial attacks at all was
doubtless attributable to the constitutional Catch 22 mentioned above.
36. Cf note 4 supra. By way of contrast, Professor Michelman has
suggested the possibility of a class of cases in which "the injury suffered by
the aggrieved owner is one for which money cannot compensate, because
the injury is to some interest of the owner's apart from net worth."
Michelman, Property as a Constitutional Right, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1097,
1111-12 (1981). For a recent contention that certain specific property in-
terests are so "personal" they should be deemed noncompensable and
hence immune from taking absent a "compelling state interest," see Radin,
Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 1002-06 (1982). Professor
Radin is presumably driven to her novel conclusion by the current unsatis-
factory state of the compromise. In particular, the Supreme Court has
sharply restricted the jury's ability to award damages for a condemnee's
subjective, non-market harm.
37. Despite Holmes' assertion in Mahon that "if regulation goes too
far it will be recognized as a taking," 260 U.S. at 415, the decision did not
constitute an express endorsement of an inverse condemnation remedy in
such cases due to its factual posture. Since the beneficiary of the regulation
had successfully sought to mandate its enforcement, the Supreme Court
was asked merely to overturn the injunction previously issued. Seeking to
limit Mahon to its facts, a number of state courts have recently contended
that the Court "did not attempt. . . to transmute the illegal governmental
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promise did require that the individual claimant demonstrate
the "cash value" of the liberty interest allegedly taken.3 8 No
longer would it suffice to claim an irreparable injury to an
abstract, ideological interest in seeing one's economic liberty
preserved inviolate."' (For instance, if our friend Mr. Nebbia
wants to recover, he must at least begin by demonstrating
material pecuniary harm from being forced to sell his milk at
too high a price.4 0 ) But whether a regulation goes "too far" in
the way of inflicting concrete individual sacrifice would now
be judicially determined by weighing the "extent of public inter-
est" involved against the "extent of [private harm]. 41 To
compensate for the fact that the publicness of the legislative
purpose was to be strictly off limits to judicial inquiry in the
context of injunctive relief, Holmes was ready and willing to
assess the relative "superfluousness" of legislative ends when
it came to determining the overall justifiability and hence
compensability of specific individual regulatory sacrifice.
That was, after all, the essential trade-off. Seen as a whole,
therefore, the Holmesian due process compromise required
that federal courts defer to the legislative judgment on the
broad issue of the facial reasonableness (or allocative effi-
ciency) of economic regulations, even as they carefully pre-
served as a judicial question "of degree" a statute's as applied
infringement into an exercise of eminent domain and the possibility of
compensation was not even considered." Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal.
3d 266, 274, 598 P.2d 25, 29 (1979), affd on other grounds, 447 U.S. 255
(1980). Accord, Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 39
N.Y.S. 2d 487, 594, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385, cert. denied and appeal dismissed,
429 U.S. 990 (1976). But a sitting majority of the Supreme Court-albeit
through dissent and dicta, respectively-have apparently laid this contro-
versy to rest. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S.
621, 633-34 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (1981); id. at 649 n.14, 650 n.17
(Brennan, J., joined by Stewart, Marshall, and Powell, dissenting). Speaking
through Justice Brennan, they confirmed that the principle behind Mahon
mandates that the victim of an excessive police power regulation be given
the option of an "inverse condemnation" remedy. Id. at 646-50. This con-
clusion is not altered by Williamson Co. Regional Planning Comm'n. v.
Hamilton Bank, __ U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 3108 (1985).
38. See note 11 supra. Cf Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254, 258-
59 (1978) (students suspended from school without procedural due process
were only entitled to recover nominal damages absent proof of actual
injury).
39. Compare Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972) with
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). See Note, De-
velopments in the Law-Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1427, 1455-56 (1978).
40. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
41. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413-14 (emphasis
added).
19851
JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY
reasonableness (or distributive equity).
A. Eminent Domain and Public Purpose.
Before examining the obscure fate awaiting Holmes'
idea, a few words are in order to support its conceptual claim
on our attention. Not only did actual signs of the compromise
at work appear in pivotal cases like Home Building & Loan As-
sociation v. Blaisdell,42 its suggested terms are consistent with
dominant strains of American eminent domain and due pro-
cess theory. For instance, the compromise may be analyzed as
a straightforward application of the pragmatic quasi-contrac-
tual approach to eminent domain popularized by natural law
theorists like Grotius, Vattel, Puffendorf, Burlamaqui, and
Hutcheson. Their theory of "fair share", which appears to
have been read and embraced by our founding generation,"
was designed to domesticate this potent public law doctrine
by reference to the universal maritime law of general average
and other traditional private law rules of necessity."" They
concluded that in a sufficient emergency the state was free to
take property belonging to another without advance judicial
due process, in much the same way that any private individ-
ual would be. As a result, the owner may not resist the tak-
ing, nor is he entitled to claim either punitive damages for a
tortious wrong or the monopoly rents created by the emer-
gency need. Instead, the taking is viewed as a privileged tres-
42. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
43. See, e.g., Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH.
L. REV. 553, 583-88 (1972); Grant, The "Higher Law" Background of the Law
of Eminent Domain, 6 Wis. L. REV. 67 (1931); III STORY, COMMENTARIES
§1784, 661 ("[The doctrine of just compensation] is founded in natural
equity, and is laid down by jurists as a principle of universal law."). See also
Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 236-37 (1897). Cf Mc-
Nulty, Eminent Domain in Continental Europe, 21 YALE L. J. 555 (1912).
44. See, e.g., MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, Bk.26, Chap.
XV (1748):
Thus when the public has occasion for the estate of an individual,
it ought never to act by the rigor of political law; it is here that the
civil law ought to triumph, which, with the eyes of a mother, re-
gards every individual as a whole community.
VATTEL, LAW OF NATIONS Bk I, Chap. XX (1773):
[Jiustice requires that . . . this individual be indemnified at the
public charge . . .for the burden of the State ought to be sup-
ported equally or in a just proportion. The same rules are applica-
ble to this case as to the loss of merchandise thrown overbroad to
save the vessel.
Cf Mouse's Case, 12 Co. Rep. 63 (1608).
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pass, which gives rise to a post hoc quasi-contractual (or im-
plied in law) duty on the part of the actor to indemnify the
owner, but only for actual losses in excess of his own fair
share of the cost of the public measure."' So long as that
post-deprivation obligation is met, due process is served. Ap-
plied to the context of a general regulatory statute, the analy-
sis supports Holmes' inference that any interim harm to an
individual's economic liberties constitutes at worst a privi-
leged governmental nuisance (i.e., a substantial, nontrespas-
sory invasion of his intangible rights) for which after-the-fact
compensation is a sufficient remedy.
More importantly, this early American eminent domain
theory, derived from natural law thinkers, vindicates Holmes'
conferral of a presumption of constitutionality-or, more
specifically, of adequate "public use"-on all such implicit
regulatory assertions of the power of eminent domain. For
one clear distinction between the public and private rights of
necessity was recognized. Unlike private assertions of the
right, any sovereign assertion of a public necessity sufficient
to invoke the right was not to be judicially second-guessed."
45. See, e.g., F. HUTCHESON, A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO MORAL PHI-
LOSOPHY 223-226 (Bk. II, Chap. XIV) (1746), where Hutcheson describes
the private plea of necessity as giving rise to an "[o]bligatio[n] resembling
those from [c]ontracts" or "[o]bligation[e] quasi ex contractu." Later he
equates this private right in principle to the "eminent right in the supreme
powers." Id. at 246 (Bk. II, Chap. IX). See also id. at 289-90 (Bk. III, Chap.
V).
46. See, e.g., H. GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 387-88 (Bk.
II, Chap. XX, §VII) (A. Campbell tr. 1901) (emphasis added):
The property of subjects is so far under the eminent control of
the state, that the state or the sovereign who represents it, can use
that property, or destroy it, or alienate it, not only in cases of ex-
treme necessity, which sometimes allow individuals the liberty of in-
fringing upon the property of others, but on all occasions, where
the public good is concerned, to which the original framers of so-
ciety intended that private interest should give way. But when that
is the case, it is to be observed, the state is bound to repair the
losses of the individuals, at the public expense, in aid of which the
sufferers have contributed their due proportion.
Cf. S. PUFFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM 1285 (C. and W.
Oldfather transls. 1934).
Hence Justice Patterson on circuit in 1795 willingly conceded that the
legislature could take property from private citizen A. and give it to private
citizen B., in the sense that the legislators "are the sole and exclusive
judges of the [political] necessity of the case," provided only that compen-
sation is paid. Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 304, 312
(C.C. Pa. 1795). Any implication to the contrary in Justice Chase's 1798
opinion in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 386, 388 (1798) (declaring that
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Being ideally representatives of the community as a whole
and not selfish actors, legislators were entitled to a presump-
tion of good faith; alternatively, in light of the extent of the
collective public interest at stake, they could be forgiven as
the responsible fiduciaries for choosing to err on the side of
overcaution. Thus, Holmes was not the first to embrace post
hoc compensation as the only pragmatic way to keep legisla-
tors honest about imposing no unnecessary sacrifice, direct or
regulatory, upon the citizenry.'7
Worse, unless the judiciary drew the separation-of-pow-
ers line squarely at the issue of compensation, "political ques-
tion" logic"8 would steadily tend towards legislative omnipo-
tence. Step by step, partisans of the legislature were certain
"a law that takes property from A. and gives it to B." violates implied limita-
tions on legislative authority) can be readily explained by the presumed
failure of the legislature in such cases to provide compensation. In other
words, Chase was invoking a situation in which the legislature might trans-
fer property from A. to B., cynically concede the absence of any public
purpose, and hence disclaim any concomitant taking clause duty to compen-
sate. The same point was made by Justice Iredell, albeit the other way
around. Justifying civil ex post facto laws that take away the vested property
rights of citizens, Chase invoked the expansive maxim that "private rights
must yield to public exigencies." But he made it clear that the principle of
compensation was an implied constraint on legislative manipulation of its
political right to decree the necessity for such sacrifice:
In such . . . cases, if the owners should refuse voluntarily to ac-
commodate the public, they must be constrained, as far as the
public necessities require; and justice is done, by allowing them a
reasonable equivalent.
Id. at 400.
47. [Conceding arguendo] that the two branches of the Legisla-
ture, subject only to the qualified veto of the Executive, are the
sole judges as to the expediency of making police regulations in-
terfering with the natural rights of our citizens . . . [olne of the
restraints upon bad legislation in this regard, is the price which
the people have to pay, by taxation, for the private property which
is taken for public use. It is not reasonable that the Legislature
will abuse the power, when their constitutents pay for the right.
Parham v. The Justices, etc. of Decatur County, 9 Ga. 341, 354 (1851).
Notwithstanding such precedents, Professor Tribe has asserted that
Holmes' use of the requirement of just compensation as "surrogate assur-
ance of public purpose" would have been quite unthinkable in the nine-
teenth century. TRIBE, supra note 1, at §9-3, 458-59.
48. See e.g., Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine, 85 YALE
L.J. 597 (1976). Professor Henkin describes the "pure theory" of the doc-
trine, under which courts voluntarily forego their paramount function of
review of constitutionality, as founded on the notion that "some constitu-
tional requirements are entrusted exclusively and finally to the political
branches of government for 'self-monitoring.' " Id. at 599.
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to try to parlay its discretion over the necessity of the taking
into comparable powers over, first, the manner and mode of
compensation and, finally, over.the necessity of making it at
all. 4
B. Pre- versus Post-Deprivation Due Process.
The compromise can be readily parsed in not dissimilar
contemporary due process terms, as well. The interim eco-
nomic harm to an individual from being forced to submit to
an excessively broad or burdensome regulatory statute, with
no ability to seek injunctive relief, is justifiable on several
grounds. They include the presumptively compensable, i.e.,
non-irreparable, nature of the interest involved,5 the poten-
tial urgency of clamping a regulatory lid on the general situa-
tion,51  and the resultant impracticability of affording
predeprivation process to the multitude potentially affected. 2
The latter consideration is especially germane since the ef-
fects of a generalized regulation on particular individuals may
be unknowable in advance. For instance, there is the question
of the diminution in market value to specific properties to be
expected from a new zoning law.
Recent Supreme Court cases suggest additional ways to
49. Justice Patterson made the point forcibly in 1795. Accepting the
political right of the legislature to judge the necessity for the policy behind
Pennsylvania's occupying-claimant law, which allowed homesteaders to
purchase the fee from absentee owners, he denied that the judiciary, con-
sistently with the concept of limited government, could allow the legisla-
ture to assert additional "state necessities" to justify the procedural provi-
sions of the Act:
Did there also exist a state necessity, that the Legislature, or per-
sons solely appointed by them, must admeasure the compensation,
or value of the lands seized and taken, and the validity of title
thereto? Did a third state necessity exist, that the proprietor must
take land by way of equivalent for his land? And did a fourth state
necessity exist, that the value of the land-equivalent must be ad-
judged by the board of property, without the consent of the party,
or the interference of a Jury? Alas how necessity begats necessity.
Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 304, 315 (C.C. Pa. 1795).
50. Compare Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 (1979) with Ewing v.
Mylinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950). See Phillips v. Commis-
sioner, 283 U.S. 589, 596-97 (1931) (Brandeis, J.):
Where only property rights are involved, mere postponement of
the judicial inquiry is not a denial of due process, if the opportu-
nity given for the ultimate judicial determination of the liability is
adequate.
51. See, e.g., Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931).
52. See, e.g., Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 27 (1981).
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flesh out the Holmesian compromise. Since the post-depriva-
tion damage remedy would arise under the principle of emi-
nent domain, which connotes a deliberate "singling out" for
sacrifice as opposed to the imposition of purely accidental
harm, the interim harm from a general regulation is unlikely
to be recoverable unless and until brought to the attention of
some responsible official. 3 Only thereafter in the event a
"variance" is not forthcoming within a reasonable time could
the harm be deemed constructively ratified by the state creat-
ing for the first time the quasi-contractual duty to compen-
sate for any disproportionate sacrifice being inflicted. Also,
the compromise would suggest that even after an award for
disproportionate sacrifice is made, the responsible authorities
should still be in a position to decide that the assessed price
for statutory uniformity is too high and simply rescind the
regulation as applied to the claimant.54
C. Governmental Immunity from Damage Actions.
Finally, before the reader can be expected to take seri-
ously the doctrinal compromise being reconstructed, a word
or two will need to be said about sovereign and official immu-
nity. Otherwise, the skeptic may retort that the thesis entails
a glaring counter-factual supposition. It assumes the availabil-
ity of an adequate post-deprivation damage remedy for exces-
sive regulatory harm; whereas, at the time of Mahon both the
state and federal governments appear to have enjoyed federal
immunity against such actions. In addition, that immunity ex-
tended to their officials who might commit or ratify regula-
tory torts within the scope of their express or discretionary
authority. To be sure, the skeptic may concede, the post-Re-
construction Supreme Court had taken steps to address this
situation by curbing the dangerous amplitude of the doctrine
of official immunity. But its efforts were confined to the very
area of specific relief deemed judicially off limits by the com-
promise. The Court afforded such federal relief through the
medium of nonstatutory actions based on the Article III sub-
ject matter jurisdiction over "all Cases .. . arising under
53. See, e.g., Williamson Co. Regional Planning Comm'n. v. Hamil-
ton Bank, _ U.S. ___ 105 S.Ct. 3108, 3117-21 (1985); San Diego Gas
& Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, (1981) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188, 1200, reh'g de-
nied (5th Cir. 1981). Cf Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
54. Accord, San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 450
U.S. 621, (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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th[e] Constitution."" The possibility of such actions first
arose in 1875 by virtue of the original counterpart to the
present 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a), granting general federal ques-
tion jurisdiction to the district courts. In particular, the
Court had invoked Taking Clause principles to support the
allowance of a federal ejectment action in 1882 against fed-
eral officers in United States v. Lee, 6 and a similar suit in 1908
for injunctive relief against state officers in Ex parte Young.5
Thus the skeptic rests his case. Sovereign immunity was in-
tact, and the Court refused to go beyond specific relief in
lowering the barrier of official immunity, being reluctant to
impose personal pecuniary liability upon dutiful officials.
But what is overlooked is that the same year as Mahon
Holmes set about to change that immunity situation in Ports-
mouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States.5 Anticipating
Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corporation,59 Holmes
reasoned that to the extent those immunity doctrines embod-
ied political or jurisprudential logic, that logic applied in the
context of specific relief only. After all, the official actions
being enjoined were likely to have been sanctioned or ratified
by the executive or legislative department; they were not
what we know today as constitutional torts committed merely
"under color of law." Therefore, as Holmes surmised and as
the Court confirmed in Larson, enjoining the commission of a
continuing tort which is authorized by the sovereign should
be a juridical last resort not a first. 6° Instead, lest it "sto[p]
the government in its tracks""1 and risk the danger of usurp-
ing valid emergency prerogatives of the co-ordinate
branches, the judiciary should first rummage about for a suit-
able post-deprivation damage remedy, such as an inverse con-
demnation action.
In Portsmouth Holmes did just that. He characterized the
commission of a continuing, presumptively ratified, tort by
federal officers, which consisted of regular artillery shellings
over petitioner's land, as a privileged act giving rise to a
quasi-contractual claim against their principal under the 1887
55. Cf Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 681-83 (1946); Bivens v. Six Un-
known Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
56. 106 U.S. 191, 220 (1882).
57. 209 U.S. 123, 124 (1908).
58. 260 U.S. 327 (1922).
59. 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
60. Id. at 703-04.
61. Id. See also Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643, 646-47 (1962).
19851
JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY
Tucker Act.62 At that time, the Tucker Act's coverage of
"claims founded upon the constitution" was still construed to
be limited by the subsequent phrase "not sounding in tort."
Moreover, the dissenting Brandeis insisted that the Tucker
Act's coverage of claims founded "upon any express or im-
plied contract with the United States" continue to be strictly
construed to apply only to an actual "contract, express or im-
plied in fact, to pay compensation."63 Holmes' analysis, bor-
rowing from classical eminent domain theory, neatly avoided
those dilemmas:
If the acts amounted to a taking . . .a contract would be
implied whether it was thought of or not."
Given his view of the "self-executing," implied in law charac-
ter of the constitutional guarantee of just compensation, 65
Holmes, if given the chance, might very well have decided
eventually (a la Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bu-
reau of Narcotics) to allow a federal common law damage ac-
tion against the states so as to effectuate the compromise.66
Or, if truly prescient, he might have anticipated the use of §
1983 to impose the quasi-contractual burden of authorized or
ratified torts committed by local state officials directly upon
their principal.6 7
62. Stat 505, ch. 359 (1887). See 28 U.S.C. §1491 (1970).
63. Portsmouth, 260 U.S. at 331.
64. Portsmouth, 260 U.S. at 330. This principle was affirmed in
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261-62 (1946) (frequent low alti-
tude flights of Army and Navy aircraft over property); United States v. Dick-
inson, 331 U.S. 745 (1947) (a taking of land by flooding in connection with
the building of a dam). See also Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 298
(1967) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("the Constitution measures a taking of
property not by what a State says, or by what it intends, but by what it
does"). For earlier unsuccessful attempts to adopt a quasi-contractual ap-
proach to the Taking Clause guarantee, see Hill v. United States, 149 U.S.
593, 601 (1893) (Shiras, J., dissenting); Schillenger v. United States, 155
U.S. 163, 177 (1894) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
65. Accord, United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980), quot-
ing 6 J. SACKMAN, NICHoLs LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN §25.41 (new 3d ed
1980).
66. Cf Bivens, 403 U.S. 388, 398 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring):
I am of the opinion that federal courts do have the power to
award damages for violation of "constitutionally protected inter-
ests" and . . . that a traditional judicial remedy such as damages is
appropriate to the vindication of the personal interest protected
by the Fourth Amendment.
Accord, Katz, The Jurisprudence of Remedies: Constitutional Legality and the
Law of Facts in Bell v. Hood, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1968).
67. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658
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D. Differential Liability Standards.
In either case, the result of such remedial fine-tuning to
guarantee the availability of an adequate post-deprivation
damage remedy at both the state and federal levels should be
the same. That is to say, the Holmesian compromise should
have been expected to take root and flower. For the ability to
liquidate a constitutional claim rather than award specific re-
lief, as Justice Harlan observed in Glidden v. Zdanok,"8 should
afford a court "greater freedom . . .to inquire into the [as
applied] legality of governmental action." 9 Relieved of con-
cern over the untoward efficiency implications of tying gov-
ernmental hands through injunctive relief, the court can con-
centrate instead on achieving individual equity through
damages. That is the posited analysis of Mahon. And at this
point an instructive parallel may be drawn to the private law
of nuisance. There a perceived remedial handicap, i.e., the
inability of courts to award damages rather than all-or-noth-
ing injunctive relief, profoundly shaped the development of
applicable substantive law. In short, the castastropic efficiency
implications of a finding of nuisance in a particular case,
given the remedial spectre of an injunction, tended to swamp
the competing fairness concerns and convince judges not to
recognize a claimant's entitlement to be free from the nui-
sance harm in the first place.7 0 Hence Professor Rabin has
cogently argued that an expansion of the doctrine allowing
defendants to buy the right to conduct a nuisance, a doctrine
synonymous with Boomer v. Atlanta Cement Co., 7 1 will benefit
plaintiffs as well:
[B]ecause damages rather than injunctions would be the
customary remedy . . .. courts would be more willing than
at present to recognize the entitlements of plaintiff.
7 2
In that sense, with respect to governmental regulatory nui-
sances impacting intangible economic liberties, Mahon should
be seen as the public law precursor of Boomer.73
(1978); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 662 (1980).
68. 370 U.S. 530 (1962).
69. Id. at 557.
70. See Ellickson, supra note 11, at 720.
71. 26 N.Y. 2d 219, 257 N.E. 2d 870, 309 N.Y.S. 2d 317 (1970).
72. Rabin, Nuisance Law: Rethinking Fundamental Assumption, 63 VA.
L. REV. 1299, 1332 (1977).
73. The foregoing analysis, with its counter-intuitive twist, explains
why this author prefers to build creatively on Larson, rather than mourn
the loss of the pre-Larson remedial status quo, especially since the scope of
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E. Promise and Reality.
In sum, with Mahon the foundation of the compensation
component of the compromise appeared secure, if only the
federal courts would flex their jurisdictional muscles to pro-
vide would-be claimants the necessary inverse condemnation
remedy. By constitutionalizing the concept of a defacto taking
of an economic liberty, Holmes had taken a bold step towards
realizing the full ethical potential envisioned for the principle
of just compensation by the author of the Taking Clause."
Following Locke, James Madison rejected the view that the
inviolability of property is limited to the "vulgar and un-
technical sense of the physical thing. '7 5 Nor did he consider
it to be confined only to the bundle of intangible rights asso-
ciated with the ownership of a specific object.7  Rather, to
paraphrase his 1792 essay Property, he asserted that in "its
larger and juster meaning" the principle behind the Taking
Clause rule that no property "shall be taken directly even for
public use without indemnification to the owner" requires
that "the United States . . . equally respect . . . [a man's]
property in [his] rights" and abstain from "indirectly vio-
lat[ing]" the same through "unequal taxes" or unfair
regulations.7 7
substantive protection afforded thereby was exiguous at best.
74. See, e.g., Note, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L. J. 694, 708-716
(1985).
75. United States v. General Motors Corp, 323 U.S. 373, 377-78
(1945).
76. Cf id. (emphasis added):
[The term "property" as used in the Taking Clause denotes] the
group of rights inhering in the citizen's relation to the physical
thing or object, as the right to possess, use and dispose if it....
The constitutional provision is addressed to every sort of interest the
citizen may possess.
77. Property, Nat'l Gazette, Mar. 27, 1792, in 14 J. MADISON, THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 266-68 (R. Rutland & J. Mason eds. 1983). This
expansive reading of the taking clause, which itself refers only to loss of
"property," reflects the obvious fact that property is a compendious term
embracing many intangible rights or expectations-or "liberties." The ref-
erence to "property" in the Fifth Amendment, therefore, may be under-
stood as a term of art referring to all compensable liberties-as opposed to
certain inviolable liberties. After all, like Locke, the libertarian framers
often used "property" as a generalized rubric for every interest of "Life,
Liberty, and Estate" to which an individual may be said to have a legiti-
mate claim, meaning "that Property which men have in their Persons as
well as Goods." See J. LOCKE, Two TREATIES OF GOVERNMENT §91, 123, 173
(P. Laslett ed. 1960). Inviolable liberties are vindicable civilly through ex-
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As the modern Court allowed the permissive scope of the
police power to expand essentially unchecked in the post-'37
era, one might logically and normatively have expected it to
employ the Mahon principle of compensation to take up the
slack, especially once it acknowledged its jurisdiction over in-
verse condemnation actions. Hence, the recognized failure of
the Court to devise "ethically satisfying ' 78 rules or proce-
dures for differentiating compensable from noncompensable
exercises of the police power probably ranks as the key factor
behind its so-called abdication in the economic arena.
To be sure, the Court still pays lip service to Mahon. And
in the process it has reaffirmed with Madisonian inflection
the historic equitable principle that the power of eminent do-
main, as embodied in the Taking Clause, imposes a quasi-con-
tractual duty79 on the state to pay for all "disproportionate"
publicly-inflicted sacrifice, direct or regulatory, where "jus-
tice and fairness" require." But there things have stayed. In
traordinary injunctive relief or, failing that, through civil disobedience tria-
ble before a criminal jury; compensable liberties, before a Seventh Amend-
ment jury. Such compensable liberties would include expectations bearing
no relation to physical objects, but arising as quasi-contractual rights based
on reasonable, detrimental reliance on the implied terms of the social con-
tract. The central issue of whether the individual's reliance on the previous
apparent state of the law was sufficiently reasonable and detrimental to
warrant compensation would ultimately rest with the jury.
As an example of an unjust regulation which was inconsistent with
"property in the general sense of the word," as well as being destructive of
"the means of acquiring property strictly so called," Madison impugned
the "spirit of legislation where a manufacturer of linen cloth is forbidden
to bury his own child in a linen shroud, in order to favour his neighbor
who manufactures woolen cloth. ... Id. at 267. This is doubtless a con-
scious and critical echo of the apologetic Blackstone, who defended
the statute of King Charles II, which prescribes . . . a dress for
the dead, who are all ordered to be buried in woolen . . . [as] a
law consistent with public liberty; for it encourages the staple
trade, on which in great measure depends the universal good of
the nation.
2 TUCKER'S BLACKSTONE 126 (1 BI. *126) (1803).
78. Michelman, supra note 4, at 1171.
79. See, e.g., Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 16 (1933) ("[T]he
right to recover just compensation . . .rest[s] upon the Fifth Amendment.
Statutory recognition is not necessary. A promise to pay was not necessary.
Such a promise was implied because of the duty to pay imposed by the
Amendment"), cited in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego,
450 U.S. 621, 654-55 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
80. See, e.g., Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)
("[T]he Fifth Amendment's guarantee [is] designed to bar Government
from forcing some people alone to bear burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole"), cited in PruneYard
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practice, the Court has abdicated 'any serious responsibility
for applying and refining the principle over time.81 Instead,
with regard to what should be the judicial question of the as
applied fairness of a regulation, involving "essentially ad hoc,
factual inquiries"82 into "the particular circumstances of each
case," 83 it has again "adopted as its watchword 'deference' to
the legislative judgment.18 4 This article advances a straight-
forward procedural diagnosis and cure for the Court's failure
to carry through with the Holmesian compromise, a failure
which is symbolized by the current ethical bankruptcy of fed-
eral Taking Clause doctrine. 85 To paraphrase Jefferson, the
problem has been the refusal of the Supreme Court to place
the ultimate administration of the equitable principle of un-
reasonably disproportionate or unfair regulatory sacrifice
"within the pale of [Seventh Amendment] juries. ' 86
F. Moral and Institutional Burdens of Appellate Review.
Without a jury to fall back on, the open-ended standard
of inequitable or unreasonable sacrifice,87 like the "reasona-
bleness" standard in torts, requires great self-confidence on
the part of a judge if he is to assert and stand by his own
subjective, outcome-determinative views-especially where
they would impose liability on the fisc. 88 Holmes was such a
jurist. An arch-antiformalist, he embraced the juridical neces-
sity for qualitative judgments; and he affirmatively did not
want a jury drawing difficult moral lines for him. If need be,
he was prepared personally to shoulder the Mahon responsi-
Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82-83 (1980).
81. See, e.g., Krier, The Regulation Machine, 1 SuP. CT. Ec. REV. 1, 5-8
(1982).
82. See, e.g., Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.
104, 124 (1978); Kaiser-Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979);
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980).
83. See, e.g., United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 156 (1952);
United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958).
84. See Epstein, supra note 12, at 355.
85. Krier, supra note 81, at 4.
86. VI T. JEFFERSON, THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 66 (Wash-
ington ed. 1861).
87. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,
(1978) ("[Tlhis Court . . . has been unable to develop any 'set formula' for
determining when 'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries
caused by public action be compensated by the Government, rather than
remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons. See Goldblatt v.
Hemptead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962).")
88. Cf Epstein, supra note 12, at 355.
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bility of deciding what regulations went "too far," just as he
insisted in the First Amendment area on treating the issue of
"clear and present danger" as ultimately a question of law,
turning on the totality of the individual circumstances.
The modern Court is perhaps commendably less sure of
itself. Consequently, in the Taking Clause context, as Profes-
sor Epstein has noted, "if there are no fixed rules to guide
inquiry, the upshot will be judicial deference, if not to the
jury then to the legislature and its administrative offspring. '"89
To avoid the fateful combination of judicial deference to
"the legislature and its administrative offspring" at both the
facial and as applied levels of inquiry, Epstein, giving no seri-
ous thought to the jury alternative, would inject "fixed rules"
back into the equation to produce a more structured inquiry,
one designed to give judges the intellectual tools and confi-
dence to invalidate more regulations.9" This article does not
dispute Epstein's call for a more rigorous theory of the Tak-
ing Clause, one which develops Holmes' balancing formula in
Mahon into a three-pronged inquiry91 along the lines sug-
89. See Epstein, supra note 12, at 355.
90. Id. at 356.
91. The author rejects for two reasons the omitted fourth part of
Epstein's inquiry, which seeks to breathe new life into the "public purpose"
doctrine. Id. at 365-369. First, he accepts the principled foundations of the
compromise with its rejection of specific relief and correlative emphasis on
breathing new life into the doctrine of "just compensation" instead.
Therein lies the true opportunity for surrogate "public purpose" protec-
tion. If compensation rules were revised in accordance with the present
thesis, a jury would be allowed to compute and compensate the claimant's
reasonable subjective harm (over and above loss of market value) in being
forced to give up his property or "liberties." Cf Harris, Ogus, & Phillips,
Contract Remedies and the Consumer Surplus, 95 L. Q. REV. 581, 601-04
(1979). In an analogous setting, Professor Ellickson has referred to this ele-
ment of harm as the claimants' "common nonfungible consumer surplus."
Ellickson, supra note 11, at 735-37. And for evidence that concern over
the current noncompensability of consumer surplus actually motivates
those few judges who still insist on a "public purpose" doctrine with teeth,
see Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616,
682-83, 304 N.W.2d 455, 481 (1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting):
But more important, [eminent domain] can entail, as it did in this
case, intangible losses, such as severance of personal attachments
to one's domicile and neighborhood and the destruction of an or-
ganic community of a most unique and irreplaceable character.
Secondly, as the recent unanimous decision in Hawaii Housing Authority
v. Midkiff, 104 S.Ct. 2321 (1984), confirms, "public purpose" is simply no
longer a subject for fruitful debate in a post-Lochner universe of discourse.
But see Epstein, Asleep at a Constitutional Switch, WALL ST. J., Aug. 9, 1984,
at 28, col. 3.
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gested by Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Penn Central Trans-
portation Co. v. New York City.9 But Epstein's solution is im-
pugned by his own earlier analysis. His three concrete
tests-which translate roughly as (i) whether the claimant
had a "legitimate" economic expectation under the pre-ex-
isting state of the law that has been injured, and if so, (ii)
whether a "sufficient threat" to a general public interest ex-
ists to warrant the degree of individual sacrifice imposed, and
if not, (iii) to what extent has the "unjustified portion" of the
sacrifice been offset through implicit "in-kind benefits" from
the operation of the statutory scheme-are each ideally
suited to application by a jury.9 From the standpoint of the
Court itself however, they each barely conceal an irreducible
and unacceptable core of unwelcome discretion.
G. The Demise of Equity.
Given the moral and institutional burden of exercising
such discretion on a case-by-case basis at the appellate level,
the modern Court has already demonstrated that it does not
consider itself bound by Mahon's high judicial duty of ad hoc
inquiry. Nor is this institutional reluctance to balance the eq-
uities necessarily the reflection of traditional sovereign immu-
nity concerns. For example, Justice Brennan has championed
the provision of an inverse condemnation remedy against lo-
cal governments under § 1983, a remedy he would likewise
extend against the states themselves under either § 1983 (and
its jurisdictional analogue) or § 1331(a). 4 Yet with Brennan
in the lead, the Court has sought refuge from Mahon's bal-
92. 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See note 11,
supra.
93. Briefly canvassed, the first criterion arguably embodies a central
element of estoppel. Did the prior state of the law reasonably induce the
claimant to take or forgo actions, that in turn have generated expectational
interests that should be deemed "property" for Taking Clause purposes.
Cf Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 125. Law courts have long since taken over
the principle of estoppel from equity and consigned the ultimate mixed
question to juries. (Despite precedent to the contrary in the area of express
contractual dealing with the government, this article contends that estop-
pel should be a lively principle for governmental liability under the social
contract.) The second criterion is similar to the nuisance law "neighborli-
ness" principle of sic utere tuo .... also a formidable redoubt of jury
equity.
The final criterion is based on computation of net damages, another his-
toric preserve of the jury.
94. See, e.g., Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 349 n.1 (1979) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting).
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ancing test in the safety and convenience of wooden, formal-
istic rules.9" And, as if to add insult to injury, Justice Brennan
persists in misreading the facts of Mahon as involving a "com-
plete destruction" of the reserved mineral estate,9" rather
than the actual one-third loss in value. 7 As a result, he is able
to adduce Mahon itself as support for a thoroughly unsatisfy-
ing reading of the Taking Clause that says, short of a physical
invasion, only a governmental regulation or activity which
entails the "total destruction of value''" or "complete
depriv[ation] . . . of all or most [of one's property]"99 should
be deemed sufficiently disproportionate to rank as an inequity
of constitutional magnitude. 00 In a situation where a genuine
constitutional need for as applied equity exists, the Court has
incongruously replied in terms of "the ideal of an impersonal
justice identical for all." ' '1 Facially neutral rules of law have
their place, but it is hard to justify their use to implement the
broad remedial principles of "justice and fairness" said to un-
derlie the Taking Clause. Rather, as later sections will ex-
plore, the approach being taken by the Court may be said to
be a natural outgrowth of nineteenth century formalism, a
doctrine which has encouraged courts in the direction of the
"final and complete emasculation of Equity as an indepen-
dent source of legal standards."'0 2
H. Efficiency Concerns.
Of course, more concrete reasons exist why the Supreme
Court has rejected any serious role in taking disputes for ju-
dicial equity and embraced bureaucratic equity in-
95. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104
(1978).
96. Id. at 121.
97. See Mahon v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 274 Pa. 489, 511 (1922)
(Kephart, dissenting), affd 260 U.S. 393, 395 (1922).
98. Penn Central Transportation Co., 438 U.S. at 127.
99. San Diego Gas 450 U.S. at 653 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
100. Cf Note, Reexamining the Supreme Court's View of the Taking
Clause, 58 TEX. L. REV. 1447, (1980):
Since Pennsylvania Coal, the Court has perceived Holmes' test as
consistent with fairness, but too burdensome on government.
Thus, the Court has self-indulgently applied the Pumpelly/Mugler
["appropriation/physical invasion"] test without openly disavow-
ing the Holmes approach.
101. Michelman, supra note 4, at 1170.
102. M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 1780-.
1860, 265 (1977).
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stead-reasons other than the general institutional burden of
fatigue and moral diffidence, that is. A specific political bur-
den tempts the Court to employ latitudinarian, bright line
rules of appellate review, glossed over by the cavalier assump-
tion that the fact-finder below has fully and fairly balanced
the equities between the state and the citizen despite clear
evidence of immoderate deference to the legislature or rote
adoption of administrative findings.' In short, the modern
Court has decided sub silentio that regulatory taking disputes,
given the latent public policy issue of curbing widespread fis-
cal liability and runaway litigation expenses, are not justicia-
ble after all-except within broad arbitrary limits involving
the presence of a physical trepass or a total destruction of
value. Rather, they are to be treated as quasi-legislative mat-
ters, involving a political trade-off between efficiency, fair-
ness, and the government's ability to afford both.
But that concern seems definitively misplaced. After all,
at this point we are only talking about the government's lia-
bility for continuing "torts" which it has in effect voluntarily
assumed through ratification and it can always turn off like a
spigot. Furthermore, though justice precedes generosity,
Congress itself has gratuitously accepted liability for a truly
unpredictable category of accidental harms under the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act.'
04
In any case, the Court's conclusion is unwarranted in
principle. A direct parallel exists between the problems of
limiting governmental exposure for intangible regulatory
103. In Penn Central the Court put great emphasis on the fact that in
the instant case-as in past cases--"a state [appellate] tribunal reasonably
concluded that 'the health, safety, morals, or general welfare' will be pro-
moted by prohibiting particular contemplated uses of land" and that as a
result any destruction of or adverse affect upon "recognized property in-
terests" was justified. 438 U.S. at 125. But as the Supreme Court acknowl-
edged, the New York Court of Appeals reached that conclusion by re-
jecting the fact findings of the trial court and employing the clearly
erroneous rule of law that an intangible regulatory harm can never amount
to a taking. Id. at 120-21.
104. See 28 U.S.C. §§2671-80 (1970). Of course, 28 U.S.C. §2680(a)
(1970), the so-called "discretionary function" exception, excludes from
coverage "any claim ... based upon the exercise or performance of or the
failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part
of a federal agency or employee of the Government, whether or not the
discretion is abused." While this exception is assumed to apply to the con-
tinuing constitutional "torts" under discussion, as Justice Brennan has
noted in a similar context, "[a governmental entity] has no 'discretion' to
violate the Federal Constitution. ... Owen v. City of Independence, 445
U.S. 622, 649 (1980).
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harm and containing the costs of government-sponsored air-
port and airplane noise and vibrations. And, not surprisingly,
in the latter context the Supreme Court has taken an identi-
cal stand. Focusing on the issue of physical invasion, its doc-
trine renders precisely the same harm to two individuals on
the ground actionable or not depending on a mere technical-
ity like the angle of overflight. 10 5 Nonetheless, a dissentient
view more in harmony with our constitutional principles has
emerged out of this cacophonous setting. That view holds
that inability to compensate the entire class of those non-
trespassorily and incompletely injured is no sufficient consti-
tutional reason why none should be.'06 Rather it asserts that
the as applied fairness of governmental nuisances must re-
main emphatically a judicial question, just as suggested by the
compromise. Accordingly, in the case of both real and regu-
latory nuisances perpetrated by the government, a judicial
fact-finder should determine on a case-by-case basis whether
the individual harm is sufficiently "direct and peculiar and
substantial" to warrant compensation. 107
To be sure, that equitable determination will involve
many substantive factors, such as those suggested by Rehn-
quist and Epstein-including no doubt one based on the gen-
eral inefficiency of compensating certain reasonably de
minimis levels of harm given the disproportionately high (and
"wasted") cost of identifying, adjudicating, and paying each
individual claim.'0 8 Unfortunately, being unable or unwilling
itself to make such ad hoc equitable differentiations among
members of the class, the Supreme Court has denied as well
any constitutional imperative to see that the task devolve on a
105. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); Griggs v. Alle-
gheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
106. See, e.g., Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580, (9th Cir. 1962)
(Murrah, C.J., dissenting) cert. denied, 371 U.S. 955 (1963); Thornburg v.
City of Portland, 233 Ore. 178, 176 P.2d 100 (1962).
107. Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546 (1914). Cf
L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at §9-3, 460 n.2 (1978). This requirement of a
showing of "substantial" harm, should automatically winnow out trivial
claimants from among the class of those nontrespassorily and incompletely
harmed; and the actual "substantial" threshold will ultimately be set by the
jury at the point where the redistributive impact can no longer justly be
ignored in the name of efficiency. See Ellickson, supra note 11, at 773.
108. The thesis of this article is consistent with use of streamlined
administrative procedures. And conditioning any right to appeal to a jury
on payment of the state's attorneys' fees in the event of a less favorable
verdict, coupled with the general cost of litigation, should go a long way
towards protecting the fisc against frivolous and "inefficient" litigation.
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more suitable judicial institution. Of course, the central thesis
of this article holds that in all difficult cases involving the as
applied fairness of regulatory conduct, regardless of what ju-
dicial standard are devised to structure the inquiry, a claim-
ant enjoys an ultimate right to have a disinterested public law
jury decide the underlying mixed question of law and fact.
Pursuit of that proposal requires a brief look at the technical
excuses the Court has given for shirking its own ostensible
Mahon duty.
I. Mixed Constitutional Questions.
There was, it turns out, an unfortunate aspect to the sug-
gested Holmesian compromise of throwing brer legislature
into the briar patch-a dark side, so to speak. Since the as
applied fairness of regulations is a mixed question of law and
fact, the Mahon standard of constitutional review, if it was to
stand up against potentially sycophantic or self-serving find-
ings of fact by legislative agencies or commissions, required
the Court to take one of two approaches. Either it could
adopt a strict legal standard capable of mechanical applica-
tion to the undisputed historical facts found below, or it
could stick by its necessarily open-ended standard of unrea-
sonable sacrifice and assert an Article III power of de novo
fact-finding as to the mixed constitutional question. As of
1922 Mahon arguably did neither. For at least until the 1928
abolition of the Writ of Error procedure, 0 9 which had lim-
ited the Court's appellate jurisdiction strictly to matters of
law, Holmes would have agreed with Brandeis that applica-
tions of the formula-less Mahon standard were essentially un-
reviewable.110 Absent fraud or willful misconduct, the admin-
istrative fact-finder need only pay lip service to the vague
standard. Since its actual application required "the exercise
of a sound and reasonable judgment upon a proper consider-
ation of all relevant facts,""' any result could be aptly char-
acterized as a pure matter of fact for Writ of Error purposes.
Even with the institution in 1928 of federal "appeals"
extending to the facts of cases, Holmes agreed with Brandeis'
109. See, e.g., R. WOLFSON AND P. KURLAND, JURISDICTION OF THE SU-
PREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES § 104 (1951).
110. Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287,
293, 298-99 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting, joined by Holmes, J.).
111. Id. (quoting Ben Avon Boro v. Ohio Valley Water Co., 260 Pa.
St. 289, 309 (1918)). See also Kentucky Rd. Tax Cases, 115 U.S. 321, 335
(1885).
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minority position that individual as applied attacks, which of
course do not really implicate the facial validity of statutes,
i.e., the'power of state to enact them at all, should be deemed
to fall within the Court's certiorari rather than its mandatory
and overburdened appellate jurisdiction, the latter being
properly reserved for cases of "general public impor-
tance." '112 The former, like the Writ of Error procedure, ex-
cluded all factual issues on review of administrative actions
save those concerning "excess of jurisdiction." At bottom,
Brandeis simply did not believe that the precious appellate
time and mission of the Court should be frittered away "as-
suring individual rights" on an ad hoc basis.1 13
Nonetheless, after the abolition of the formalistic Writ of
Error procedure, it is difficult to imagine that the self-confi-
dent Holmes would any longer have disputed the practical
conclusion reached by Chief Justice Hughes (the author of
Blaisdell) as to an appellate matter properly before the Court:
[T]he [Article III] judicial ...power necessarily extends to
the independent determination of all questions, both of fact
and law, necessary to the performance of that supreme
function [of constitutional review]. The case of confiscation
is illustrative, the ultimate conclusion almost invariably de-
pending upon the decisions of questions of fact. 4
So it fell to Brandeis alone to counter Hughes' logic with a
practical anomaly. He invoked the historically dubious public
right/private right dichotomy first articulated in 1856 in
Murray's Lessee.? 5 There Justice Curtis insisted that as of
1791, the year the Fifth Amendment was ratified, it was as-
sumed that in certain urgent public law matters, such as tax
collection, the legislative and executive branches could pro-
vide adequate predeprivation due process. 1 This much was
unexceptionable, but in a critical dictum Curtis also asserted
112. John P. King Mfg. Co. v. City Council of Augusta, 277 U.S.
100, 109-13 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting, joined by Holmes, J.). Cf
Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bordurant, 257 U.S. 282, 289 (1921) (Bran-
deis, J., dissenting).
113. See 16 WRIGHT, MILLER, COOPER AND GRESSMAN, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE §4015, 650 (1977). Cf Rescue Army v. Municipal
Court, 331 U.S. 549, 571 (1947).
114. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 60-61 (1932).
115. St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. at 38, 78-
81 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
116. See Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59
U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).
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that after any such privileged deprivation the state could both
refuse to furnish any postdeprivation judicial remedy against
itself and immunize the officials involved against any private
damage action, absent excess of authority. Thus, as a result
of prior extensions of Murray's Lessee, Brandeis was in a posi-
tion to refute Hughes' assertion of a judicial duty of indepen-
dent fact-finding by simply noting that even in a straight tak-
ing case, where the constitutionality of the governmental
action clearly depended on just compensation being paid,
Congress has been permitted to commit conclusive ascertain-
ment of the quantum of damages to administrative commis-
sions or tribunals. 1 7
J. Hoist By Its Own Petard.
But what is most significant is that Brandeis, in his influ-
ential concurrence in St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United
States,118 did not defend the continued finality of administra-
tive fact-finding in public law matters on the basis of the his-
torical arguments in Murray's Lessee, arguments from which
the majority was so clearly backing away. For example,
Hughes had impugned the historical soundness of Curtis' dic-
tum since it would tend to
establish a government of bureaucratic character alien to
our system, whenever fundamental rights depend, as not in-
frequently they do depend, upon the facts, and finality as to
facts becomes in effect finality in law. 1 9
Rather Brandeis defended administrative determinations of
constitutional fact on two competing policy grounds.
First, there was the perennial argument that a require-
ment of de novo Article III fact-finding would intolerably bur-
den the federal courts. 20 More especially, however, Brandeis
repeatedly invoked the reductio ad absurdum of the Seventh
Amendment to justify Curtis' conclusion. 21 After all, even if
the majority were correct about the need for judicial fact-
finding in public law disputes implicating constitutional
rights, what was to keep Congress and the states from confer-
ring such responsibility on "a jury of inexperienced layman,"
117. See, e.g., Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 376 (1875);
Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 593 (1897).
118. St. Joseph Stock Yards, 298 U.S. at 78-81.
119. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. at 57.
120. 298 U.S. at 81.
121. Id. at 73, 78-81.
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whose findings would themselves be effectively sheltered
from judicial review by the second clause of the Seventh
Amendment?'22 Indeed, that was the basic lesson taught by
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. v. Chicago' (though Bran-
deis did not mention it). There the bold fact that the Court
at long last extended the Taking Clause guarantee against
the states had arguably been eclipsed by the legislature's sim-
ple expedient of entrusting the ultimate issue of just compen-
sation to a jury. Its essentially unreviewable verdict was for
one dollar. And so Brandeis asserted that the Constitution it-
self erected the ultimate barrier against Hughes' ideal of
-supremacy of the law" being anything more grandiose in
practice than making sure the accredited local fact-finder
pays lip service to the applicable federal rule or standard.'
In conclusion, Brandeis asked why, if the Constitution was
content to leave the finding of facts in judicial proceedings
largely to mere laymen, Congress and the states should be
debarred from according the same conclusive weight to find-
ings of an "expert agency"?'
A deeply ironic element of historical deja vu surrounds
Brandeis' rhetorical question. Well before writs of certiorari
and other means of direct appellate review were utilized, ju-
dicial review of administrative actions in England took the
form of collateral attack through common law actions of tres-
pass, trover, and replevin against the officials involved. 6 For
example, the historic Dr. Bonham's Case involved a trespass
action for false imprisonment against the Royal College of
Physicians and Surgeons. Most importantly, in such damage
actions the underlying administrative findings of fact (such as
the conclusion that Dr. Bonham was guilty of malpractice)
were traversable before the jury, even though the officials
had been expressly granted discretionary authority to decide
such facts.'27 This libertarian procedure, designed to vindi-
cate due process of law (i.e., the supremacy of common law
procedures) over the bureaucratic innovations of Bacon et
122. Id. at 73.
123. 166 U.S. 226, 242 (1897).
124. Brandeis' point was more telling then than now, since today fed-
eral trial courts enjoy undisputed authority to direct civil verdicts.
125. St. Joseph Stock Yards 298 U.S. at 81.
126. See, e.g., Jaffe, Judicial Review: Constitutional and Jurisdictional
Fact, 70 HARV. L. REV. 953, 953-55 (1957).
127. See Dr. Bonham's Case, 8 Coke 114, 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (C.P.
1610). See also Rooke's Case, 5 Coke 99b, 77 Eng. Rep. 209 (C.P. 1598).
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al., 12 bore the apparent impress of Chief Justice Coke's af-
fection for the jury.'2"
In the period 1680-1700, however, with the growing as-
cendancy of Parliament, English courts began to impose on
such collateral attacks the doctrine of "jurisdictional fact,"
previously used to circumscribe the scope of direct appellate
review of legislative courts.'3 0 As a result, so long as adminis-
trative judges stayed within the ambit of their statutory dis-
cretion, the common law jury lost its former right to second
guess the accuracy and fairness of their findings at least tech-
nically speaking."' In short, King's Bench acquiesced in the
power of Parliament to confer on legislative courts the right
to make factual mistakes and perpetrate inequities, all in the
name of equitable discretion.
In order to reach that conclusion in the classical 1700
case of Groenvelt v. Burwell,"3 2 however, Lord Chief Justice
Holt first had to distinguish Coke's opinion in Dr. Bonham's
Case. He did so on the basis that the censors of the Royal
College, the administrators involved in both cases, had in fact
been granted valid judicial powers by Parliament.'3 Then,
anticipating Brandeis in St. Joseph Stock Yards, Holt con-
structed a perverse syllogism, taking as his major premise the
conceded non-reviewability of mistaken findings - of fact by
common law jurors.'" From there it was a short, dubious
step to the conclusion that mistaken findings by nontradi-
tional judicial fact-finders should be deemed similarly
128. See Jaffe, The Right to Judicial Retiew I, 71 HARv. L. REV. 401,
403 (1958).
129. A more technical, less romantic, explanation for Coke's allow-
ance of a retrial of administrative findings before a jury lies in the fact that
until the availability of certiorari was established in 1700 no "appellate"
review over agency decisions was available. See, e.g., Jaffe, Judicial Review:
Constitutional and Jurisdictional Fact, 70 HARv. L. REV. 953, 956 n.11
(1957).
130. Id. at 955-56. See, e.g., Terry v. Huntington, 145 Eng. Rep. 557
(Ex. 1680) (an action of trover for goods levied on to satisfy an excise on
wine assessed by the Commissioners of Excise).
131. Subsequently, it would appear that jurors often stretched the
concept of ultra vires to cover findings of general administrative unfairness,
precipitating a nineteenth century appellate crackdown.
132. 91 Eng. Rep. 1202 (K.B. 1700) (Holt, L.C.J.).
133. Id. at 1211. Coke had maintained that the censors "are not
made judges, nor a Court given them, but have an authority only ......
Dr. Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 657.
134. 91 Eng. Rep. at 1212-13. The unreviewability of criminal ver-
dicts by collateral contempt proceeding was formally established by Bushel's
Case in 1670.
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conclusive:
By this statute the original power of the jury at common
law being vested in censors, [their verdict] is equally
peremptory.135
The modern irony of course is that Holt's omnipotent
Parliament labored under nothing comparable to the Article
III or Seventh Amendment constraints of the U.S. Constitu-
tion, which proscribe the diversion of judicial power to non-
Article III institutions, not to mention the shifting of discre-
tionary common law fact-finding to non-jurors. Otherwise,
Groenvelt could not so easily have been written. Nonetheless,
Brandeis just as facilely converted the hard-won constitu-
tional prerogative of Article III jurors to make essentially un-
reviewable findings of fact in favor of individual liberty into
the concededly nonjudicial right of administrators to "fudge
the facts" ' in favor of the state. Besides the historical smoke
and mirrors of Murray's Lessee, Brandeis achieved his feat of
legal legerdemain by successfully insinuating that Seventh
Amendment jurors are mere "lay" adjuncts in the Article III
process, who do not share in essential Article III judicial
powers.
The section that follows represents an argumentative re-
sponse to Brandeis' rhetorical question in St. Joseph Stock
Yards, asserting the constitutional transitivity of "lay" and
"expert" fact-finders. It musters history and policy to support
an antithetical reading of the Seventh Amendment as guaran-
teeing an independent-minded Article III jury especially in
public law cases (and hence as justifying wholesale deference
135. Id. at 1213. This argument was prefigured by counsel in Terry
v. Huntington, 145 Eng. Rep. 557, 558 (Ex. 1680).
136. This is a paraphrase of Judge Frank's famous effort at de-
bunking the "myth" of the jury as conscious dispensers of democratic eq-
uity, in which he denied that jurors possessed the requisite sophistication to
tailor their findings of facts in order to reach the desired legal result-a
sophistication rendered unnecessary by the general verdict. On the other
hand, Frank would doubtless have had to concede both the logical need
and capacity for such "serpentine wisdom" on the part of expert agencies:
It is said that juries often do not find the facts in accordance with
the evidence, but distort-or "fudge"-the facts, and find them
in such a manner that (by applying the legal rules laid down by the
judge to the facts thus deliberately misfound) the jury is able to
produce the result which it desires, in favor of one party or the
other. "The facts," we are told, "are found in order to reach the
result."
J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 110-11 (1949).
19851
JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY
to findings of "constitutional fact" by state appellate courts
only where they are adopting mixed findings made by a jury).
K. The Status Quo.
In the meantime the Court has adopted Brandeis' argu-
ment in St. Joseph Stock Yards, halted its retreat from Murray's
Lessee, and thereby eliminated the last vestige of the posited
Holmesian compromise. Thus did Brandeis convert his solo
dissent in Mahon into the defacto position of the Court by way
of the procedural back door. The vague Mahon standard of
unjust or unreasonable sacrifice was entrusted to the tender
mercies of the accredited administrative or juryless judicial
fact-finder, which now need only review the relevant circum-
stances, pay lip service to the correct "rule of law," and find
the constitutional facts so as to reach the politically expedient
result.'
Equally disturbing is the inference drawn by the accred-
ited fact-finders from the Supreme Court's lax standard of
review as to the diminutive constitutional status of individual
equity, an inference that is not necessarily inaccurate. 138 The
137. See Federal Power Company v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S.
591, 602 (1944) (Douglas, J.), which made the standard for confiscation in
rate-making cases whether "the total effect of the rate order [is] unjust or
unreasonable," rather than compliance with any fixed standards of law.
Since virtually any mixed finding will be fairly debatable, given the multi-
plicity of facts, the administrative process is essentially shielded from
review.
138. See, e.g., Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 516, 517, 528
(1944) (Douglas, J.) (an unsuccessful "facial attack" by a landlord on the
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 which required the Administrator to
promulgate rates that were merely "generally fair and equitable"). Finding
"considerations of feasibility and practicability . . . germane to the consti-
tutional issue," the Court held that Congress could decide to authorize a
general rate schedule, even though as applied to a particular landlord it
might be unfair and inequitable, especially since in wartime the manpower
for ad hoc determinations was limited. Id. at 517, 520-21. In addition, any
individual harm to a landlord's "fair return" was balanced in equal protec-
tion terms by the widespread uncompensated losses, including lives, being
exacted by government in wartime. Id. at 519. (On the "equal protection"
dimensions of the Taking Clause, see note 4 supra. Again, however, these
observations were strictly dicta insofar as they implied anything about Mrs.
Willingham's future ability to contest the inequity of the imposed rates in a
post-deprivation as applied attack.
Yet Justice Brennan, following the surface logic of Bowles, does appar-
ently condone individual regulatory inequities short of the physical inva-
sion/total destruction of value threshold, even in the context of an as ap-
plied attack, so long as they stem from changes in the "general law"
adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the com-
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contrary inference, supported by this article, is that the
Court's deferential physical invasion/total destruction of
value standard represents merely an appellate rule, born of
its own institutional position, which both presupposes and re-
quires that lower courts in fact fully and fairly balance the
equities. With the statutory Writ, of Error eliminated, this
policy of continued deference to non-jury factfinders (espe-
cially in the economic area) can only reflect some combina-
tion of (1) federalism principles concerning the line dividing
matters of exclusively state and local concern and those fed-
eral rights of which the Supreme Court must be the ultimate
arbiter or analogous separation-of-powers principles and (2)
prudential institutional principles of "sound appellate prac-
tice." The latter pertain to the Court's need to conserve its
energy in its hierarchial role as the promulgator of general
federal standards, rather than fritter it away as a trier of
fact;139 hence they actually support a more responsible fact-
finding role for lower courts (and by extension for juries).
But it is easy for the two sets of principles to become con-
founded. As a result, the Court may conclude - or appear to
those same lower courts to conclude - that U.S. Constitu-
tional guarantees themselves are merely intended to restrict
governmental action within broad, general parameters, so
that less easily categorizable statutory wrongs, which turn on
the particular facts of how a statute is applied, are (in Bran-
deis' phraseology) of "trifling [federal] significance." ' "0 Yet,
mon good"-war or no war. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. Cf Usery v.
Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976). There is in all this, of
course, a conscious echo of Holmes' opinion for the court in Bi-Metallic
Investment Co, v. State Board of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915), in
which the property assessments in an entire county were raised by forty
percent. Affirming the tax against a facial attack, given the impracticability
of a predeprivation hearing, Holmes wrote:
General statutes within the state power are passed that affect the
person or property of individuals, sometimes to the point of ruin,
without giving them a chance to be heard. Their rights are pro-
tected in the only way that they can be in a complex society, by
their power, immediate or remote, over those who make the rule.
Id. at 445. But Holmes, unlike Brennan, is not disparaging the right of
individualized redress. Rather he expressly presumes that each owner al-
ready possessed the truly important right under prior decisions to contest
the assessed valuation of their individual parcels, against which the new
uniform rate would be applied. Id. at 444.
139. See Note, Supreme Court Review of State Findings of Fact in Four-
teenth Amendment Cases, 14 STAN L. REV. 328 (1962); 16 WRIGHT, MILLER,
COOPER, & GRESSMAN, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4033 (1977).
140. John P. King Mfg. Co. v. City Council of Augusta, 277 U.S.
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as Brandeis himself later acknowledged, 4 ' the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment do render the as applied fairness of
governmental regulations a federal question of fundamental
importance. And so, too, as a consequence is the identity of
the all-important dispenser of federal constitutional equity.
II. THE THESIS: A SEVENTH AMENDMENT PUBLIC LAW JURY
The Seventh Amendment to the federal Constitution,
which provides that "the right of trial by jury shall be pre-
served' ' 4 2 in all common law actions involving more than
$20., appears to have been something of a popular ark of the
covenant-one of the most sought-after provision in the Bill
of Rights. 4 s Indeed, first mention of the need for a Bill of
Rights in the Philadelphia Convention centered on the lack
of a civil jury guarantee."' And thereafter opponents of the
Constitution continually railed against this deficiency, the sit-
uation having been gravely compounded in their view by the
decision to confer appellate jurisdiction on the Supreme
Court "both as to law and facts."' " That jurisdictional grant,
they feared, would enable the Court to nullify the essential
virtue of the civil jury they were demanding, i.e., its ability to
render an unreviewable general verdict on all mixed ques-
tions of law and fact. Justice Story records that these objec-
tions, which were "pressed with . . . urgency and zeal,"" 6
100, 115 (1928) (Brandeis, J. dissenting). Cf Telluride Power Transmission
Co. v. Rio Grande Western Ry., 175 U.S. 639, 645-46, 647 (1880).
141. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405 (1935).
142. In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be pre-
served, and no fact tried by jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in
any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the
common law.
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
143. See, e.g., Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amend-
ment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639, 688-89 (1973).
144. Id. at 657-661. Guarantees of a civil jury and freedom of the
press were the two principal "rights" emphasized by Antifederalists and
Federalists alike in demanding a bill of rights. See, e.g., J. MAIN, THE ANTI-
FEDERALISTS 160-62 (1961). As one commentator has noted, the absense of
the former "was lamented by nearly everyone who commented in any de-
tail on the Constitution." Id. at 160. And it is arguable that the latter was
directly linked in many minds to the problem of safeguarding the preroga-
tives of the criminal jury.
145. Id. at 673 n.89. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, No. 81, at 488-
91 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton) [hereinafter cited as FEDERALIST
PAPERS].
146. III STORY, COMMENTARIES, supra note 24, at § 1757, 628.
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had such "a vast influence on popular opinion ' 147 that they
"well nigh prevent[ed] . . . ratification [of the Constitu-
tion]." 14 8 Moreover, they remained "one of the strongest
points of [continued] attack upon the [C]onstitution"' 49 until
the Seventh Amendment itself was ratified.
This section, drawing in part on those to follow, recon-
structs a general conceptual model of the civil jury that
would explain why it was pervasively viewed as the "bulwark
of Liberty"-"the very palladium of free government. 1 5'
The basic argument is that civil jury trails were prized by the
populace chiefly for their public law implications, that is, for
their utility in preventing possible oppression in tax suits,
condemnation proceedings, and other administrative actions
and, if necessary, in obtaining redress for consummated gov-
ernmental wrongs through collateral suits for damages
against officials. 51 In the latter regard, the important contro-
versy over the jurisdiction of the vice-admiralty courts dem-
onstrates that damage actions were used not merely to punish
executive misconduct but more often to make a dutiful offi-
cial the means of vicarious redress against his oppressive, but
immune principal-the sovereign legislature. 5 '
147. Id., § 1762, at 632.
148. Id., § 1757, at 628. Alexander Hamilton, having reached the
same conclusion, used THE FEDERALIST, No. 83 to persuade his fellow New
Yorkers that the lack of a civil jury guarantee in the proposed Constitution
was not the serious defect alleged:
The objection to the plan of the convention, which has met with
most success in this state, and perhaps in several of the other
states, is that relative to the want of a constitutional provision for the
trial by jury in civil cases.
FEDERALIST PAPERS, No. 83, supra note 145, at 495 (emphasis in original).
149. III STORY, COMMENTARIES, supra note 24, at § 1762, 633.
150. Federalist Papers, No. 83, at 562 (A. Hamilton). In the Virginia
ratification convention, for example, Patrick Henry rang all the changes on
this rhetorical theme, extolling variously the "transcendent excellency"
and "essentiality to the preservation of liberty" of this mode of trial. 3
ELLIOT, DEBATES, supra note 22 at 314, 324, 462, 583, 544. See also Wolf-
ram, supra note 143 at 670 and n. 85.
151. See, e.g., M. TACHAU, FEDERAL COURTS IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC
109 (1978); L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 204-22,
249 (1965); E. HENDERSON, FOUNDATIONS OF ENGLISH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
30, 32-35, (1963); Damsky v. Zavatt, 289 F.2d 46, 49-50 (2d Cir. 1971)
(Friendly, J.) (in 1791 an in personam action by the Crown to collect taxes
through the Court of Exchequer was a suit at common law in which the
right of jury trial existed). Cf Wolfram, supra note 143 at 705-708; The
Federalist No. 83, passim (A. Hamilton).
152. See, e.g., J. REID, IN A DEFIANT STANCE: THE CONDITIONS OF LAW
IN MASSACHUSETTS BAY, THE IRISH COMPARISON, AND THE COMING OF THE
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During the period 1787-91 executive immunity under
the common law, even for officials exercising a quasi-judicial
or discretionary authority, turned on a finding of reasonable-
ness. 1" This absence of any blanket immunity a la Murray's
Lessee guaranteed the civil jury a de facto opportunity to en-
gage in collateral review of the redistributive consequences of
legislative policy.'" Where an unjust statute was enforced,
the jury's right to decide all mixed questions of law and fact
would enable it effectively to ignore the judge's instruction
that the governing rule of law conferred immunity on the of-
ficial provided only certain facts were found to be true, i.e.,
that the official acted reasonably under the circumstances and
in good faith. 55 With this "higher" equitable power to find
AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1977) [hereinafter cited as Reid]. The critical par-
allel argument is that the dutiful official may be said to have taken his job
cum onere insofar as the citizen's common law right of action is concerned;
nonetheless, he enjoys a presumptive right of indemnity against the legisla-
ture, which will make a policy of paying if it wants to attract and keep the
best administrative personnel. See Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236,
255-56 (1845) (Story, J., dissenting). See also HART AND WESCHSLER, THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 332-33 (2d ed. 1972).
153. See, e.g., Jaffe, supra note 151, at 240.
154. Professor Jaffe has criticized the modern doctrine of official im-
munity, which looks only to the presence and value of discretion in admin-
istration without regard to the question whether the damage is of a sort
that should be compensated, on the basis of the critical historical insight
that:
[i]t forgets that the purpose of allowing actions against officers is
not primarily to assert the notion of official responsibility but to
find a conduit to the treasury in cases where there should be com-
pensation and where no other device is provided.
Id. at 249. Implicit in Jaffe's soft-pedaling the issue of executive discretion
is his assumption that exective officers asked to carry out legislative policies
can effectively bargain for indemnification against liability for good faith
actions. See id. at 245, 249.
155. The more technical side of the vice-admiralty courts contro-
versy involved the supposed conclusiveness of a decree of condemnation or
forfeiture from such a court in establishing "probable cause" for the
seizure and thus precluding subsequent legal action-and, more especially,
the attempt by Parliament in the infamous Sugar and Stamp Acts to invest
the vice-admiralty courts with the power to issue a special certificate of
probable cause conferring immunity from retaliatory damage suits if it
found the officers had acted in good faith, even though no decree of con-
demnation was forthcoming. See, e.g., C. UBBELORDE, THE VICE-ADMIRALTY
COURTS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 68 (1960). The use of such certifi-
cates (together with the trial of violations of the Acts of Trade in the vice-
admiralty court in Halifax, Nova Scotia, safely beyond the reach of a colo-
nial common law court's writ of prohibition, see E. AND H. MORGAN, THE
STAMP ACT CRISIS 39-40 (1962), induced John Adams to opine in 1765 that
the "most grevious innovation" wrought by the Stamp Act-even more
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any such law, along with its associated immunity rule, funda-
mentally unfair as applied to the facts at hand (and hence
void pro tanto), the quasi-civil or public law jury was instinc-
tively embraced by the people as a redoubt of popular sover-
eignty-a local counterweight to the danger of centralized
federal oppression, especially in the form of unreasonable ex-
cise taxes. But, as the infamous Sugar and Stamp Acts
proved, novel statutory conferrals of official immunity"6 em-
ploying only the lesser standard of "good faith" and authoriz-
ing courts to certify its presence as a matter of law, could be
used to keep a tax case out of the hands of a jury alto-
gether-denying the citizen even his post-deprivation remedy
at law against the revenue agent. After the Revolution some
American legislatures mimicked Parliament by experi-
menting with juryless revenue procedures of their own, such
as qui tam actions. Proponents of the Seventh Amendment,
therefore, viewed it as reaffirming-in the face of such
lapsed "English" practices, which had drawn even Black-
stone's fire167 -an ideal constitutional model predicated upon
dangerous than its threat to the "grand and fundamental principle" of no
taxation without representation-was "the essential change in the constitu-
tion of juries." J. ADAMS, THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN ADAMS 23-24
(G. Peek, Jr. ed. 1954).
156. Even in the darkest hours of Stuart absolutism, the doctrine of
the civil irresponsibility of the sovereign-captured in the aphrorism "the
King can do no wrong"-concededly entailed the corollary "neither can
He authorize any wrong." As a result, for every act of the King necessarily
carried out through others some ministers or officer was always legally an-
swerable. See, e.g., 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 463-469
(5th Ed. 1942); 6 Ibid. 226-267. Cf. III W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*225 (1768):
But injuries to the rights of property can scarcely be committed by
the crown without the intervention of it's [sic] officers; for whom
the law in matters of right entertains no respect or delicacy, but
furnishes various methods of detecting the errors or misconduct
of the agents, by whom [it is piously assumed] the King has been
deceived, and induced to do a temporary injustice.
157. [Tlhe liberties of England cannot but subsist as long as this
palladium remains sacred and inviolate; not only from all open at-
tacks (which none will be so hardly as to make), but also from all
secret machinations, which may sap and undermine it; by intro-
ducing new and arbitrary method of trial; by justices of the peace,
commissioners of the revenue, and courts of conscience. And however
convenient these may appear at first (as doubtless all arbitrary
powers, well executed, are most convenient), yet let it again be
remembered that delays and little inconveniences in the forms of
justice, are the price that all free nations must pay for their liberty
in more substantial matters; that these inroads upon this sacred
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a citizen's ultimate right to have a jury decide the facts and
review the basic fairness of the applicable law in all cases directly
or indirectly pitting him against the state.
Although the model revolves around the power of dis-
crete nullification normally associated with the criminal
jury, 58 compelling direct and circumstantial evidence exists
that this power informed the tacit orthodoxy of the quasi-
bulwark of the nation are fundamentally opposite to the spirit of
our constitution; and that, though begun in trifles, the precedent
may gradually increase and spread, to the utter disuse of juries in
questions of the most momentous concern.
IV W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES **349-50 (emphasis added). In his argu-
ment for the Crown in the -famous Writs of Assistance Case, Mr. Gridley
sought to justify general search warrants in customs cases on the basis that
they were not as "inconsistent with Eng. Rts. & liberties" as juryless tax
collection procedures; but both he argued were justified by necessity-
"the necessity of having public taxes effectively and speedily col-
lected [being] of infinitely greater moment to the whole, than the
Liberty of any Individual.
QUINCY'S REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND ADJUDGED IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF TURE OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY, BETWEEN 1761 AND 1772
469, 479-82 (1865). See M. SMITH, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASE 282-85
'(1978), suggesting the possibility that Gridley's heart was not in his
conclusion.
158. See, e.g., Howe, juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARV. L. REV.
582 (1930); Scheflin and Van Dyke, Jury Nullification: The Contours of a Con-
troversy, 43 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 51 (1980) Scheflin, Jury Nullification:
The Right to Say No, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 168 (1972); Van Kyke, The Jury as a
Political Institution, 16 CATH. L. REV. 224 (1970) and 3 THE CENTER MAGA-
ZINE 17 (No. 2, March-April 1970); Comment, The Changing Role of the Jury
in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE L. J. 170 (1954); Kershen, Vicinage, 29
OKLA. L. REV. 801 (1976) (Pts. I and II), 30 OKLA L. REV. 3 (1977) (Pts. III
and IV); Note, Jury Nullification: The Forgotten Right, 7 NEW ENG. L. REV.
105 (1971); Sperlich, Trial by Jury: It may Have a Future, 1978 SUP. CT. REV.
191; Note, Jury Nullification in Historical Perspective: Massachusetts as a Case
Study, 12 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 968 (1978); Ingber, A Dialectic, The Fulfillment
and Decrease of Passion in Criminal Law, 28 RUTGERS L. REV. 861, 932-37
(1975); Kuntsler, Jury Nullification in Conscience Cases, 10 VA. J. INT'L. L. 71
(1969); Richardson, Jury Nullification: Justice or Anarchy?, 80 CASE & COM.,
Mar-Apr. 1975, at 30; Sax, Conscience and Anarchy: The Prosecution of War
Resisters, 57 YALE L. REV. 481 (1968); Kaufman, The Right of Self-Representa-
tion and the Power of Jury Nullification, 28 CAS.W. RES. L. REV. 269 (1978). Cf
Simson, Jury Nullification in the American System: A Skeptical View, 54 TEX. L.
REV. 488 (1976); Christie, Lawful Departures from Legal Rules: "Jury Nullifi-
cation" and Legitimated Disobedience, 62 CAL. L. REV. 1289 (1924); L. MOORE,
THE JURY: TOOL OF KINGS, PALLADIUM OF LIBERTY (1973); J. FRANK, COURTS
ON TRIAL (1949); L. GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY (1930); P. DEVLIN, TRIAL By
JURY (1956); W.R. CORNISH, THE JURY (1968); L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN LAW 252 (1973); W. FORSYTH, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY (2D ED.
1971); C. Curtis, It's Your Law (1954); KADISH & KADISH, DISCRETION TO DIS-
OBEY (1973); H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966).
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civil or public law jury as well.1 We have, for instance, Alex-
ander Hamilton's arid160 and unsuccessful, yet earnest, at-
tempt in The Federalist, No. 83 to head off mounting de-
mands for the Seventh Amendment. He did so by disputing
the popular impression that such a jury could thwart the un-
fair application of a tax statute, either in a collection pro-
ceeding or in a collateral damage action. Hamilton embraced
the "retrograde" English and local practice out of an instinc-
tive fear that the Seventh Amendment concept was being
hypocritically and cynically advanced by states'-rightists as a
159. See, e.g., 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 180-181 (H. Storing
ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERAIISTJ ("Impartial Ex-
aminer") ("So different are many species of property, so various the pro-
ductions, so unequal the profits arising, even from the same species of
property, in different states, that no general mode of contribution [via ex-
cise taxes] can well be adopted in such a manner as at once to affect all in
an equitable degree. . . . If this branch of revenue takes place, all the con-
sequent rigors of excise laws will necessarily be introduced in order to en-
force a due collection. On any charge or offense in this instance you will
see yourselves deprived of your boasted trial by jury."); 6 id. 137 ("A
Plebian"); 2 id. 417 ff. ("Brutus"); 2 id, 231-32, 249-50 ("Federal
Farmer"); 3 id. 23-29 ("Old Whig") ("Are there not a thousand civil cases
in which the government is a party?-In all actions for penalties, forfeit-
ures and public debts, as well as many others, the government is a party
and the whole weight of government is thrown into the scale of the prose-
cution[,] yet these are all of them civil causes."); 3 id. 204-05 ("Aris-
tocratis"); 5 id. 37 ("[Maryland] Farmer"); 5 id. 113-15 (Richard Henry
Lee); 6 id. 9, 11-15 ("Cincinnatus"); 6 id. 73-74 ("Countryman"). Like the
The Federalist, No. 83, these passages suggest that the campaign of the
Anti-federalist and democratic Federalists for the Seventh Amendment
contemplated the right of jurors in public law cases to dispense with the
enforcement of excise taxes which would be inequitable as applied. And, as
Wolfram notes, since they "won" their views are entitled to at least re-
spectful consideration. Wolfram, supra note 143 at 669 & n.84. See, also 4.
C. ANDREWS, THE COLONIAL PERIOD OF AMERICAN HISTORY 140ff., 152ff.,
222-27, 251ff. (1934); Kalven, The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REV.
1055 (1964); Scheflin and Van Dyke, supra note 158 at 69-71. But see Hen-
derson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L. REV. 289, 328
(1966); and Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial: A Study in the
Irrationality of Rational Decision Making, 70 Nw. U.L. Rev. 486 (1975).
160. The adjective belongs to Professor Wolfram, who noted that
Hamilton's attempt to deny the utility of civil jury trials in relieving a de-
fendant from an unjust tax law, on the basis that the jury was theoretically
obligated to take the law from the judge, see FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note
145, at 500, foundered on his own practical admission that the jury's
power to decide mixed questions of law and fact rendered judicial control
over the law of the case "impracticable." Id. at 504. "[That fact], no
doubt," as Wolfram notes, "was precisely the point of those who wished to
have juries sit in taxation cases." Wolfram, supra note 143, at 705 n.183.
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Trojan horse.161 It was designed, he feared, for the system-
atic nullification inter alia of the Article I power of the pro-
posed Congress to levy direct taxes on the people-a power
Hamilton deemed absolutely critical to the survival of that
one true bulwark of American Liberty, the federal Union.16 2
Though Hamilton lost the battle, in that the Seventh
Amendment was duly proposed and ratified, he won the war
vicariously. While his views did not "satisfy the popular opin-
ion" of his day, they were invoked by subsequent generations
of federal judges to undermine the importance of what his
political opponents had accomplished. They saw to it that po-
tentially unsympathetic local juries would get little or no op-
portunity to sabotage the uniform administration of national
policies.
A. Levellers and the Scottish Enlightenment.
While other historians have identified the significant role
played by Revolutionary-era civil juries in vindicating the
Whig view of law against the positivist Loyalist view,' the
tendency has been to dismiss such nullification episodes as
mere exercises in "creative institutionalism," expedient ma-
nipulations of the available legal machinery to vindicate fixed
constitutional principles. 64 This article, however, disputes
the significance to the founders of absolute "natural law" enti-
161. The hypocrisy lay in the fact that most states themselves levied
taxes summarily. See FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 145, at 500. And in his
own State of New York "more numerous encroachments ha[d] been made
upon the trial by jury . . . since the Revolution, though provided for by a
positive article of our Constitution, than has happened in the same time in
... Great Britain." Id. at 509. In his zeal to discredit this, the most politi-
cally popular position taken by strident advocates of a Bill of Rights (indi-
viduals whom he judged less committed to individual rights than to
smothering the Constitution in its cradle), Hamilton overlooked or ignored
the fact that state courts had already begun to purify their statute books of
just such summary procedures. (By 1830 New York itself would provide
(and later guarantee) a right of jury trial in excise tax proceedings.
162. For Hamilton's views on the necessity of ending the system of
supporting the central government through quotas and requisitions upon
the states, a system that prevailed under the Articles of Confederation, by
granting Congress the Article I, §8 "Power to lay and collect Taxes, Du-
ties, Imports and Excises," see FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 145, at 188-
223.
163. See, e.g., Reid, supra note 152, at 71.
164. See Teachout, Light in Ashes: The Problem of "Respect for the Rule
of Law" in American Legal History, in LAW IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND
THE REVOLUTION OF THE LAW 167, 198-199, 224 (H. Hartog ed. 1981) (re-
printing 53 N.Y.U.L. REV. 241 (1978)).
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tlements, such as freedom of speech, arguing instead that the
American constitutional jury was intended to play a dynamic
role in the definition and enforcement over time of the basic
but essentially mutable constitutional principle of "natural
equity" or fundamental fairness, a principle which underlies
both the express substantive guarantees of the Bill of Rights,
like "just compensation,"' 16 5 and any which may be deemed
implicit in the Ninth Amendment. It does so by attempting in
the next section to relate the jury-centric nature of Whig law
to contemporaneous intellectual and moral presuppositions
about the nature of sovereignty, individual rights, and
constitutionalism. 16
First, that section suggests that a missing link in making
this connection has been the political and legal philosophy of
the Levellers, a radical party during the Puritan Revolution
of the 1640's. The Levellers embraced Chief Justice Coke's
revival of Magna Charta as a means of curbing the preten-
sions of a "democratic" Parliament to omnipotence, preten-
sions which it couched in terms of the ancient maxim salus
populi suprema lex. Asserting the post-Reformation right to
read canonical legal texts for themselves, the Levellers inter-
preted Chief Justice Coke's First and Second Institutes (with
their celebration of both reason and the jury) creatively, al-
165. See e.g., Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 233
(1897); Grant, The "Higher Law" Background of the Law of Eminent Domain, 6
Wis. L. REV. 67 (1931).
166. f Teachout, supra note 164, at 198-199. In his fine essay Pro-
fessor Teachout tries to supplement the institutional focus of other schol-
ars of the jury by expanding on Bernard Bailyn's suggestion that the colo-
nial revolutionaries wound up emphasizing substantive principles above
institutions, principles which they then carefully embodied into written
constitutions. Id. at 198 n.86, citing I B. BAILYN, PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICA
REVOLUTION 1750-1776, 99-104 (1965). As an example, Teachout adduces
James Otis' "creative" and "highly sophisticated interpretation of Lord
Coke's celebrated Bonham's Case" in the 1761 Writs of Assistance case.
Teachout emphasizes Otis' development of the public law implications of
that case and especially his invocation of the inviolable "privilege of the
house." In fact, the public law implications of Bonham's Case had been
developed a century earlier by the Levellers, and Otis' use of the conclusio-
nary maxim that "a man's home is his castle" should not overshadow the
fact that he argued the case principally on the basis of the unreasonable-
ness of the search practices under the local circumstances of the Colonies.
Even Bailyn has noted Otis' opposition to the notion that the concept of
fundamental rights could be catalogued. This article asserts that Otis
would have been more likely to embrace a dynamic model of institutional
liberty, with the jury (guided by judge and counsel) primarily responsible
for overseeing the evolution of new standards of constitutional reasonable-
ness, than Bailyn's model of fixed guarantees.
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beit literally. They took Coke to mean that due process of
law as guaranteed by Chapter 29 of Magna Charta is merely
declaratory of the ancient, pre-Norman right-or "gothic
liberty"-of jurors to square all positive laws (whether statu-
tory or decisional) with the basic common law principles of
reasonableness and fairness."" Despite the disappearance of
167. Significantly, the Levellers' locus classicus for the historic dis-
pensing power of the common law jury was Coke's authoritative citation of
Littleton in his First Institutes to the effect "[t]hat if the jury will take upon
them the knowledge of the law upon the matter, they may." 1 Co. Inst.
228. While the text pertained to what we would now consider the private
law governing the Assize of Novel Disseisin, the Assize was originally a
criminal action; and Coke's text served as the lynchpin in John Lilburne's
successful argument before his criminal jury in 1652. Lilburne, the leading
Leveller theorist of the jury, deemed this substantive dimension of trial by
jury explanatory of Coke's effusive celebration of the jury in the Second
Institutes as synonymous with the ideal of due process of law enshrined in
chapter 29 of Magna Carta. See V, HOWELL, STATE TRIALS, 417-444. See also
T. PEASE, THE LEVELLER MOVEMENT. 326-46 (1916). Cf. STORY, III COMMEN-
TARIES, supra note 24, § 1773, 652:
The right [to trial by jury] constitutes one of the fundamental arti-
cles of Magna Carta, in which it is declared ...no man shall be
arrested, nor imprisoned, nor banished, nor deprived of live, &c.
but by the judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land. The
judgment of his peers here alluded to, and commonly called in the
quaint language of former times a trial per pais, or trial by the
country, is the trial by a jury, who are called the peers of the party
accused, being of the like condition and equality in the state.
On Coke's authority the "or" in the phrase "by the judgment of his peers,
or by the law of the land" was to be read conjunctively in accordance with
the medieval Latin vel. Indeed, it is by now well known that in the original
context the reference to "peers" referred not to our familiar democratic
institution but to a special dispensation from the normal course of the law,
wrested from King John by his barons, entitling them to be tried "by no
one lower in the social scale." See, e.g., C. REMBAR, THE LAW OF THE LAND
168 (1980).
Ironically, the law courts administering Henry II's system of possessory
assizes gave the "or" its normal disjunctive meaning from classical Latin,
denying the barons the fruits of their victory by subjecting them to the
verdict of the assizes' more democratic jury. Id. at 170. Universal demo-
cratic trial by jury in England, therefore, technically sprang from the "law
of the land," not the "judgment of. . .peers" language in Magna Carta.
But once the dead letter feudal "judgment of ... peers" passed from
memory, it was natural economy of thought to reconcile the artifactual
phrase with the existing scheme of things by reverting to the conjunctive
"or". Hence those like Felix Frankfurter, who condemned Sixth and Sev-
enth Amendment juries on the basis that they derive from an ignorant,
irrational attachment to a feudal phrase, "judgment of. . .peers," found
in Magna Carta, have almost willfully underestimated the sophistication of
the 17th and 18th century devotees of the jury.
In point of fact the Levellers downplayed the importance of Magna
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the movement by 1650, its populist view of the equitable
power and constitutional duty of the jury to judge of the law
as well as the facts doubtless contributed to the celebrated
result in Bushell's Case in 1670.1"8 There Chief Justice
Vaughan vindicated the right of the juror to follow his con-
science rather than the judge's charge, without fear of cita-
tion for contempt. The Leveller ideal of the independent-
minded jury continued to influence political thought and
literature through our founding period'-when once again
claims of Parliamentary omnipotence filled the air. And in
revolutionary American this received ideal of the jury was
powerfully strengthened by the epistemology of the prevalent
Scottish "moral sense" school of philosophy. The unanimous
verdict of twelve randomly-chosen citizens enjoyed ready-
made philosophic status in a climate of opinion favorable to
moral empiricism and fundamentally at odds with the
Hobbesian tradition of subjective relativism. 7
Carta to the constitutional status of the English jury, viewing that instru-
ment as a painful reminder of the continued bondage of England's free
customs beneath the Norman legal yoke. Instead, they took all references
to the jury in Magna Carta as merely declaratory of the jury's ancient,
prefeudal status under the English "law of the land." For the Levellers the
jury gained nothing in status from its inclusion in Magna Carta. For evi-
dence of the wide English belief in such a pre-Norman, Anglo-Saxon tradi-
tion of the jury, see, e.g., SIR MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON
LAW OF ENGLAND 117-18 (2d ed. 1716):
So the Trial by Jury of Twelve Men was the usual Trial amount
the Normans in most suits, especially in Assizes, &Juris Utrums, as
appears by the Contumier, cap. 92, 93 & 94 and that Trial was in
Use here in England before the Conquest, as appears in Brompton
among the Laws of King Etheldred, cap. 3.
For a discussion of Jefferson's belief in this Leveller-inspired ideal of a sim-
pler prefeudal law of the land presided over by the jury, see E. DUMBAULD,
THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE LAW 152-55 (1978).
168. Vaughan 135, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670).
169. An example of a later Leveller-inspired pamphlet is Sir John
Hawles' THE ENGLISHMAN'S RIGHT/A DIALOGUE BETWEEN A BARRISTER AT
LAW AND A JURY-MAN (1680), in CLASSICS OF ENGLISH HISTORY IN THE
MODERN ERA (1978). Professor Reid himself has written persuasively of the
influence of the Levellers on the founding generation. See Reid, In Legiti-
mate Stirps: The Concept of "Arbitrary," the Supremacy of Parliament, and The
Coming of the American Revolution, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 459 (1977).
170. This article will document the corrosive effect of nineteenth
century positivism on this popular ideal of the intuitive genius of the jury.
Taking Bentham as a prime exemplar of positivist jurisprudence, we can
anticipate much that follows by noting that he dismisses notions such as
"natural equity" or "common sense" out of hand as transparent rational-
izations for biased, subjective-as opposed to rational, objec-
tive-decisionmaking. J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF
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B. "Preserving" An Ideal Not a Practice.
The Seventh Amendment speaks of "preserving" 'the
right of jury trial. A failure to appreciate the importance of
this popular ideal of the jury, with its basic tenet that Reason
spoke directly even to self-taught Americans "without
priestly or professional intermediaries,"' has led most mod-
ern commentators to interpret the Seventh Amendment as if
principally designed to "preserve" in amber (as of 1791) a
static set of historical English practices.17 2 It would seem to
be more in keeping with the constitutional context to con-
strue the Amendment as "preserving" a dynamic popular
ideal, embracing the substantive role of civil and criminal ju-
rors in Article III adjudication under the Constitution, 7 '
MORALS AND LEGISLATION 136-43 (1948). Yet Bentham himself acknowl-
edged that positivism was primarily a commercial or private law, not a con-
stitutional or public law, credo. Where "English liberties" were being in-
fringed, he readily embraced the jury's prerogative to nullify as a means of
pressuring Parliament for reform:
• . . By a few successive exertions of such fortitude, not only mo-
mentary and partial relief against particular oppression would be
afforded in each particular instance,-. . . But by a gentle and
truly constitutional pressure, measures of complete and permanent
relief might . . . be extorted from the legislature.
J. BENTHAM, THE ELEMENTS OF THE ART OF PACKING AS APPLIED TO SPECIAL
JURIES 3 (1821) (emphasis added).
171. See G. WILLS, THE INVENTING OF AMERICAN 101 (1978).
172. For varying perspectives on the accepted "historical test" of the
scope of the Seventh Amendment, see Wolfram, supra note 143, at 639-
649; Henderson, supra note 159, at 289-91; and 5 MOORE'S, FEDERAL
PRACTICE 138.08[5](4), at 79 (1971). It is ironic that the accepted source of
this notion that actual English practice as of 1791 determines what are
"Suits at common law" is Mr. Justice Story's opinion in United States v.
Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750), since that
case dealt with the separate question of what "rules of the common law"
govern appellate reexamination of facts found by a jury for purposes of the
second clause of the Seventh Amendment. See Wolfram, supra note 143, at
641 n.5. In fact, for purposes of the initial clause of the Seventh Amend-
ment, Story, a Republican champion of the jury, rejected a static reference
to "old and settled [English] proceedings" and instead treated Seventh
Amendment common law "Suits" as a dynamic category extending to all
new types of cases provided only that they determine "legal rights." See
Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S.(3 Pet.) 433, 447 (1830). In short, for each
clause he chose an interpretation which expanded the scope of what he
acknowledged to be a very popular Amendment.
173. With little confidence in the reasoning ability of jurors, many
modern scholars try to control the potential damage from the Sixth and
Seventh Amendments by confining any "substantive" role for the jury to
the simpler, cut-and-dried moral issues that reach criminal courts. See, e.g.,
Henderson, supra note 159, at 327-335; Simson, supra note 158, at 502;
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from which contemporaneous English practice may well have
strayed. Indeed, the American Revolution itself is commonly
characterized as an attempt to vindicate an ideal English con-
stitution against "its recent practice and its current
workings. '1 7
4
In this regard, Felix Frankfurter, like Alexander Hamil-
ton before him, may have been misled by the coexistence at
the state level during the period 1787-91 of constitutional
analogues to the Sixth and Seventh Amendments alongside
of summary juryless revenue procedures like the qui tam pro-
ceedings.1 75 Frankfurter wrote an influential 1926 article that
paved the way for juryless federal trials of "petty" offenses,
despite the Sixth Amendment's express coverage of "all"
Frank, supra note 158, at 179 (it is unlikely that "twelve men, summoned
from all sorts of occupations, . . . unacquainted with their own mental
workings . . . can . . . do as good a job . . . as an experienced judge"). By
contrast, Jefferson, like Thomas Reid, used the "ploughman" to exemplify
his critical belief that the "moral sense" is equal in all men:
State a moral case to a ploughman and a professor. The former
will decide it as well and often better than the latter, because he
has not been led astray by artificial rules.
6 THE PAPERS Or THOMAS JEFFERSON 258 (J. Boyd ed. 1957) [hereinafter
cited as JEFFERSON PAPERS.] Ironically, therefore, Lord Devlin has recently
supported a restrictive historical interpretation of our Seventh Amend-
ment by citing a 1603 English case in which the Chancellor asserted that
his court "was better able to judge than a jury of ploughmen," a case in
which the conclusion would have "to be discerned by books and deeds."
Clench v. Tomley, Cary 23, 21 Eng. Rep. 13 (Ch. 1603), quoted in Devlin,
Equity, Due Process and the Seventh Amendment: A Commentary on the Zenith
Case, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1571, 1577 (1983). The political forces behind the
Seventh Amendment cast substantial doubt on the relevance of this bit of
precedent, unless we can assume that equity has no role in the construction
of written instruments.
William Walwin, one of the Levellers credited with inventing the belief
that "trial by jury is a Bastion of English liberties," see, e.g., VEALL, THE
POPULAR MOVEMENT FOR LAW REFORM 1640-1660, 372 (1970), wrote in
1650 in opposition to the elitist notion that "understanding" in the sense
of book learning was more important than "conscience' or common sense
in a juror, noting that the slower members of the jury will not be unduly
swayed by the few "nimble-pated men ... , except they have reason and
equity of their side." Walwyn, Juries Justified, in CLASSICS OF ENGLISH LEGAL
HISTORY IN THE MODERN ERA (1978). (Of course, none of this is to say that
the judge may not argue persuasively to the jury that it should not invoke
principles of equity in deciding a particular issue because the parties have
voluntarily agreed in advance to a particular black-and-white solution).
174. Wood, The Intellectual Origins of the American Constitution, NA-
TIONAL FORUM 5, 7 (Fall 1984).
175. Frankfurter & Concoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitu-
tional Guarantee of Trial by Jury, 39 HARv. L. REV. 917, 924 ff. (1926).
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criminal prosecutions. In it he erroneously inferred that such
juryless procedures were accepted as implicit, historical ex-
ceptions to the new constitutional guarantee.' What both
Frankfurter and Hamilton failed to note was the clear evi-
dence that state supreme courts had already begun to ex-
punge such procedures from the statute books. In fact, two
of the five American judicial review cases we know to have
been available to the framers in Philadelphia involved the in-
validation of statutory qui tam proceedings as violative of the
"inestimable right of trial by jury. ' 17 7 And two of the other
three also involved the preservation of jury trial against
"new-fangled" summary jurisdictions.178 In this context the
epithet "new-fangled," like the Leveller's incessant and pejo-
rative use of "innovative," was meant to signal not so much a
change in actual recent practice, as a deviation from the his-
toric ideal, an ideal which recent debates over the state bills
of rights had brought into better focus.
But in his zeal to eliminate local juries as an impediment
176. Id. Frankfurter, concerned about the unwillingness of federal
juries to convict for minor violations of the widely unpopular Volstead
(prohibition) Act, resolved to do something about it. Accordingly, his
search for such implicit, historical exceptions to the right of trial by jury
was conducted in the seemingly inhospitable context of the Sixth Amend-
ment's guarantee of a jury in "all" criminal prosecutions. But that obstacle
proved no more difficult to get around than had Justice Story's liberal con-
struction of the Seventh Amendment (as extending to dynamic definition
of "common law") for critics of the Seventh Amendment-and for some of
the same reasons, as the text suggests. Frankfurter argued pragmatically
for a summary federal criminal jurisdiction over misdemeanors involving
the possibility of only a short prison term; his view soon prevailed. See Dis-
trict of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937).
177. Trevett v. Weeden (R.I. 1786) and Holmes v. Walton (N.J.
1779). For a discussion of these unreported cases and their possible rele-
vance to the intended scope of judicial review under the U.S. Constitution,
compare R. BERGER, CONGRESS v. THE SUPREME COURT 38-48, (1969) with W.
CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 943-973 (1953). In his 1803 edition of Blackstone, St. George
Tucker protested that the legislative tendency to extend summary debt col-
lection procedures beyond the case of "public collectors" and other public
officials, who might be deemed to have submitted to the rigors of such
proceedings, to ordinary citizens was inconsistent with the spirit of the bill
of rights-since it would "sap the foundation of the trial by jury, and fi-
nally subvert it." IV TUCKER'S BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES APP. 58-59 (Edi-
tor's Appendix Note E) (1803). For informal reports of the cases, see B.
SWARTZ ED., THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 404-08, 417-29
(1971).
178. See The New Hampshire "Ten Pound" Act Case (1786) and
Bayard v. Singleton, 1 Martin 5 (N.C. 1787). See Berger and Crosskey,
supra note 177.
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to the implementation of national policies, like that of prohi-
bition, Frankfurter joined the movement to debunk Magna
Carta as "a lawyer's myth." '179 After all, "the most notable
example" used by legal realists to demonstrate how the feu-
dal origins of Magna Carta were misunderstood and romanti-
cized by seventh century Englishmen and eighteenth century
Americans was the conversion of "the judicicium parium [into]
trial by jury."' 80 Thus Frankfurter freely impugned the polit-
ical credentials of Chief Justice Coke,18' called the inventor
179. R. POUND, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 49 (1942).
180. C. MCILWAIN, THE HIGH COURT OF PARLIAMENT AND ITS
SUPREMACY 57 (1910).
181. Dismissing Coke as essentially a political hack, Frankfurter ten-
dentiously and inaccurately insisted that it was "the most reverend of legal
fables" that Magna Charta (1215) had guaranteed trial by jury, since trial by
jury had not yet even taken shape. Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 175 at
922. While it is true that no precise analogue to the criminal petit jury
then existed as part of the King's centralized court system, modern histori-
ography suggests that the "grand jury" assembled by the Assize at Claren-
don (1166) was in many respects the functional equivalent of the modern
petit jury, rather than a mere accusatory mechanism. For if the assize de-
termined that guilt was sufficiently probable that trial by ordeal should oc-
cur, the defendant was in effect condemned. After 1166 even success in the
ordeal required that the defendant promptly "abjure the realm," leaving
family, possessions, and mother tongue behind. See, e.g., C. REMBAR, THE
LAW OF THE LAND 144-55 (1980).
Moreover, not only were jury trials an ancient fixture of English law as
dispensed in local courts, they became the procedural centerpiece of the
centralized common law practice that grew up around Henry II's Assize of
Novel Disseisin (1166). The very word "assize" came to mean "the inquisi-
tion of twelve men." The jury of inquest had the right to view the site on
its own and to decide both the law and the facts of the case. Obviously,
such independence meant that Frankfurter would not consider it the func-
tional equivalent of the Sixth or Seventh Amendment jury. It was not suffi-
ciently under the thumb of the judge. By contrast, the Levellers cited
Coke's First Institutes and a statute in the 13th year of Edward the First
(both of which confirm the law-finding discretion of the assize) as declara-
tory of the ancient and enduring pre-Norman prerogatives of the local
jury-which, they argued, carried over into Henry II's centralized system.
Significantly, the Leveller view of the historical relevance of assize practice
in determining the law-finding prerogatives of the modern jury was en-
dorsed by James Wilson, a leading draftsman of the Constitution and early
Supreme Court Justice. II THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 215-20 (J. An-
drews ed. 1896). Frankfurter's out-of-hand dismissal of the relevance of the
assize to constitutional theory parallels the treatment by 19th century
American jurists of the ad quod damnum or sheriffs jury, a direct descen-
dent of the assize, which had been widely used in England and the states in
eminent domain actions during the period 1787-91.
Frankfurter's 1926 article was part of what Dean Pound labelled a con-
certed "movement" among pragmatic positivists to debunk Magna Carta as
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of the myth of Magna Carta,'8 2 whose Second Institutes, re-
printed by the Long Parliament, had first inspired the popu-
lar identification of trial by jury with Magna Carta's guaran-
tee of due process of law. What Frankfurter omitted to
mention was the fact that the Second Institutes served as
"hardly less than a legal political Bible to the framers of our
polity," as well. 18 3 As Mark De Wolfe Howe wrote of the
founding generation:
Building upon legend which Coke had dignified with spuri-
ous annotations and English Puritans had sanctified with pi-
ous pedantry, the Americans discovered that the rights that
really mattered to them had their roots in common law. 184
Chief among them was trial by jury. And as Mcllwain has
noted, echoing Vinogrodoff, what is more important than the
details of its origin is the history of the subsquent influence of
Magna Carta, of what it came to mean to later generations. 18 5
Moreover, it is relatively clear that the American partisans of
the jury were by no means overawed by the antiquity of
Magna Carta, but were wedded to the political principles be-
hind the institution.18
6
"a lawyers' myth"-and, for good measure, to dismiss the notion of separa-
tion of powers as a product of Montesquieu's misreading of the British pol-
ity of his time. R. POUND, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 49 (1942). Their purpose
was to "give Bacon the last laugh over Coke" by denying the existence of
any implied substantive or structural constitutional constraints on the sov-
ereignty of the legislature. Id. at 14, 51. And, as noted in the text, their
attempts to impugn Magna Carta turned on the "revelation" that it was a
feudal document and that trial by one's "peers" had nothing to do with the
democratic jury. See e.g., B. KENNEY, JUDGMENT BY PEERS 108 (1949). This
would have come as no surprise to the Levellers and later opponents of the
Norman feudal yoke like Jefferson. For a concurring view that Frank-
furter's 1926 article, notwithstanding its later influence on the Supreme
Court, was a discreditable performance, see Rembar, supra, at 390-95.
182. McIlwain, supra note 180, at 57-58 and n.2.
183. R. POUND, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 14, 51 (1942); accord Berger,
supra note 177, at 28, 371.
184. Howe, The Migration of the Common Law: The United States of
America, 76 L.Q. REV. 49, 50 (1960).
185. McIlwain, supra note 180, at 58. Nor was the myth confined to
these shores in the late eighteenth century. Holdsworth records that the
final personal triumph of Lord Camden (a great friend of our Revolution)
over his rival Mansfield was the declaratory form in which Fox's Libel Act
(1792) was passed. "[Althihough historically of dubious correctness, "as
Holdsworth asserts, id. at 305, 10 id. at 680-88, Fox's Libel Act vindicated
Lord Camden's belief in the constitutional law-finding role of the jury,
which was so professionally unpopular among his fellow judges.
186. McIlwain, supra note 180, at 57-58. Cf. J. POLE, THE PURSUIT OF
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For true supporters of the Seventh Amendment, there-
fore, jurors represented the "intuitive side" of the law,187 a
common sense approach to what is fair and reasonable neces-
sary to supplement "the professional or perhaps overcondi-
tioned . . .response of a judge."'1 88 Accordingly, alongside of
separation of powers, the executive veto, and legislative bi-
cameralism, the Sixth and Seventh Amendment guarantees
may be viewed as implementing a sort of Article III judicial
bicameralism-with the jury occupying the "principal place"
in the administration of justice as "arbiter not only of fact
but of law." '89 Whatever its ancient historical accuracy,
therefore, the popular American mythology of the jury,
which both fueled the demands for a Bill of Rights and there-
after definitively shaped the course of early state and federal
practice, must influence our understanding of the proper
scope of those Amendments.""
Thus, the Seventh Amendment was arguably designed to
give juries a vital share in the Article III power of the federal
courts. Specifically, the next section advances the unanimous
cross-sectional jury (as distinct from a majority of a panel of
appellate judges) as the intended dispenser of democratic eq-
uity under our constitutional system.' Under that view the
jury has the final constitutional veto-the ultimate right to
decide against the state the inevitably "mixed" or "intermin-
gled" question of the fundamental fairness of particular ap-
plication of its rules of positive law.' 92 The proposed institu-
EQUALITY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 16 n.6 (1976).
187. See Curtis, supra note 158, at 104.
188. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 529 (1975); Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968).
189. See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, (1943) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
190. See Wolfram, supra note 143, at 669 & n.84. Justice Rehnquist,
following Professor Wolfram's lead, has embraced the substantive role of
the civil jury in reaching results that the judge "either could not or would
not reach by disregarding applicable rules of law." Id. at 671. See Parklane
Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 340 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
191. Cf H. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 1
(2d ed. 1948) (defining equity as "the power to meet the moral standards
of justice in a particular case by a tribunal having discretion to mitigate the
rigidity of the application of strict rules of law so as to adopt the relief to
the circumstances of the particular case.")
192. Despite the second clause of the Seventh Amendment and the
statutory constraints formerly imposed by the Writ of Error procedure, the
Supreme Court has asserted an independent duty in certain constitutional
cases to review itself "mixed" bindings of law and fact-that is, "where a
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tional model of the jury argues for a formal reinstatement of
the jury into a cooperative role in pricking out a constitu-
tional common law of protectible "liberty" and "property," a
step the Supreme Court has tentatively taken in the obscenity
area. 193 That approach would provide one theoretical solu-
tion to the modern Court's impasse, in the face of the silently
reproachful Ninth Amendment, over the responsible genera-
tion of non-interpretive constitutional guarantees out of the
open-textured language of the Due Process
Clauses194-especially in the area of economic expecta-
tions.1 95 More importantly, perhaps, it would relieve the insti-
tutional pressures that have led the Court to adopt an ex-
tremely narrow, literalistic approach to the "just
compensation" guarantee of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. The suggested model would allow appellate
judges to continue to promulgate relatively fixed rules of law
designed to govern a whole class of cases by providing a con-
stitutional floor of protection, while the jury would act with a
sort of ratchet effect to advance individual liberty in particu-
lar cases. Even if a judge finds that a statute is "facially" con-
stitutional, since it satisfies constitutional minima, the claim-
ant gets a second bite at the cherry by submitting to the jury
the mixed question of its as applied fairness.
conclusion of law ... and a findings of fact are so intermingled as to make
it necessary, in order to pass upon the Federal question, to analyze the
facts." See, e.g., Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 385-86 (1927). But that has
lately been a duty more honored in the breach in the area of economic
liberties. In any case, such a duty is consistent with the proposed model of
the Seventh Amendment since it has been asserted by the Court to advance
the cause, of.individual liberty-not to relieve the state from a verdict that
is not warranted by the facts. On the other hand, if the Court were to insist
on assimilating the public law jury to the civil jury and assert a power to
overturn a verdict unfavorable to the state, this article-asserts that the pub-
lic law jury is enough unlike the civil jury that a new trial-not a directed
verdict-should be ordered.
193. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
194. For some flavor of the controversy over the extent to which the
Supreme Court should invoke the Due Process Clauses to constitutionalize
values not readily inferable from the constitutional text, structure, or his-
tory, see Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional
Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 44-45 (1975); Rehnquist, The Notion of a
Living Constitution, 54 TEXAS L. REV. 693 (1976); and ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST (1980).
195. This general model is congruent in many particulars with that
proposed by Professor Bacigal for use in implementing the Fourth Amend-
ment prohibition against "unreasonable" searches and seizures. See Bacigal,
A Case for Jury Determination of Search and Seizure Law, 15 U. RICH L. REV.
791 (1981).
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C. The Hamiltonian Counter-Reformation.
The next section, however, traces the 19th and 20th cen-
tury forces behind the demise of the model-and the belated
triumph of Hamilton's position in The Federalist, No. 83. It is
simply not true, as some would suggest, that the equitable dis-
pensing power of the civil jury fell of its own weight-left
chronically "hung" by a breakdown in the "state[s'] ethical
unity."'"9 Rather the law-finding power of local juries, both
civil and criminal, succumbed to the same systematic intellec-
tual attack that Bacon and Hobbes waged earlier against
Coke. The imperative administrative demands of a modern,
centralized state, coupled with the Hobbesian conviction that
ethical unity is a philosophic impossibility, dictated that no
branch of the judiciary, judge or jury, could legitimately
claim the right to engage in subjective "mutilation" of gen-
eral statutory schemes. 19 7 The potential for frustrating their
effective implementation was unacceptable, especially given
the quixotic nature of any attempt at individualized equity.
Hamilton helped "give Bacon th[is] last laugh over Coke."198
His unsuccessful attempt at a preemptive strike against the
public law jury in The Federalist, No. 83, based on the as-
sumption that this power of a local jury to "mutilate all law"
ultimately translates at the federal level into a power to "dis-
solve the Union," finally bore fruit in the mid-nineteenth
century.
As a result of such Baconian reflections, appellate courts,
both state and federal, "arrogantly' 9 9 and "speciously" ' 00
196. Compare W. NELSON, DISPUTE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN
PLYMOUTH COUNTY, MASSACHUSETTS, 1725-1825, at 150-51 (1981) with W.
NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW 65-66 (1975).
197. Compare the statement by the judge in John Lilburne's trial to
the effect that his "damnable heresy" concerning the lawfinding power of
juries would be "enough to destroy all the law in the land." II THE WORKS
OF JAMES WILSON 217 (J. Andrews ed. 1896).
198. Pound, supra note 179, at 14.
199. The adopted characterization is Professor Howe's. See supra
note 158, at 586.
200. Even Leonard Levy, otherwise an unstinting admirer, so de-
scribes the reasoning process by which Chief Justice Shaw of Massachusetts
in the case of Commonwealth v. Anthes, 5 Gray 185 (1855) turned back an
1855 legislative attempt to override his earlier opinion in Commonwealth
v. Porter, 10 Metc. 263 (1845), by codifying the "popular belief that the
right to be judged by one's peers meant the right of one's peers to decide
issues of law against the instructions of the trial judge." See L. LEVY, THE
LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW 290-91, 293 (1957).
Levy seems to concede the historical accuracy of Judge Thomas' dissenting
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undermined the basic ideal of a jury competent to decide
both the law and the facts of a case, even though that ideal
had been faithfully reflected in most early federal civil and
criminal practice. They decreed the sacrifice of democratic
equity after erecting twin altars to (i) a formalistic version of
the Revolutionary idol of "the rule of law," and (ii) the Arti-
cle VI supremacy of federal law. With regard to the former,
appellate courts decided that under a written constitution an
individual's right to appellate review of the law actually ap-
plied in his case was a more critical implied aspect of constitu-
tional "due process of law" than any so-called law-finding
function of juries. So jurors began to be sternly admonished
as to their duty to apply the law just as it was given them,
without equitable adjustments of any sort, so that appellate
courts would have something definite to review.
Under this view the true constitutional common law jury
by definition had to be a compliant jury, duty-bound to apply
the rule of law given them, if judges were to carry out their
"all-important" function of judicial review. This development
was especially ironic since the prototypical American judicial
review cases, which presumably had influenced the adoption
of that principle in Philadelphia, involved appellate interposi-
tion to vindicate the prerogatives of the jury against statutory
inroads. Later when the roles were reversed and legislatures
sought to restore the popular ideal of the law-finding jury in
the face of appellate repression, the courts refused to brook
opposition to their competitive ideal of appellate-based due
process. The statutes were declared unconstitutional. Like-
wise, the federal Supremacy Clause, which all judges in the
nation were bound by oath to support, tended to confirm the
appellate courts in their growing professional attachment to
this ideal of the rule of uniform, centrally-administered law.
With the jury progressively reduced in technical status to me-
view:
[I]f this doctrine as to the right of the jury be an error, it is, in the
country at least, an old one, the error of many of our wisest and
most conservative judges and statesmen . . . . I cannot but feel
that, if I err in these views, I err with the fathers; that I am in the
old and beaten path, standing super antiquas vias.
Id. at 302. Nonetheless, the fact that Shaw's result was ostensibly supported
by the circuit opinion of Justice Story in U.S. v. Battiste, 25 Fed. Cas. 1042
(C.C.D. Mass. 1835), and that Shaw's opinion was in turn embraced by Jus-
tice Harlan on behalf of the Supreme Court in Sparf and Hansen v. U.S.,
156 U.S. 51, 80 (1894), emboldened Levy to accuse Thomas of numerous
unnamed "egregious inconsistencies" in his defense of the popular model
of the jury. Levy, op cit. at 302.
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nial fact-finder, therefore, it is little wonder that modern
judges profess puzzlement at the notion that denial of a jury
in public law actions has political overtones.
D. Murray's Lessee, Official Immunity, and Vicarious Redress
Against the Sovereign.
More importantly, however, the ultimate disappearance
of the model can be traced to the collapse of the very concept
of a "public law" legal action beneath the combined weight
of the doctrines of sovereign and official immunity. As a re-
sult of Justice Curtis' opinion in the 1855 tax collection case
of Murray's Lessee,2 °' no citizen today can claim a Seventh
Amendment right to a jury (with or without law-finding
power) in contests against the government, whether involving
a tax collection 'suit, an inverse condemnation action, or an
administrative law proceeding.202 Specifically, Curtis affirmed
Congress' Article I power to authorize the conclusive extraju-
dicial distraint and sale of the property of a tax collector al-
legedly delinquent in his accounts with the Treasury. That
result might be justified on the basis of an implicit contrac-
tual waiver of the ultimate right to a jury trial, but Curtis
went further. He asserted in the influential but controversial
dictum encountered in the Introduction, that Congress could
effectively deny an Article III post-deprivation remedy in all
tax distraint cases (even those involving ordinary citizens)
simply by withholding its consent to suit.2 0 This was so, Cur-
tis argued, because the statutory precept itself was sufficient
to immunize from personal liability an executive officer act-
ing in good faith.204
201. Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S.
(18 How.) 272 (1856).
202. See generally 5 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACrICE 38 (1985).
203. For the middle-ground modern view, see Commissioner v. Sha-
piro, 424 U.S. 614 (1976); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
204. Though a private person may take his property, or abate a
nuisance, he is directly responsible for his acts to the proper judi-
cial tribunals. His authority to do these acts depends not merely
on the law, but upon the existence of such facts as are, in point of
law, sufficient to constitute that authority; and he may be re-
quired, by an action at law to prove those facts; but a public agent,
who acts pursuant to the command of a legal precept, can justify
his act by the production of such precept. He cannot be made re-
sponsible in a judicial tribunal for obeying the lawful command of
the government, and the government itself, which gave the com-
mand, cannot be sued without its own consent.
Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 283. This was obiter dicta insofar as
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Curtis' freshly-minted federal doctrine of good faith im-
munity for legislative agents runs directly counter to the con-
stitutional thesis being advanced here. That thesis holds that
common law actions against officials were regarded by the pro-
ponents of the Seventh Amendment as a critical avenue of
vicarious redress against the federal government, necessary
to square its affirmative constitutional obligations (notably
the duty to pay "just compensation" for property involunta-
rily taken) with the political reality of sovereign immunity. In
light of those affirmative obligations, founders like Madison
and Jefferson viewed with anathema any American analogy to
the conceded power of the omnipotent post-1688 English
Parliament to authorize private injury with impunity and to
immunize its executive henchmen. Not even the absolutist
Stuart Kings had the temerity to try to convert their personal
immunity from process into a right to authorize third-party
wrong. 1 5 Moreover, the Parliamentary attempt to introduce
good faith executive immunity into American jurisprudence
had begun inauspiciously with the Sugar and Stamp Acts.
Juryless admiralty- courts were given the right to award a cer-
tificate of good faith so as to insulate customs officers from
common law accountability. In that regard the Acts were
considered to represent yet another departure from the ideal
English gothic constitution. Indeed, John Adams viewed the
potential effects of this immunity doctrine on the public law
role of the constitutional civil jury as the most insidious fea-
ture of the two Acts, even worse than their violation of the
principle of "no taxation without representation." Before
giving a brief account of the unlikely American success of the
doctrine in the nineteenth century, it is important to note
why proponents of official liability largely acquiesced in the
doctrine of sovereign immunity, regarding it as making, not
weakening, the constitutional case for the former.
It is not quite accurate, albeit tempting, to consider the
survival of sovereign immunity under the U.S. Constitution
as "one of the mysteries of legal evolution. 2 0 6 Having pat-
terned their ideas on eminent domain after the quasi-contrac-
tual approach of the natural law theorists, the founders
the statute in question specifically conferred on the taxpayer the right to a
post-deprivation action in federal court.
205. See, e.g., L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
198-212 (1965); R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 315-54; 2 W.
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 435 (4th ed. 1936).
206. Borchard, Governmental Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 4
(1924).
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tended to accept two qualifications on the state's affirmative
duty of compensation. Concededly, government incurs an ob-
ligation to pay when it involuntarily appropriates a citizen's
property. But where the appropriation is part of an underly-
ing consensual transaction, whose terms were agreed upon in
advance, as was the case with the summary procedures em-
ployed for reckoning with tax collectors in Murray's Lessee,
the equities are different. There the claimant may be said to
have voluntarily taken his chances, relying in advance on the
"good faith" of the legislature.2 0 7 More importantly, even
where the transaction is a classic case of forcible expropria-
tion, the government's duty to pay is impliedly contingent on
its practical ability to do so.20 8 And of that the legislature
must be the judge.20 9 After all, the fisc may be empty or such
funds as remain may be desperately needed to fight a war or
meet some other emergency. In either case the legal obliga-
tion to pay would be temporarily dormant.2 10 This pragmatic
207. See. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 580-81 (1934)
("[clontracts between a Nation and an individual ...are only binding on
the conscience of the sovereign and have no pretense to compulsive force
• . ."). See also Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 407 (1821) (Marshall,
C.J.). Cf, III STORY, COMMENTARIES, supra note 24, §1671, at 542, citing
disapprovingly Lord Mansfield's opinion in Macbeath v. Haldimand, 1
Term Reports, 172, to the effect that "whoever advances money for the
public service, trusts to the faith of parliament." Cf note 646 infra.
208. See, e.g., H. GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 388 (A.
Campbell tr. 1901):
Nor will the state, though unable to repair the losses for the pre-
sent, be finally released from the debt, but whenever she possesses
the means of repairing the damage, the dormant claim and obliga-
tion will be revived.
Accord, II THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 286-87 (J. Andrews ed. 1896).
209. Similarly, Anglo-American legislatures, jealously protective of
their hard-won democratic prerogative over the levying and spending of
taxes, convinced the judiciary not to allow unauthorized executive acts to
force the legislature's hand in either respect by creating a finding claim
against the fisc. Rather the legislature was to be given the right to decide
which executive acts to ratify. This critical aspect of the overall historic
phenomenon of democratic sovereign immunity is not developed here,
since the article focuses on continuing harm from the implementation of
legislative policies (not one-shot actions), so that defacto ratification should
be apparent.
210. Cf Banker's Case, 14 State Trials 1, 26 (1700) (Howell ed.
1812) (Treby, L.C.J.) (emphasis added):
Now who shall direct the payment of. . .debts, the barons [of the
Court of Exchequer] or the treasurer? Who is the best judge of
the state of the kingdom, and of its necessities? So that suppose
there was only 4,000 1. in the exchequer, and we were threatened
with a foreign invasion, how shall this money be disposed? . . .
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political limitation on the principle of compensation was sym-
bolized for many by Congress' Article I, § 8 power "to pay
the Debts . . .of the United States." Similarly, the passage of
the Eleventh Amendment vindicated Hamilton's assertion in
The Federalist, No. 81 of the States' own "privilege of paying
their . . . debts in their own ways. "211
Correctly understood, however, that privilege furnishes
no grounds for converting the juridical principle of compen-
sation into a matter of pure legislative largesse. Justice Story,
for one, agreed with those founders who viewed the petition
of right as constitutionally obligatory upon the sovereign
Crown. 12 Hence he supported St. George Tucker's analo-
gous assertion in his 1803 "republican" edition of Blackstone
that the sovereign American legislatures should consent in
advance to legal proceedings in the nature of petitions of
right and agree to appropriate funds to pay all judgments. 3
Still, any such agreement would necessarily be subject to the
implicit proviso, "as the state of the fisc reasonably permits."
To be sure, where no colorable claim of emergency executive
prerogative was present, Lord Holt advocated the issuance of
an unconditional judgment leviable against the fisc under a pe-
tition in the Court of Exclequer, based on the Crown's
breach of an express contract in the Banker's Case in 1700.114
And this I take to be the true reason why no action can be
brought against the treasurer, because he acts as a judge, and not
as a minister of the court. . . . So I take it, 'may be paid, is
enough for the barons to say; but 'must be paid,' is only for the
treasurer to say.
Accord, id. at 103-105 (Sommers, L.K.).
211. FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 145, at 488.
212. STORY, COMMENTARIES, supra note 24, §1672 at 541.
213. Id. at 541-42 and n.1. See 1 TUCKER'S BLACKSTONE , App. 352
(1803).
214. 14 State Trials 1, 29-38 (1700) (Howell ed. 1812). The case in-
volved a decision by the Court of Exchequer affirming the validity of let-
ters patent issued under the great seal of the King, which commanded the
commissioners of the Treasury to pay monies out of his hereditary excise
to certain royal creditors. Moreover, Parliament had passed an appropria-
tion statute directing the treasurer to make such payments to the King (and
impliedly to his designee) on a regular basis. Hence there was no valid dele-
gation of discretionary jurisdiction to the treasurer to withhold payment of
these appropriated revenues upon a finding of supervening necessity. On
the contrary, as Lord Holt emphasized, the ability of the King to alienate
this branch of his revenues might itself be essential to prevent a national
emergency:
[If the King could not raise money by alienating his revenue, the
nation might perish; for he cannot otherwise raise money than by
an act of parliament, for which there might not be time. . ..
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But that result reflected the diminished constitutional status
of the Crown and the fact that the funds in question had al-
ready been appropriated by Parliament for unrestricted royal
purposes.
While the modern Supreme Court seems less confused
than its predecessors21 over the difference between the jus-
ticiability of the sovereign's duty to pay and the conceded
non-justiciability of its ability to pay, 16 it has been no more
willing to use that insight to develop substantive Taking
Clause jurisdiction along principled lines-free from an im-
plicit, inhibiting reference to Congress' own intent in waiving
its immunity against the recovery of claims in the Tucker Act.
Were it otherwise, the silent reproof of an affirmative judg-
ment could serve to concentrate the sovereign's attention in
weighing responsibly the political factors underlying its
"payability." Nor would full payment be any less certain than
it is when the citizen's only action was against a potentially
insolvent official.
Thus, with no other mechanism to establish legislative
accountability, we may safely assume that Madison, Jefferson,
and Adams would all have dismissed out of hand, as did Mar-
shall in Osborn v. Bank of the United States,2"7 the "extravagant
proposition" that a government official committing an author-
Id. at 30.
215. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Eslen, 183 U.S. 62, 65-66
(1901); cf. Draft Opinion in Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. 697, 702-03
(1865) (Taney, C.J.):
The award of execution is a part, and an essential part, of every
judgment passed by a court exercising judicial powers. It is no
judgment, in the legal sense of the term, without it. . . . It would
be merely an opinion . . . unless Congress should at some future
time sanction it, and pass a law authorizing the court to carry its
opinion into effect. Such is not the judicial power confided to this
Court...
216. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 570 (1962) (Harlan,
J.), holding that "the capacity to enforce a judgment is [not] always indis-
pensable for the exercise of judicial power"). In Glidden the Court upheld
the status of the Court of Claims as an Article III court despite the fact
that Congress had passed a general appropriations bill only for judgments
of less than $100,000 and that even the payment of those judgments was
subject to later Congressional countermand. See id. at 568-571. See also La
Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423, 461-62 (1899) (up-
holding justiciability of a declaratory judgment action by the United States
before the Court of Claims to determine the correctness of award by an
international arbitral commission with whose enforcement the federal
courts had no concern).
217. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
19851
JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY
ized or privileged constitutional tort is shielded from "an ac-
tion at law" by a theory of vicarious sovereign immunity. The
fact of sovereign immunity cuts just the other way. What
then is the explanation for Curtis' clear dictum to the con-
trary? Leaving aside the Sugar and Stamp Acts, it may be
traced directly to a purported statutory conferral of immu-
nity on U.S. tax collectors. Congress had sought to shield its
revenue agents against quasi-contractual claims for monies al-
legedly had and received through the illegal exaction of cus-
tom duties. And the enactment was upheld in Cary v. Curtis18
over the Seventh Amendment protests of Justice Story. While
the majority noted that the statute left open the possibility of
other common law actions like trover and replevin, Story
found that the Seventh Amendment rights being "pre-
served" were illusory. 19 That was because greater tactical so-
phistication on the part of the taxpayer was required to ma-
neuver into a position to bring the remaining actions.
But more to the present point, having skirted his proce-
dural arguments, in dicta the Cary majority locked horns with
Story over the substantive issue of the constitutional role of
official liability. Focusing on the plight of the "innocent" tax
collector, who was acting within his discretion and was statu-
torily prohibited from protecting himself through set-off or
sequestration of contested collections,"' they denied that a
cause of action in quasi-contract could lie against such an of-
ficer. After all, the law never implied a contract where it
would be unjust to do so. And under the circumstances "jus-
tice and fairness" imposed any implied duty to repay on the
government, which both authorized the discretionary con-
duct and benefitted from the actual collections."'
Story recoiled in horror. This reasoning by implied anal-
ogy to the doctrine of judicial immunity was a perversion of
our received constitutional principles. It made a "mockery of
justice" to invoke respondeat superior where the principal was
immune. Besides, notwithstanding Curtis' later assertion, it
was Story's judgment that a common law remedy was histori-
cally available to the citizen for taxes illegally exacted (even if
not to the collector against the state); and he asserted that
such a public law action should in turn be available against all
officials who commit wrongs under color of law, even or
218. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236 (1845).
219. Compare id. at 250 with id. at 255-56 (Story, J., dissenting).
220. Cf Elliot v. Swartwout, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 137 (1836).
221. 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 250-52.
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rather especially if authorized.222 Story denied that the princi-
ple of quasi-contract was limited to routine private law cases
of unjust enrichment, as suggested by the majority. Anglo-
American constitutional history gave it "much broader and
deeper foundations. ' 2 3 In particular, by virtue of our consti-
tutional principles any executive officer who elects to work
for the state should be deemed to take his job cum onere, i.e.,
subject to the citizen's historic right to sue him at law in or-
der to obtain vicarious redress against his immune princi-
pal.22' Hence concern for the "innocent" executive officer is
definitively misplaced. And in any event equitable symmetry
is introduced by the fact that the officer will enjoy a perfect
right of indemnity against the state, a right which the -legisla-
ture can be trusted to honor in his case, not just out of good
faith, but in a pragmatic effort to attract and retain loyal
administrators.
The second reason most often advanced in support of
Curtis' innovative common law of official immunity is implicit
in the first. And it illustrates the tacit role played in the de-
bate by the nineteenth century ideological clash over the
proper role of the jury, a debate explored in the next section
of the article. As a matter of separation of powers and re-
spect for a co-equal branch, the judiciary did not want to sub-
ject executive officers to the danger of having their discre-
tionary decisions second-guessed in legal actions-especially by
lay jurors.22 ' Besides the indignity of it all, potential liability
might paralyze the exercise of vital executive discretion in
cases where the officers had not been guaranteed a right of
indemnity. But that concern-the product, as Professor Jaffe
noted, of "unrealism in the name of realism!" 22 6-is mis-
placed where the officers are carrying' out legislative policy. If
the legislature is concerned about such paralysis, it can always
agree in advance to waive its own immunity or to indemnify
officials against liability for their good faith, discretionary
policy choices-assuming it is not enough to ask such officials
(like citizens) to trust in the government's good faith or prag-
matic good sense. (That is the recent solution to the execu-
tive paralysis dilemma imposed by the Supreme Court under
222. Id. at 254.
223. Id. at 255.
224. Id. at 259-60.
225. See, e.g., Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 648
(1980); James, Tort Liability of Governmental Units and Their Officers, 22 U.
CHI. L. REv. 610, 638, 642-43 (1955).
226. Jaffe, supra note 151, at 249.
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§ 1983 in the case of local governments, where Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity concerns are technically in-
applicable.) In general sovereign immunity situations, this ar-
ticle contends, a competing constitutional postulate demands
that the threat of executive paralysis in the implementation
of legislative policies be maintained as a continuous source of
pressure on the legislature to agree in advance to pay its
quasi-contractual obligation for continuing harm from au-
thorized executive policy choices. 27
As noted earlier, official immunity against collateral com-
mon law attack developed when Lord Holt turned Bushell's
Case on its head. After conceding judicial status to legislative
courts and their officers, Holt concluded that they deserved
to share in the jury's constitutional immunity from liability
for erroneous fact-finding. Of course, Holt's motive was to
assert an implied common law right of direct appellate super-
intendence over these judicial entitites via certiorari.2s8 And
in that way the ideal of direct appellate judicial review, lim-
ited to matters of law or excess of jurisdiction, began to grow
up at the expense of collateral judicial review by jurors,
which had included an equitable inquiry into the underlying
justification for administrative acts. Yet despite Holt's efforts
active administrative review by damage action survived in
England well into the nineteenth century. Although techni-
cally limited to issues of "jurisdictional facts," juries in such
cases were apt to be guided by a broader sense of the equi-
ties, including the need to provide claimants with vicarious
redress against the state. Hence English appellate courts in
227. Accord, Jaffe, supra note 151, at 249. Cf. Laski, The Responsibility
of the State in England, 32 HARV. L. REV. 447 (1919); Jaffe, Suite Against
Governments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 HARV. L. REV. 209, 215-18
(1963); Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative Officers, 21 MINN. L. REV.
263 (1937); James, supra note 225. Historically, official liability in common
law damage actions for good faith acts, whether ministerial or discretion-
ary, did lead as a matter of course to indemnification by the sovereign. Yet
that fact and its implications have been lost on even the most perceptive
critics who applaud the tacit value judgment made by modern courts in
conferring blanket administrative immunity lest "courageous and indepen-
dent official action" be inhibited. Id. at 643. As Professor James had said,
"the benefits to be had from the personal liability of the officer (especially
since the prospect of actual compensation to the victim from that source is slight)
are outweighed by the evils that would flow from a wider rule of liability."
Id. at 638-39 (emphasis added). On official immunity in general, see Cass,
Damage Suits Against Public Officers, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1110 (1981).
228. The Case of Cardiff Bridge, 91 Eng. Rep. 135 (K.B. 1700);
Groenvelt v. Burwell, 91 Eng. Rep. 1202, 1212 (K.B. 1699). See Jaffe, The
Right to Judicial Review, 71 HARV. L. REV. 401, 414-17 (1958).
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the last century had to define the concept of jurisdictional
facts with narrower and narrower precision and direct more
and more verdicts. 29
In the United States, as Murray's Leasee attests, federal
courts extended the fact-finding prerogatives and immunity
of jurors to quasi-judicial administrative officers, notwith-
standing Article III and the Seventh Amendment."' In the
process, however, Justice Story was not the sole dissentient to
emerge. For example, in a case anticipating Murray's Lessee
and recalling the obnoxious immunity provisions of the Sugar
and Stamp Acts, Chief Justice Marshall dissented from the
Court's holding that Congress could confer on administrative
officers a "good faith" discretionary right to seize vessels that
might appear suspicious to them.23 ' Citing constitutional con-
cerns, Marshall asserted that the jury in a collateral damage
suit should be free to determine whether the officer exercised
"reasonable care" in arriving at his subjective conclusion.2"2
Likewise, in his "much-maligned" opinion for the Massa-
chusetts' Supreme Court in Miller v. Horton,2"  Justice
Holmes upheld the liability of a health official for destroying
a horse which the board of health found diseased, but which
a jury later found not diseased. Although Holmes based the
decision on a narrow reading of the statute, as authorizing
distruction only of beasts actually diseased, in dicta he indi-
cated grave doubts as to the widely-accepted right of the leg-
islature to authorize the "good faith" destruction of animals
merely suspected of being diseased,3 4 so as to shield officials
from judicial second-guessing. Anticipating Mahon and the
posited Holmesian compromise, he conceded that such a stat-
ute, would be valid as an emergency measure so far as actually
authorizing good faith destruction was concerned-as well as
presumably shielding the officer against punitive damages.
But due process of law, he cautioned, might well entitle the
claimant to "revision by a jury" in a post-deprivation damage
action of any unreasonable administrative determination.2 33 In
229. Jaffe, Judicial Review: Constitutional and Jurisdiction Fact, 70
HARv. L. REV. 953, 959-61 (1957).
230. James, supra note 225, at 640-41. Compare Bradley v. Fisher, 80
U.S. 335 (1871) with Kendall v. Stokes, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 87 (1845).
231. Otis v. Watkins, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 339 (1815).
232. Id. at 358 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting).
233. 152 Mass. 540, 26 N.E. 100 (1891). See Jaffe, supra note 229, at,
967 n.48.
234. Id. at 101.
235. Id. at 102. And there, pragmatically speaking, the jury might
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other words, the statute would not necessarily furnish an ab-
solute shield of immunity, since to the extent the valid exer-
cise of such broad discretion led to the infliction of unreason-
ably disproportionate harm it might constitute an
unconstitutional taking.
Thus, the extension of the jury's fact-finding preroga-
tives to quasi-judicial officials may have been justified on a
separation-of-powers or federalism basis, but only to the ex-
tent of precluding direct appellate interference to stop the
discretionary governmental action in its tracts or to compel it
to go forward. The possibility of collateral attack through a
common law damage action, however, should have survived
to permit a jury to establish whether a de facto taking oc-
curred and, if so, to exert pressure on the legislature to com-
pensate. Instead, not only were juries denied the defacto priv-
ilege of reviewing the redistributive impact of legislature
policies in terms of the reasonableness of their implementa-
tion, federal courts even removed allegations of bad faith or
maliciousness as a potential common law source of jury lever-
age over national policy."" As such unrealistic realism esca-
lated, driven by a thinly-desguised juryprobia, blanket official
immunity threatened to become a reality.
E. Jury As Modern "Odd Man Out."
As noted in the Introduction, however, the modern Su-
preme Court has backed away from Curtis' dictum. Even so,
demonstrating continued concern over paralyzing legislative
policy, it held in Larson"3 7 that the legislature had impliedly
and effectively abolished any constitutionally-based nonstatu-
tory right to equitable relief against an officer for a continu-
ing authorized tort. This was because Congress voluntarily
provided a Tucker Act damage remedy. Only at that point
does the more difficult conceptual question posed by this arti-
cle arise.
Can this Tucker Act remedy or a similiar administrative
return a verdict of "unreasonable" in the larger sense that, whether or not
the officer's exercise of discretion or ministerial responsibility was mistaken
or accurate, it led to unacceptably high redistributive consequences, for
which no other means of compensation were provided.
236. Compare Kendall v. Stokes, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 87 (1845) with Gre-
goire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949
(1950).
237. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corporation, 337
U.S. 682 (1949).
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remedy, neither of which carries a right to a Seventh Amend-
ment jury, be deemed to abrogate the citizen's federal and
state common law right to litigate such as applied constitutional
disputes in an action against the responsible officials? Larson
specifically failed to reach the question. 8' In a case where
that is found to be Congress' intent, this article suggests that
the constitutional trade-off may have to be provision of a full-
fledged Seventh Amendment jury as part of the statutory
remedy. 39
But that extravagant proposition is apt to be dismissed
with a shrug, modern legal culture having long since drained
the jury trial guarantee of all legitimate substantive content.
Thus, while the modern Supreme Court apparently attributes
Curtis' suspect doctrine of blanket official immunity to his
misreading of Cary (in which the majority condoned Con-
gress' removal of one common law remedy against a tax col-
lector but only in view of the continued availability of other
common law remedies),40 it refuses to attach any special po-
litical significance to the fact that the alternative remedies in
Cary involved a jury. Still laboring under Brandeis' influence,
the Court sees no implicit Seventh Amendment obstacle to
Congress' substitution of an exclusive administrative remedy
for the citizen's historic common law right of action against
238. Id. at 688 & n.8. This analytical use of Larson to support an
expansion of the pecuniary liability of the government or its officers should
make it clear why the author chooses not to join in the current round of
hand-wringing over Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 104 S.
Ct. 900 (1984), a case which barred the use of a federal court injunction to
force a state court official to comply with state law. See, e.g., Shapiro, Wrong
Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst Case, 98 HARv. L. REv. 61,
63 (1984). Indeed, the majority in Pennhurst is careful to note that damage
actions against state officials for wrongful conduct are not affected. 104 S.
Ct. at 913 n.19, 914 n.21.
239. Workmen's compensation statutes, initially invalidated on jury
trial grounds or modified to provide an election to remain outside the sys-
tem, do not constitute a telling counter-argument. The conclusionary anal-
ysis used to support them holds that once a common law action is
"merged" into a "statutory" action, the constitutional guarantee has
"nothing on which to operate." See Jaffe, supra note 151, at 98 & n.48. For
present purposes workmen's compensation claims may be adequately distin-
guished from taking claims on the basis that submission to the juryless sys-
tem for adjudicating the former forms, part of a consensual contractual
relationship.
240. See Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S.
50, 68 n. 23 (1982), citing Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 549 n.21
(1962). Glidden in turn cited Cary v. Curtis, 3 How. 236, 250 (1834), for
the proposition that the case turned on the availability of other legal
remedies.
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the administrator of an unjust law. On the contrary, it is
more than likely the spectre of the public law jury that has
prompted the modern Court to endorse mechanically the
case law extending the flawed logic of Murray's Lessee (permit-
ting conclusive administrative fact-finding) to taking or "just
compensation" claims arising from acts of taxation, regula-
tion, or confiscation.241
This tact would have been especially tempting to the
Court insofar as it justly feared that the potential Article III
baggage of a Seventh Amendment jury might dissuade Con-
gress from extending to federal courts the coveted privilege
of original jurisdiction or appellate review in public law cases,
as through the Administrative Procedures Act and the
Tucker Act. After all, a literal application of Murray's Lessee
would justify having such claims determined in full by the
legislative or executive branches themselves. So that today
when the Court acknowledges that Murray's Lessee leads to
the counter-intuitive result that an "independent [Article III]
judicial tribunal" of any sort (not just a Seventh Amendment
jury) is excluded from the very public law areas in which "po-
litical theory" suggests it is most needed,2 42 but then purports
241. Kohl v. U.S., 91 U.S. 367, 375-76 (1875). Ironically, one reason
why the Supreme Court allowed implicit immunity doctrines to gut the
public law jury was its fearful misconception of the legitimate scope of
Congress' express power via Article III, section 2 to curtail (and, the Court
reasoned, place conditions upon) the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court over "suits to which the United States is a party." Compare Ex parte
Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438 (1928) with Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530,
549, and n.21 (1962). In fact, the "exceptions" power was designed to
head off criticism by jury-philes of the Court's otherwise blanket Article III
"appellate" jurisdiction over both "the law and the facts" of cases, by ena-
bling Congress to prevent the retrial of facts found by a common law jury.
R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 303-14 (1969). This provision
did not appease the critics, who did not want the jury's "inestimable privi-
lege" to render an unimpeachable general verdict left to the tender
mercies of Congress. See, e.g., 3 COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST supra note 159,
at 60-61 ("A Democratic Federalist"). So to be "doubly sure," they success-
fully agitated in the Ratification Conventions for what became the Seventh
Amendment provision that "no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise reex-
amined in any court of the United States"-thus (it would have seemed)
effectively supplanting the "exceptions" clause. Instead, the clause would
come back to haunt them. On the other hand, Professor Berger's well-rea-
soned analysis is that Congress's Article III "exceptions" power, like its
Article I powers, is subject to the Fifth Amendment and cannot be manipu-
lated so as to deny Article III jurisdiction over takings actions. Burger, op.
cit. at 314. And along with obligatory Article III jurisdiction comes the
obligatory Seventh Amendment jury-or so'this article asserts.
242. See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 68 n.20. For recent reflections
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to bow selflessly before the "historical fact" that as of 1791
such quasi-judicial matters could be conclusively determined
by the other branches of government,43 one is entitled to a
healthy cynicism. Courtesy of Congress' voluntary conferral
of jurisdiction on Article III courts in such matters, all Cur-
tis' controversial assertion now means in practice is that pub-
lic law actions constitute an implicit, historically-grounded ex-
ception to the Seventh Amendment. And so why should the
Court go to bat historically for the jury, if the results could
unsettle its own convenient modus vivendi with Congress?
F. The "Historical" Public Law Jury.
Nonetheless, there are at least four direct avenues for at-
tacking Curtis' historical conclusions as applied to the jury, in
addition to the indirect tact pursued in the next section; and
for purposes of illuminating the general thesis, those alterna-
tive avenues , by now somewhat familiar to the reader, will be
briefly summarized.
First, one might argue that once Congress has volunta-
rily conferred Article III jurisdiction over public law matters,
as in the case of the Tucker Act, the Seventh Amendment, as
an essential aspect of that jurisdiction, must apply if the sub-
ject matter itself constitutes a "Sui[t] at common law." And
"just compensation" claims do clearly fall within Justice
Story's dynamic definition of that phrase in Parsons v. Bed-
ford.244 Story, a believer in an expansive civil jury guarantee,
asserted that by the phrase "common law" the framers of the
Amendment intended
what the constitution denominates in the third article 'law;'
not merely suits, which the common law recognized among
its old and settled proceedings, but suits, in which legal
rights were to be ascertained and determined .... 145
Hence "just compensation" actions, as suits for damages, con-
cededly satisfy Story's definition, but for certain alleged his-
on the viability of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, see, id. at 67; Owen
v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 645 & n.28 (1980).
243. Id.; see also id. at 67-69. For another view critical of the Northern
Pipeline Court's continued "blind deference" to Curtis' suspect historical
claims in Murray's Lessee, see Redish, Legislative Courts, Administrative Agen-
des, and the Northern Pipeline Division, 1983 DUKE L.J. 197, 205, 209 n.88.
244. 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433 (1830).
245. Id. at 446-49. See also STORY, COMMENTARIES, supra note 24, at §
1762.
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torical exceptions having to do with the fact that as of 1791
Parliament did not inevitably require juries in English con-
demnation cases and when it did it often employed the highly
independent ad quod damnum jury.2 46
Those exceptions appear irrelevant, however, once the
federal statutory remedy is viewed as a surrogate for the
common law damage action that would have been available
against the administrative officer enforcing the unjust tax,
regulation, or confiscation:
[T]he state is not suable except with its consent . .. The
State may also, when providing for its own needs under the
right of eminent domain . ., give all necessary protection to
its agents and relegate the owner to such remedy as it deems
proper, provided it is adequate and accords to the citizen due
process, and without reference to the Seventh Amendment. 4
So said the Sixth Circuit in upholding the original provision
in the Tennessee Valley Authority Act empowering commis-
sioners to assess just compensation for properties taken. But
it is a non sequitur to assume that because the state need not
consent to be sued, it can condition that consent on the de-
struction of a pre-existing legal remedy.
Secondly, the English exceptions may be irrelevant for
another reason. Story considered that Article III divided fed-
eral jurisdiction into three inclusive categories, law, equity,
and admiralty; and for him the addition of the Seventh
Amendment meant that law should be viewed as the great
residual category, after allowance for relatively static, particu-
larized equity and admiralty exceptions.2 4 ' He found confir-
mation for that view of the framers' intent in the fact that
the day before Congress proposed the Seventh Amendment
for ratification, it enacted §§ 9, 12, and 13 of the Judiciary
Act of 1789 as a stopgap measure. 49 Those sections provided
a residual right of jury trial in all non-equity and non-admi-
ralty proceedings in the district and circuit courts, as well as
in the Supreme Court. Hence the conclusion reached by the
Supreme Court in Kohl v. United States25 ° that the Seventh
Amendment is inapplicable to condemnation suits because
246. Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 376 (1875).
247. Welch v. TVA, 108 F.2d 95, 98-99 (6th Cir. 1939), cert. den.
309 U.S. 688 (1940).
248. STORY, COMMENTARIES, supra note 24, at § 1762.
249. Id.
250. 91 U.S. 367, 376 (1875).
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they were "common law" actions in which Parliament some-
times failed to provide a jury does not follow, unless we stand
Story's analysis on its head. For it suffices for Seventh
Amendment purposes that such suits were not part of the his-
toric equity and admiralty exceptions. Yet Story's analysis has
been inverted by those who incongruously cite his analysis of
the second clause of the Seventh Amendment (which for dif-
ferent reasons he interpreted by reference to historical En-
glish practice as of 1791) as a basis for impugning his own
dynamic analysis of the first clause.8 Where Story insisted
that the Amendment extended jury trials to "the fullest lati-
tude of the common law," these critics would deny its opera-
tion unless "assessment by [common law] jury [was] uniformly
resorted to" in English practice as of 1791.152 And so it may
be another non sequitur to assume with the modern Court
that because the state need not consent to be sued, it can con-
dition that consent on a modification of the intended residual
scope of the Seventh Amendment.
Rather one suspects that in practice the jury has served
as a judicial bargaining chip in securing Congress' waiver of
sovereign immunity. That analysis is borne out by Justice Mc-
Lean's contemporaneous dissent from Story's dynamic defini-
tion of the jury guarantee in Parsons. Since the Seventh
Amendment does not bind the states, he noted, an unwanted
federal/state procedural discrepancy would be introduced
into diversity of citizenship actions by Story's expansive ap-
proach, despite Congress' Practice Act which sought to con-
form the procedures in such cases. 83 In particular, McLean
indicated strong concern that otherwise valid state laws ap-
pointing commissioners to evaluate real property in the case
of improvements erected by occupying claimants would be
unenforcible in federal courts and, more importantly, that
Congress itself would be powerless to adopt a commission sys-
tem in condemnation cases. He concluded that this dichot-
omy did not make sense in terms of realpolitik, anticipating
the latterday arguments of Justice White.2 5' After all, given
251. See 5 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE I 38.08 [5.-4] n.2, citing United
States v. Wonson, 28 Fed. Cas. 745, 750 (CCD Mass. 1812). (No. 16,750)
(Story, J.).
252. Blair, Federal Condemnation Proceedings and the Seventh Amend-
ment, 41 HARv. L. REV. 29, 32 (1927). See 5 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
38.32[1] (1984).
253. 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 452.
254. Id. at 456; see Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 116 (White, J.,
dissenting).
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Congress' power to abolish or alter the jurisdiction of lower
federal courts so as to leave the trial of all such cases to jury-
less state courts, little is gained and much is risked by insist-
ing on technical limits to Congress' ability to shape a jurisdic-
tion it need not confer at all. Little is gained by resisting
McLean's unsavory bargain, that is, if one does not share
Story's enthusiasm for the popular mythology of the jury.
One who was familiar with that mythology first-hand and
mirrored Story's enthusiasm was Justice Patterson. Indeed, in
a 1795 diversity action 55 he charged a law-finding jury as to
his conviction that a Pennsylvania statute, empowering com-
missioners to award compensation in just such occupying
claimant cases, violated fundamental American principles of
constitutional law implicit in the civil jury guarantee of Penn-
sylvania's own Constitution:
The interposition of a jury is, in such case, a constitutional
guard upon property, and a necessary check to legislative
authority. It is a barrier between the individual and the leg-
islature, and ought never to be removed. 5
Thirdly, the English historical exceptions may be irrele-
vant because they are a statutory, not a common law, phe-
nomenon, emanating from an omnipotent Parliament uncon-
strained by either a Taking Clause or a Seventh Amendment:
A jury was dispensed with in such cases, not because at
common law in similar cases a trial by jury could not be
had, but because each statute of Parliament providing for
an appropriation of property was a law unto itself. 57
Given the presence of both guarantees in the U.S. Constitu-
tion, the Fourth Circuit concluded in 1913 that the status of
an American taking claim under the Seventh Amendment
should not be prejudiced by reference to lapsed English prac-
tice in 1791 .258 Employing Story's analysis, the court held
that a taking claim is the equivalent of a suit at common law
since "[t]he jury at common law was always the tribunal to
assess damages. 2 59 Support for this view comes from Chief
Justice Coke's response to one of the first parliamentary stat-
255. Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dali.) 304 (C.C. Pa.
1795).
256. Id. at 315.
257. United States v. Beatty, 203 F. 620, 624-26 (4th Cir. 1913).
258. Id.
259. Id. Accord, Badgett, Jury Trial in Condemnation Proceedings, 13
TENN. L. REV. 181 (1935).
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utes to authorize commissioners to take property at a "rea-
sonable price" assessed by them, viz., the Statute of Sewers
involving the drainage of low lands. In the Case of the Isle of
Ely26 Coke narrowly construed this novel authority as limited
to the maintenance of ancient sewers. He did so on the the-
ory that such a procedure could only be justified by local cus-
tom and acquiescence. Coke insisted that the proper method
for opening new sewers was through use of the ancient ad
quod damnum or sheriff's jury, which would assess the dam-
ages. This decision prompted yet another skirmish between
Privy Council and King's Bench, with the Privy Council com-
mitting plaintiffs for contempt who brought successful tres-
pass and replevin actions against commissioners or their bai-
liffs for appropriating property for new sewers without a writ
of ad quod damnum.2 61
Fourthly, the English historical exceptions themselves do
not hold up under analysis. There were specific common law
analogues to "inverse condemnation" actions;' and in the
context of the important petition of right there existed an
entitlement to a jury trial at King's Bench of all disputed le-
gal issues, 63 not to mention the ubiquitous ad quod damnum
jury to measure damages. To deny, as some would, that the
petition of right can be deemed a true common law action,
since relief was discretionary, is to elevate form over
substance:
It is of no consequence that theoretically speaking the per-
mission of the Crown is necessary to the filing of the peti-
tion, because it is the duty of the King to grant it, and the
right of the subject to demand it.2 14
That leaves only the dubious claims that the petition of right
was never part of the American common law 2 5 and that the
260. 10 Co. Rep. 141, 77 Eng. Rep. 1139 (1610). For general back-
ground, see Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV.
553, 576-79 (1972).
261. See Hetley v. Boyer, 79 Eng. Rep. 287 (K.B. 1614). See Jaffe &
Henderson, Judicial Review and the Rule of Law: Historical Origins, 72 L. Q.
REV. 345 (1956).
262. See Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. at 563, citing inter alia 9 W.
HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 7-45 (1926).
263. See Holdsworth, supra note 262, at 17, 42 n.8.
264. United States v. O'Keefe, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 178, 183-84 (1870).
Accord, JAFFEE, supra note 151, at 212. See also R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE
SUPREME COURT 315-54 (1969).
265. Jaffe, supra note 151, at 213. But see United States v. Lee, 106
U.S. 196, 238-239 (1882) (dissenting opinion).
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alleged Revolutionary shift from Crown to legislature ren-
dered the precedent inapposite anyway."'
Just as importantly, however, there was in 1791 the near
universal right in England and the states to an ad quod
damnum jury on the issue of damages in straight condemna-
tion actions, available (if not in the first instance) at least on
appeal from an unfavorable administrative award.26 7 But
nineteenth century judges rejected the ad quod damnum jury
as a precedent for application of the constitutional civil jury
guarantee for a number of reasons. On the one hand, it was
too independent of the common law court;2"" but under the
model of a law-finding jury being proposed, the fact of its
independence would be corroborative. Moreover, the ad quod
damnum jury does enjoy a distinguished common law lineage.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has suggested that
the use of an ad quod damnum jury merely to "establish a par-
ticular fact [i.e., value] as a preliminary to the taking" does
not rise to the dignity of a full-fledged "Suit at common law"
for Seventh Amendment purposes. 69 Of course, the historic
ad quod damnum jury was capable of doing more than assess-
ing damages, 270 and under the public law model being pro-
266. Cf Jaffe, supra note 151, at 213.
267. See, e.g.,id. at 14-15; 1 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN §§ 1.21-1-
22 (3d ed. 1981).
268. In short, the common law ad quod damnum or sheriffs' jury was
not regarded as historical precedent for determining the scope of the Sev-
enth Amendment because it was not sufficiently under the thumb of the
court. See, e.g., Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1899),
(holding that the constitutional trial by jury in its "primary and usual"
sense connotes the "supervision of a judge empowered to instruct the ju-
rors in the law and to advise them on the facts, and (except on acquital of a
criminal charge) to set aside their verdict if in his opinion it is against the
law or the evidence"). By contrast, the Anglo-Saxon jury-centric county
courts that survived the Norman Conquest and inspired the Leveller tradi-
tion were judgeless courts held incident to the jurisdiction of the sheriff.
See Lysander Spooner, An Essay on the Trial By Jury (1852) in LET'S ABOLISH
GOVERNMENT 60-65 (M. Rothbard ed. 1972).
269. United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 519 (1883).
270. Indeed, the historic ad quod damnum jury possessed something
very like the power to prohibit proposed local condemnations on the
grounds of inadequate public purpose or necessity. And until the 1960's
this historic prerogative was reflected in the constitutionally prescribed em-
inent domain procedures of both Michigan and Wisconsin. See MICH.
CONST. art. XIII, §2 (1908); Wisc. CONST. art. XI, §2 (1848). Generally,
juries were designated to determine issue of the necessity for the taking, as
well as damages, in all condemnations by governmental entities (other than
the state itself) and by private entities. See, e.g., In re Slum Clearance v.
City of Detroit, 331 Mich. 714, 50 N.W.2d 340 (1951).
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posed the intention is that the jury would take an active role
in assessing liability for regulatory takings.
Not coincidentally, Curtis' decision in support of Con-
gress' disenfranchisement of the local jury in federal tax as-
sessment cases paralleled in approach contemporaneous state
court decisions acquiescing in the "increasing tendency of
state legislatures [after 1830] to eliminate the role of the
[county ad quod damnum] jury in assessing damages for the
taking of land "l 1-and to supplant the compensation jury
with appraisers or commissioners whose valuations were bind-
ing on the condemnee. Despite popular protests that the ad
quod damnum jury enjoyed constitutional status,27 2 legislatures
acceded to the importunities of chartered railroads and canal
companies lest juries from counties dissatisfied with the
state's policy of internal improvements or juries mistakenly
assuming the corporate condemnor to have unlimited re-
sources continue empowered to frustrate important state pol-
icies. The courts oblidgingly manufactured the tenuous ex-
cuses just canvassed for impugning the common law
credentials of that institution. Thus, the claim of individual-
ized equity was advertently (and unnecessarily) subordinated
to the need for an inexpensive method of adjudicating claims
yielding uniform, predictably low judgments. 73
271. Horwitz, supra note 102, at 84-85. See also id. at 67-69. Repre-
sentative state court decisions (cited in id. at 84 nn. 115-117) include Beek-
man v. Saratoga & R.R., 3 Paige 45 (N.Y. 1831); Willyard v. Hamilton, 7
Ohio 111 (pt. 2) (1836); and Raleigh & Gatson R.R. v. Davis, 2 D&B 451
(N.C. 1837). See also Bonaparte v. Camden & Amboy R.R., 3 Fed. Cas. 821
(1830). And in 1848 Daniel Webster lamented the untoward implications
for personal liberty of the passing of the ad quod damnum jury, remarking
that:
It is said, the citizen is safe, because, under the exercise of the
eminent domain, he is to receive compensation . . . . That fur-
nishes no security, for the mode and amount of compensation is
fixed ex parte by the government and its agents.
West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How). 507, 517 (1848) (emphasis
added.) But Webster's position in the Fugitive Slave Act controversy pre-
vented him from impugning the constitutionality of such a state of affairs.
272. See, e.g., L. HARTZ, ECONOMIC POLICY AND DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT:
PENNSYLVANIA, 1776-1860, 159 (1948).
273. In light of the off-setting benefits reaped by many, if not most,
condemnees in such internal improvement cases and the fact that rural,
unimproved land was likely to be involved, even before commissioners en-
tered the picture net judgments rendered by juries might well be less than
the condemnor's litigation expenses. So a clear impetus and perceived justi-
fication for the demise of the ad quod damnum jury was its large expense
relative to the predictable size of the average claim. See, e.g., Horwitz, supra
note 102, at 67. A more sensitive and historically sound approach, how-
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G. Jury as Political Pawn.
The foregoing factors render Curtis' original historical
judgment, especially as applied to exclude juries from "just
compensation" actions, profoundly suspect. In the final analy-
sis, therefore, his dictum rests on the principle of sovereign
immunity, the power of Congress to shape Article III juris-
diction, and the bogus corollary of official immunity-not on
an accurate historical analysis of the Seventh Amendment.
But this article leaves largely for another day the technical
aspects of the debate over the constitutional status of the
compensation jury.174 Instead, it seeks in the next section to
demonstrate that Curtis' hidden agenda in Murray's Lessee
was to sabotage Story's dynamic definition of the Seventh
Amendment and that he did so as a natural outgrowth of his
own die-hard role in the Fugitive Slave Act Controversy.
Echoing Hobbes, attorney Curtis in 1851 had upbraided
those who championed the right of northern juries to dis-
pense equity in favor of "the liberty of a mere black" when
"the unity and security of a white man's country" were at
stake.275 Accordingly, Curtis' 1855 opinion may be seen as a
ever, would have been to give the condemnee a suitably conditioned right
to appeal from the commissioners' valuation for a trial de novo before a'
jury. See Henderson, supra note 159 at 17; Tachau, supra note 151, at 91.
Cf Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1 (1899); Williams v. Taunton,
126 Mass. 287 (1879).
274. The author plans to explore the historical origins of the public
law jury in greater depth in a subsequent article. The important thing to
note at this point is that the state and federal judiciaries were in the con-
venient position of doing the bidding of the "democratically elected" legis-
lature-and were certainly not disposed to stick out their own necks to
save a so-called "popular" institution which they so distrusted
professionally.
Two state courts, however, which did buck the legislative trend by ac-
cording constitutional status to the compensation jury were those of Massa-
chusetts and its legal twin, Maine. See Chadwick v. Proprietors of Haverhill
Bridge, 2 Dane's Abr. 686; and Day v. Stetson, 8 Me. 365, 372 (1832). Not
surprisingly, modern Massachusetts courts have narrowly construed the
role of the constitutional compensation jury as limited to condemnations of
tangible real property, not loss of good will, subjective harm, etc. See, e.g.,
Sawyer v. Commonwealth, 182 Mass. 245, 65 N.E. 52 (1902) (Holmes,
C.J.). The idea has been repudiated altogether in Maine. Ingram v. Maine
Water Co., 98 Me. 566, 57 A. 893 (1904).
275. 1 B. CURTIS, JR., A MEMOIR OF BENJAMIN ROBBINS CURTIS 135-
136 (1897), as paraphrased in R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED 176 (1975). Cur-
tis, appointed to the Supreme Court by Millard Fillmore, enjoyed the
strong backing of Secretary of State Daniel Webster, who was principally
attracted by the likelihood that Curtis, a stauch nationalist, would vigor-
ously prosecute Fugitive Slave Act cases in his circuit duties as presiding
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key component in the overall process referred to earlier by
which the historic law-finding prerogative of local juries was
deliberately sacrificed to a perception of the imperative de-
mands of the Supremacy Clause. And unless that process can
be reversed and the legitimate political function of the jury
recognized and restored, vindication of the right to a jury in
public law actions by itself will make little practical
difference.
For instance, while the modern Court has finally (1) ac-
knowledged that inverse condemnation actions may well be
"inherently judicial" and are certainly "justiciable" for Arti-
cle III purposes" 6 and (2) asserted along with Chief Justice
Hughes that Article III judicial power requires not only a
presumptive right to review the law, but also a right to re-
view the facts of cases decided administratively, since "funda-
mental rights [often] depend . . . upon the facts, and finality
as to facts becomes in effect finality in law" 2 7 7 -it has still
failed to put (1) and (2) together. The acknowledged consti-
tutional justiciability of such actions alone, but especially in
view of the acknowledged importance of what factfinder ap-
plies the law to the facts, dictates that they be tried by a Sev-
enth Amendment jury.7 Yet presumably today the Court
refuses to take that logical step for an additional reason not
present for the Brandeis court. By virtue of the 1943 decision
in Galloway v. United States, 7 a divided Supreme Court defin-
itively joined the nineteenth century movement by which
judges leveraged an asserted power over the "legal sufficiency
of the evidence" in civil cases into a constitutional right and
judge over the First Circuit in eastern New England (Maine, N.H., Mass.,
and R.I.). Webster was not disappointed. See, e.g., Gillette, Benjamin R. Cur-
tis, in II THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1969,
895-924 (L. Friedman & F. Israel, eds. 1969),
276. See Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. at 549 and n.21, 563-64.
277. See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 86 n. 39, quoting Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 57 (1932) (Hughes, C.J.).
278. This was the Justice Douglas' conclusion in Glidden, 370 U.S. at
602 (dissenting opinion); cf. Kohl v. U.S., 91 U.S. 367, 378-79 (1875)
(Field, J., dissenting). See Beatty v. United States, 203 F.620, 624-25 (4th
Cir. 1913) (holding that the Seventh Amendment extends to just compen-
sation actions). Cf Hines, Does the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States Require Jury Trials in all Constitution Proceedings?, 11 VA. L. REV.
505 (1925); Blair, Federal Condemnation Proceedings and the Seventh Amend-
ment, 41 HARV. L. REV. 29 (1927). Except for the fact that Crowell v. Ben-
son, involved an admiralty case, the Article III right of de novo factual re-
view vindicated therein by Hughes arguably would have included a Seventh
Amendment component.
279. 319 U.S. 372 (1943).
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duty to direct a verdict upon a proven set of facts, which
could not be taken away. Proclaiming themselves to have
been the "governor of the trial" at common law,280 they
boldly asserted this right as an integral part of the constitu-
tional civil jury trial guarantee itself. (This should make it
clear why the independent ad quod damnum jury was repudi-
ated as a common law anomaly.)
Accordingly, if Article III means that the Seventh
Amendment jury is definitively under the thumb of the trial
and appellate judges-and can have no substantive role to
play even in public law actions-then it is hardly worth the in-
tellectual candle for the Court (or any one else for that mat-
ter) to champion their right to exist.28' In other words, even
if a jury were provided as a matter of right in public law ac-
tions, under the ethos of Galloway what possible political or
libertarian significance could it have? For example, while the
Supreme Court acceded in 1951 to the Advisory Committee's
recommendation that Rule 71A(h) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure provide that federal courts may employ a jury
in condemnation suits, it has since made clear that such a jury
is to have no substantive role whatsoever in articulating and
applying the constitutional standards for what constitutes a
280. See, e.g., Herron v. Southern Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 91, 93 (1931);
Keley v. Chicago, M, & St. P. Ry., 138 Wis. 215, 225, 119 N.W. 309, 314
(1909). Accordingly, the modern doctrine is that summary federal proceed-
ings need only be followed by appellate review-not de novo jury trial. See
Phillips v. Comm'r, 283 U.S. 589, 595, 597, 599 n.9 (1931). Cf. 1 K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 594, 595 (1958). So when the Northern Pipe-
line Court speaks of an Article III concern over how the facts are found, it
is really only talking about what standard of deference to apply to the find-
ings of a non-Article III adjunct. See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 86-87.
281. For instance, Redish shares this author's view that plenary Arti-
cle III fact-finding jurisdiction should extend to all public law cases pitting
an individual against the state and in which the individual asserts a consti-
tutional claim. See Redish, supra note 159, at 224. (Non-constitutional
claims, involving employment relationships, do not require plenary Article
III jurisdiction. But by virtue of his own narrow, non-substantive view of
the Seventh Amendment jury, see Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury
Trial: A Study in the Irrationality of Rational Decision Making, 70 Nw. U. L.
REV. 486 (1975), he is willing to balance away the obligatory Article III
status of the Seventh Amendment jury, at the same time that he emphati-
cally rejects Justice White's attempt to balance Article III in its entirety
against "competing constitutional values and legislative responsibilities."
See Redish, supra note 159, at 221-24. Instead of endorsing a jury as his
public law factfinder, Redish comes down predictably on the side of recom-
mending a nondeferential standard of judicial review over administrative
action. Id. at 227-28. One should question the workability of his suggestion
given the crowded state of federal appellate dockets.
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taking.2"' Rather the statutory jury is limited strictly to the
issue of compensation, and even then its historic discretion
over damages is strictly regulated. As epigrammatically
summed up by one justice, "[t]here are powerful forces loose
in this country that deprecate the use of juries . . . [Yet if
properly understood, juries through their control over dam-
ages] in condemnation cases [would be permitted to] perform
. . .an historic restraint on executive and judicial power. "283
H. Proposals for Rehabilitation.
Hence the balance of the article primarily attempts to
flesh out a cogent model of the Seventh Amendment public
law jury that assimilates its prerogatives to those of the his-
toric law-finding criminal jury, at the same time that it distin-
guishes its function from that of the private law jury.284 For
example, since they occupy a conceptual middle ground, ver-
dicts by public law juries against the state need not be treated
as final, like acquittals, but should be subject at most to the
limited right of courts in 1791 to set aside a civil verdict and
order a new trial. In other words, Galloway need not be sym-
metrically applicable to Seventh Amendment public law and
private law juries.
In. that vein the next section explores why nineteenth
282. This is even though the substantive taking standard articulated
by the Court fairly cries out for the special competence of the jury, since it
involves essentially an "ad hoc, factual inquiry." The Court itself, institu-
tionally incapable of administering the fact-sensitive standard of dispropor-
tionate sacrifice, has transmuted it into essentially a mechanical rule involv-
ing the presence vel non of a physical invasion or total destruction of value.
283. United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. at 23-24. (Douglas, J., dis-
senting, with whom Black, J., joined) (emphasis added).
284. The basic argument being advanced here-that the Seventh
Amendment guarantee was intended to be most nearly, if not absolutely,
immune from judicial balancing in the area of public law litigation-simply
avoids the basic thrust of Edith Henderson's central critique. She maintains
it is illogical to extrapolate from the jury's uncontrollable power to acquit
in criminal cases to "an equally unlimited right to give a verdict for either
side in an ordinary civil case 'between party and party' .... ".See Hender-
son, supra note 159 at 291 (emphasis added).
Hence, it is contended that federal directed verdicts are inappropriate in
public law actions involving constitutional claims. Of course, as with En-
glish practice in 1791, a verdict may be set aside and a new trial ordered
for a sufficient failure of proof. And while historically if the second jury
brought in the same verdict, a third trial was rarely ordered, see Henderson
op cit. at 311, this author would concede to federal judges the technical
right to order repeated retrials in public law actions, if they and prepared
to justify to the public such apparent moral arrogance.
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century appellate judges may have been justified in departing
from ancient practice by using the directed verdict to sup-
plant the private law jury in certain cases. In the context of
commercial contracts, for example, where evenly-matched
parties have presumptively had an ample opportunity to re-
duce to writing the essential terms of their agreement, it
might be inappropriate for a civil jury to rewrite the transac-
tion on the basis of its communal sense of fairness. Both par-
ties have exhibited a preference for commercial certainty
over natural equity. But it would be a fallacy to apply the
commercial "four corners" rule of contractual interpretation
to the social contract which public law jurors are asked to
expound, since that contract governs a relationship of such
complexity as to defy any exhaustive ex ante attempt to re-
duce it to writing.2 85 (Perhaps that is the essential lesson of
the Ninth Amendment.) Moreover, unlike members of a
commercial jury public law jurors would themselves be tax-
paying parties on the other side of the social contract alleg-
edly broken. As a result, a dilemma present in normal civil
actions would be avoided. For even if public law jurors were
to err on the side of generosity to the claimant, they could do
so without necessarily being unjust to the other party. None-
theless, by a parity of reasoning the modern Court could be
expected to deny the proposed constitutional public law jury,
just as in the case of its statutory counterpart, any historic
prerogative of interpreting the implied terms of the social
compact through the power of dispensing individuals from
the operation of inequitable statutes.
Then, in order to reconcile the claimed dispensing
power of the criminal law and public law juries with the true
Revolutionary meaning of "the rule of law," the next section
reinterprets that phrase as being exclusively neither the
Hobbesian "rule of legislators" nor the Horwitzian "rule of
rough, communal standards of justice"-but something in
between.286 The public law jury has the right to make "com-
285. Cf. Speidel, An Essay on the Reported Death and Continued Vitality
of Contract, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1975). Professor Speidel suggests that
the underlying assumption of the objective "bargain theory" of contract,
i.e., that the "parties could or should presentiate, that is, express all of the
material elements of the future exchange in the present agreement," is
"hardly consistent with the dynamics of the long-term relationship between
professor and university, husband and wife ... "-and citizen and state?
Id. at 1173.
286. Professor Horwitz has asserted that the founding generation
viewed the common law as "a known and determinate body of legal doc-
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mon sense," not idiosyncratic, exceptions to the standing law
in the direction of greater lenience towards the individual-a
right the court can concededly oversee through the power to
set aside a verdict. Conversely, the existence of standing laws
was a necessary, not a sufficient, condition for their imposi-
tion. The article then seeks to square such equitable power
on the part of local jurors with the legitimate structural im-
peratives of Article VI.
I. Implementing the Compromise.
Finally, in light of encouraging recent developments in
the law of § 1983 and elsewhere, providing federal damage
and inverse condemnation actions against local governmental
entities and officials2' 7 (replete with the possibility of a Sev-
enth Amendment jury28 8 ), it is appropriate to focus briefly on
the actual role a jury might play in drawing the difficult
moral line which sets off governmental actions that go "too
far" in the way of unfairly sacrificing individual liberties to
the putative public good.' 89 If the model Seventh Amend-
ment public law jury were available in an inverse condemna-
tion action, it could award compensation on the basis that
governmental actions unfairly frustrated legitimate expecta-
tions formed in reasonable, detrimental reliance on the pre-
existing state of the law. By recognizing a new category of
compensable liberties, occupying a middle ground between to-
day's "preferred" liberties that are essentially inviolable and
"disparaged" economic liberties that are essentially negligi-
ble, practical protection could be afforded to a whole new
spectrum of intangible expectations or privileges which are
trine." Horwitz, supra note 102, at 4. For this proposition, as Professor
Teachout has noted, Horwitz gives us an improbable cite to the Hobbesian
views of Governor Hutchinson of Massachusetts. See Teachout, supra note
164, at 211. While Hutchinson's positivistic view is predicated on the ab-
sence of any ethical consensus in society, Horwitz is interested in asseting
the opposite, that is, that the revolutionary rule of law embodied a pre-
rational devotion to communal values. Cf. R. UNGER, MODERN SOCIETY 142-
43 (1976). In his zeal to construct a precommercial, non-instrumentalist
Eden, Horwitz consistently overlooks the dynamic and, yes, rational role
that was to be played in republican America by Jefferson's ploughman/
juror.
287. See, e.g., Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658
(1978), and Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
288. See Burt v. Abel, 585 F.2d 613 (4th Cir. 1978).
289. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) Cf.
Van Alstyne, The Fate of Constitutional Ipse Dixits, 33 J. OF LEG. ED. 712
(1983).
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now considered neither fish nor fowl-that is, neither prop-
erty nor liberty. 90
Although the Supreme Court has recognized that the
"just compensation" guarantee of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments embodies an ideal of "fairness," '91 as noted
earlier institutional constraints on the Court-with its
crowded docket, concern for federalism, and hierarchial re-
sponsibility to decide cases of generalized importance-have
convinced it to dispense constitutional equity largely at
wholesale.292 Without the time or perceived responsibility to
290. The Supreme Court has recently recovered from an obsessive
bout with due process absolutism, see, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970), during which it sought to prevent all deliberate governmental harm
to individual interests absent the provision of prior adversarial hearings.
See Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property," 61 CORNELL L. REV. 405, 430-31
(1977) With its new focus on the provision of adequate post-deprivation
remedies as a means of squaring harmful governmental conduct with the
demands of "due process," the procedural and substantive implications of
the Seventh Amendment provide all the more reason why the Court
should leave it principally to state and federal juries to define over time the
substantive dimensions of new categories of actionable constitutional torts.
Cf id. at 433-34. By contrast, Professor Monaghan suggests that federal
judges should assume primary responsibility for defining the scope of com-
pensable liberties under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. This sug-
gestion follows his judgment that Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601
(1972) (characterizing as "property" for federal "due process" purposes
claims of entitlement against the state which are based on "rules or mutu-
ally explicit understandings"), makes the crucial issue of protectible or com-
pensable entitlement under the due process clause "a question of law,
rather than one of [mixed] constitutional fact." Monaghan, op cit. at 437
n.209. While this may be true in the peculiar context of a governmental
employment relationship, general principles of estoppel and implied-in-fact
contract (as applied by juries) should govern reasonable subjective expecta-
tions induced in the general citizenry by the pre-existing state of the law.
291. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 49 (1960).
292. This phenomenon stems from a lingering tradition of deference
to state court findings of fact, a deference originally compelled by the per-
ceived limits of the statutory Writ of Error process-the only appellate
process authorized by Congress for removal of state court cases to the Su-
preme Court until 1928. (The common law writ of error brought up for
review only matters of law, in contradiction to an appeal in equity under
which both law and fact were reviewed. See King v. West Virginia, 216 U.S.
92, 100 (1910).) The Judiciary Act of 1789, adopting the writ of error
procedure, was enacted under Congress' "exceptions" power just one day
before the Seventh Amendment was submitted to the states for ratification;
and like the second clause of that Amendment, it was designed to counter
the popular fears that the Supreme Court's Article III "appellate" jurisdic-
tion would be employed to negate the historic prerogative of the jury to
render an essentially non-reviewable verdict where law and fact were inter-
mingled. Despite the historic association with maintaining the prerogatives
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examine ad hoc the fairness of contested statutes or regula-
tions, the Supreme Court tends to absolutize in all-or-nothing
fashion its perceptions of fundamental constitutional fairness.
Usually these constitutional common law rules, like the "Mi-
randa warning" rule on the voluntariness of confessions or
the "one man-one vote" decision, establish a precautionary
national floor of protection. But while such preferred liber-
ties as speech are absolutely protected or very nearly so, a
citizen's claim for the "uncompensated" taking of intangible
economic expectations ranks at the other end of the spec-
trum. The Court may speak of "fairness," but it dispenses its
equity in the form of the wooden, all-or-nothing physical in-
vasion/total destruction of value rule, which decidedly favors
the state. 293 As Justice Black observed, this delusive form of
appellate "balancing" of the equities-that takes a remarka-
bly "deprecatory" view of those on the side of the citizen and
a remarkably "sympathetic" view of those on the side of the
state-is really no balancing at all.294
Moreover, because the Supreme Court chooses to act at
a high level of generality, in order to validate a citizen's ex-
pectations it often must oust the state from all regulatory au-
thority over a particular area of conduct. Given this stark in-
stitutional choice between upholding or invalidating in toto a
statutory scheme authored by a democratically-elected legisla-
ture, the Supreme Court, afflicted as it is by anti-majoritarian
angst,"'8 tends to err decidedly on the side of upholding all
economic legislation. This mandatory due process "death sen-
tence" for oppressive statutes-like capital punishment for
forgery of old-may be said to "endanger the property
which it [was] intended to protect. '2 96
More constitutional equity could be dispensed in the eco-
nomic area if the Supreme Court were institutionally
adapted-like the jury-to dispense it on a retail ("as ap-
of the jury, the Writ of Error process was eventually used by the Supreme
Court to sanctify fact finding by all state fact-finders, including
commissioners.
293. See Penn Central Trans. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,
124 (1978).
294. El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 532 (1965) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
295. See BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 956
(1975); and Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some In-
tersections Between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REv. 169, 185-87
(1968).
296. RADZINowcIz, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS AD-
MINISTRATION FROM 1750 (1948).
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plied") basis, rather than on a wholesale ("facial") basis. Since
it is not, this article argues on the basis of both history and
policy that the Court should formally enlist the cooperative
help of local juries, a la Miller v. California,297 to implement
the Holmesian compromise posited in the Introduction. Not
only can juries help particularize the federal standard of fair-
ness to local facts, just as importantly they can at the same
time liquidate a valid claim of unfairness so as to give the
government an effective option either not to proceed further
or to pay. Even Jefferson was content to see a citizen's sub-
stantive right to bodily liberty (and the attendant guarantee
of habeas corpus) deliberately circumvented by repeated false
arrests without probable cause, so long as the truly essential
post-deprivation right to have a jury liquidate his subjective
harm (via punitives) and award damages was preserved.29
The modern Court is correct in moving in Jefferson's direc-
tion,299 though its logical compass is unsteady. In fact, a uni-
tary approach to remedying dignitary harms and indirect eco-
nomic deprivations by the policymaking organs of the state is
firmly within its conceptual grasp, an approach involving
neither strict scrutiny nor extreme deference on the part of
the judiciary.
Especially if all governments were liable for the good
faith acts of their officials, as is now true of local governments
under § 1983, the Supreme Court would be on solid ground
in justifying under the Due Process Clause the interim inflic-
tion of virtually any economic harm and perhaps a wide
range of dignitary harm proximately resulting from a statu-
tory or regulatory policy, but not (as is currently the case
with indirect economic harm) on the basis of the respect due
to the policymaking branches alone. Rather in both types of
cases due process immunity/judicial deference should be
made to hinge on the correlative fact that a constitutionally-
297. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
298. Why suspend the Hab. corp. in insurrections and rebellions?
The parties who may be arrested may be charged instantly with a
well defined crime. Of course the judge will remand them. If the
public safety requires that the government should have a man im-
prisoned on less probably testimony in those than in other emer-
gencies; let him be taken and tried, retaken and retried, while the
necessity continues, only giving him redress against the govern-
ment for damages.
13 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 442 (J. Boyd ed. 1959).
299. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651-76 (1977) (the pre-
determination deprivation involved corporal punishment of a student by a
school official); See also Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
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adequate factfinder stands ready and able to assess and liqui-
date an individual's damages. In that way the Due Process
and Taking Clauses form a meaningful conceptual unit, along
the lines of the so-called Holmesian compromise, furnishing
the citizen graduated two-tiered protection, promoting effi-
ciency and fairness. The former provides wholesale protec-
tion through specific relief against "facially" unreasonable
governmental actions. And the lax "mere rationality" stan-
dard of review which characterizes that facial protection
against generalized police power regulations relates, not only
to the extraordinary nature of the relief, but also ideally to
the fact that retail protection (in the form of an adequate le-
gal remedy for as applied unfairness) exists under the Taking
Clause. The availability and adequacy of such a postdepriva-
tion damage remedy under the Taking Clause would demand
nothing less than a thoroughgoing reconsideration of the ul-
timate judicial acceptability of certain due process
deprivations.
Some deprivations that were once deemed impermissible
even if accompanied by a post hoc damage remedy might now
be allowed, and some that have been permitted even without
such a remedy might now be condoned only with one. For
instance, historically the Court may have shown less disposi-
tion to tolerate a policy choice involving a deliberate prede-
termination infliction of mental suffering or dignitary harm
since they were once deemed noncompensable (save under
the guise of punitives predicated on maliciousness), not to
mention nonrecoverable (if only a vicarious action against the
potentially insolvent official was available)-and, in large
measure for those reasons, "irreparable." Hence no
postdeprivation damage remedy could be deemed adequate.
Conversely, because early police power regulations tended to
involve relatively trifling interferences with an individual's in-
tangible expectations, the Court may have decided to resolve
the matter of the perceived inadequacy of available
postdeprivation remedies the other way-finding that indi-
vidual harm from generalized police power regulations is pre-
sumptively de minimis. But as soon as one posits (a) the availa-
bility of a direct remedy against the state (b) before a
factfinder with an increasingly accepted (because societally
necessary) competence to quantify intangible losses,300 such a
300. Civil juries are increasingly being permitted to award tort dam-
ages for the intentional or negligent infliction of mental anguish, even in
cases in which the emotional trauma stems from damage to physical prop-
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historic due process compromise comes unstuck. No longer
should the Court's inability to formulate an objective stan-
dard, like fair market value, for liquidating harm to intangi-
ble expectation reciprocally affect its willingness to recognize
erty (such as a dream house) and results in no physical symptoms. See, e.g.,
Rodriguez v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970). The problems of
difficulty of proof and measurement of damages-and the concomitant
danger of fraudulent claims-have been subordinated to an increased
awareness of the reality of psychic and dignitary harm and of the formalis-
tic hypocrisy of willingly entrusting the issue to juries where "mental
anguish" happens to accompany a slight physical injury. W. PROSSER, TORTS
§ 12, 50 (4th ed. 1971). Indeed, even in the area of breach of contract, a
defendant may now be assessed mental distress damages by a jury if he
"had reason to know when the contract was made that the breach would
cause mental suffering for reasons other than pecuniary loss." RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 341. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Aetna Cas. & Surety
Co., 80 Mich. App. 439, 264 N.W. 2d 19 (1978).
Yet, the Supreme Court has recently reconfirmed that an objective stan-
dard (i.e., fair market value) disregarding subjective values is particularly
appropriate in the federal condemnation context precisely because of the
presence of a jury:
[F]or juries should not be given sophistical and abstruse formulas
as the basis for their findings nor be left to apply even sensible
formulas to factors that are too elusive.
United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 105 S.Ct. 451, 458 (1984) (quoting Jus-
tice Frankfurter in Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 20
(1949).
The thesis of this article is that such a conclusion stems from questiona-
ble premises, namely, that a condemnee enjoys a jury trial only through
the grace of Rule 71 A(h), and that a judge rather than a jury should dis-
pense democratice equity since the latter is more apt to embody local bias
and prejudice than commonly-shared notions of natural justice or equity.
(On the positivist fetish for certainty and predictability in the law and asso-
ciated animus towards the jury, see Note, Towards Principles of Jury Equity,
83 YALE L.J. 1023, 1026-28 (1974).
Moreover, perhaps lex non favet delicatorum votis ("the law favors not the
wishes of the dainty") was good law in the rough and ready atmosphere of
eighteenth century England with her open sewers in the streets, disease,
etc.-where all might be expected to cultivate something of a thick skin. In
twentieth century America, where private and public energies alike are
openly devoted to the pursuit of "spiritual . . . [and] aesthetic" ends,
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954), a certain psychic "daintiness"
(as the above state court decisions acknowledge) has become the modern
social and legal norm. The Supreme Court should follow suit by allowing
condemnees compensation for their "reasonable" subjective harm from be-
ing forced to surrender property to the state, as determined by a jury.
Other western legal systems do allow consequential damages for the actual
expenses of moving, as well as a premium for the consumer surplus lost by
being an unwilling seller. See, e.g., Bigham, "Fair Market Value," "Just Com-
pensation," and the Constitution: A Critical View, 24 VAND. L. REV. 63, 80-90
(1970).
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such expectations as legal entitlements in the first place. That
is especially so since the degree of intangible regulatory harm
which government today routinely inflicts approaches the
level of grand not "petty larceny," and its ability to raise rev-
enue is essentially unlimited.0 1
In short, we do not require the modern insights of the
economic theory of property rights to grasp the practical po-
litical significance of entrusting the ultimate substantive defi-
nition of "liberty" and "property" under the Due Process
and Taking Clauses to a public law jury wielding a "liability
rule" (and assessing damages), as opposed to an appellate
court wielding a "property rule" (and either granting or
withholding specific relief).3 2 More interests can receive pro-
tected judicial status consistent with the legitimate preroga-
tives of the other branches of government. 3 Both efficiency
and fairness can be maximized. Long ago Chancellor Kent, in
equitable actions involving significant conflicting equities, re-
fused the all-or-nothing ("ex vigore") relief of specific per-
formance or rescission, preferring instead to remit plaintiffs
to the good offices of a jury which through damages could
"affor[d] relief . . . with a moderation agreeable to equity
and good conscience."' ' Similarly, constitutional public law
juries can help to decide as a matter of local understanding
and evolving standards of fair play (which they in effect de-
fine), subject of course to applicable national minima, what
constitute reasonable, 0 5 compensable s 6 (versus merely "uni-
lateral") expectations on the part of a fellow citizen vis-a-vis
their government 3 0-and to what extent any such reasona-
301. The allusion is to Justice Holmes' "petty larceny of the police
power" metaphor found in a draft opinion in Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co.,
260 U.S. 22 (1922). I HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS 457 (Howe ed. 1953).
302. Cf Calabresi and Melamed, supra note 29.
303. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recently noted that where liabil-
ity for damages for wrongs inflicted in the good faith implementation of
governmental policies or other good faith exercise of executive discretion
is formally placed on the government entity, where it belongs, legitimate sep-
aration of powers concerns over having a jury second-guess the reasonable-
ness of the policy judgment of coordinate and coequal branches of govern-
ment are all but eliminated. Owens v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622,
651-54 (1980). There is no threat of personal liability to induce policy-
making paralysis on the part of executive officials.
304. Seymour v. Delancey, 6 Johns Ch. 222 (1822).
305. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
306. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124-25 (1978).
307. The underlying thesis, that an individual's legitimate intangible
expectations should be compensable if subjected to unreasonable, non-de
minimis frustration by the exercise of any governmental power, whether in
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ble expectations have been unfairly frustrated. With regard
to the latter issue of assessing damages, the jury will implicitly
establish what is the current socially-determined level of rea-
sonably de minimis, noncompensable sacrifice which the gov-
ernment may randomly impose on its citizens as a sort of gen-
eral in-kind tax, at the same time that it gives the
government credit for all special in-kind benefits of the regu-
latory measure to the claimant." 8 The two questions of right
and remedy are integrally related. In the public law setting
all-or-nothing rules are certainly no more appropriate, if not
demonstrably less so, than the harsh rule of "contributory
negligence" in the field of tort law;"0 9 hence the "physical in-
vasion" and "total destruction of value" rules should be
scrapped in favor of the jury's "time-honored right . . . to
the guise of taxation, regulation, or eminent domain, contingent only upon
validation of those expectations by a public law jury, may be profitably
compared to the similar thesis in Epstein, Taxation, Regulation, and Confisca-
tion, 20 OSGOOnE HALL L.J. 433 (1982). See also Epstein, Not Deference But
Doctrine: The Eminent Domain Clause, 1982 Sup. CT. REV. 351.
308. Compare the role of the ad quod damnum jury in Bauman v.
Ross, 167 U.S. 548 (1897), in netting against the harm to condemnee all
implicit "special and direct" benefits from the project and that of the his-
toric nuisance jury in determining what is the acceptable neighborhood
level of "give and take" at or beneath which no intangible interference
with a plaintiff is deemed sufficiently substantial to be actionable. See Ep-
stein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and its Utilitarism Constraints, 8 J. oF
LEGAL STUDIES 49, 82-87 (1979).
What Professor Epstein may have overlooked the possibility that Lord
Bramwell, in articulating the principle of "give and take" in Bamford v.
Turnley, 3 BH. & S. 66, 83-84, 122 Eng. Rep. 27, 32-33 (1862), was seek-
ing to harmonize with the principles of corrective justice otherwise inex-
plicable jury verdicts-but not necessarily to provide judges with a con-
strained and calibrated rule of "reasonableness" (dealing with low-level
reciprocal harm) as a benchmark for directing verdicts in favor of one
party or the other. Ideally, in the public law context the rule of "give and
take" would serve as the basis for charging the jury and would be consis-
tent with wide discretion in that body. After all, as Epstein rightly notes,
the socially-determined threshold level of compensable sacrifice of intangi-
ble expectations is a dynamic one, subject to continuous redefinition under
changing circumstances; and one of those circumstances would be the con-
temporary reasonable of the claimant's expectations. And while in the pub-
lic law setting one could plausibly champion an asymmetric arrangement
that allows both judge and jury to invoke the strict rule on behalf of the
individual claimant, this author feels that corrective justice-not to men-
tion constitutional history-will be better served by acknowledging the
jury as the principal expositor of this standard of "as applied" fairness.
309. Compare Powell, Contributory Negligence: A Necessary Check on the
American Jury, 43 A.B.A.J. 1005 (1957) with Scheflin and Van Dyke, supra
note 158, at 70-71.
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reach a compromise verdict," 1 ' i.e., to do equity between a
citizen and his government."'
By way of contrast, one brief comparative law example
should suffice to illustrate the reciprocal effect exerted by the
Supreme Court's unwillingness to formulate flexible, open-
ended standards for just compensation on its ability to recog-
nize substantive entitlements. (And, as we might expect, the
Court's inflexibility appears to stem from its determination to
impose strict limits on the discretion of any compensation
jury.) In 1964 in Burmah Oil Co. v. Lord Advocate"' the Brit-
ish House of Lords decided that the precautionary wartime
destruction of a petroleum facility to keep it out of the hands
of an advancing enemy gave rise to a quasi-contractual claim,
which in turn would support a petition of right. In so hold-
ing, the Law Lords relied in part on the Scots law of eminent
domain, which is derived from the same natural law sources
as our own. Accordingly, they adopted Vattel's influential dis-
tinction between private harm from governmental wartime
acts done deliberately and by way of precaution (librement et
par precaution), as where corn is destroyed out of fear it will
fall to the enemy, and that resulting from acts done by inevi-
table or accidental necessity (necessite inevitable) in the heat of
battle, as where the enemy forces the government's hand by
occupying a certain house that is then shelled." The latter
category of unintentional harms, Vattel concluded, does not
give rise to a quasi-contractual duty to compensate.314
310. Karcesky v. Laria, 382 Pa. 227, 114 A.2d 150 (1955). Of
course, if the individual deems a particular expectation to be inalienable,
he can always seek a declaratory judgment to that effect and, if unsuccess-
ful, perhaps try his luck with a criminal jury.
311. Another official casualty of the nineteenth century was this no-
tion that the historic prerogatives of the civil jury included an equitable
discretion to award damages based on the open-ended notion of what is
fair under the totality of the circumstances, subject to the limited power of
the court set aside the verdict and order a new trial. Instead, the measure
of damages became a peudoscientific "question of law" for the courts-and
equity was once more sacrificed to the nineteenth century idol of neutral,
uniform rules of law. See, e.g., Horwitz, supra note 102, at 80-84. The clear
social price paid for such capacious, sharply-drawn, seemingly egalitarian
legal categories, which subsume much factual diversity under a single rule,
was of course that inherent in any decision to treat unlikes alike. Whatever
the justifications for these inroads on the historic prerogatives of the pri-
vate law jury, the contention again is that they are not of symmetrical ap-
plicability to the Seventh Amendment public law jury.
312. [1964] 2 All E. R. (H.L.) 348.
313. Id. at 360-62.
314. E. VATTEL, DRorrS DES GEUs Bk. 3, ch. 15, 232 (1834).
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Vattel's distinction was well-known to American law, as
indicated by its use in the 1788 Pennsylvania case of Repub-
lica v. Sparhawk 15 Yet the Law Lords noted the irony that in
the nearly identical 1952 case of United States v. Caltex,316 the
Supreme Court ignored these equitable principles behind our
written Taking Clause in favor of an unsatisfyingly literalistic
approach. The Court had held that the property in question
was not "taken" or appropriated, rather it was merely de-
stroyed. Thus, notwithstanding the Ninth Amendment, per-
haps Hamilton had been correct in warning Madison and
others that a written Bill of Rights would create the ines-
capable implication of an exclusive list of reserved individual
rights rather than an illustrative list embodying even more
fundamental organic principles. 11
Still, the Caltex case was admittedly a difficult one. The
majority argued that at the time of demolition the facility
had been tantamount to a public nuisance, "a potential
weapon of great significance to the invader. 3 1 8 By contrast,
the dissent argued that it clearly was not a "public nuisance"
per se, subject to uncompensated executive abatement as a
matter of law. 1 9 What the dissent failed to note was the clear
procedural concern lurking just beneath the surface of this
broad, almost cavalier, substantive ruling by the majority.
They must have felt strongly that the claimant suffered little
or no actual harm as a result of the destruction, since the
facility would probably have been destroyed in due time by
the enemy or as a result of noncompensable battle damage.
But actually computing "just compensation" in the case
would have been like valuing the prospects for life and health
of the celebrated boy who fell off the bridge and in the midst
of his plunge was electrocuted by defendant's negligently ex-
posed wires.3 20 With no trusted institution like the jury to
turn to for the resolution of the complex of metaphysical
"factual" questions surrounding a regulatory-type taking (i.e.,
whether the facility was a sufficient threat or nuisance to war-
315. 1 U.S. (DalI.) 357 (1788) (the claimant's stores of flour were re-
moved to a governmental storehouse for safe keeping, where they fell into
enemy hands).
316. 349 U.S. 149 (1952).
317. FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 145, at 512-14 (No. 84).
318. 349 U.S. at 155.
319. Id. at 156.
320. Dillon v. Twin State Gas & Elec. Co., 85 N. H. 449, 456-57, 163
A. 111 (1932). See Peaslee, Multiple Causation and Damage, 47 HARv. L.
REV. 1127 (1937).
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rant the degree of actual harm inflicted, by implicit reference
to the presumptively higher acceptable level of intentional un-
compensated sacrifice government may impose during war-
time), the Supreme Court took the formalistic way out, re-
versing the Court of Claims as a matter of law. The House of
Lords allowed the action, leaving it up to the appropriate
fact-finder to determine the "chances of [the facility's] sur-
vival and restoration, intact or damaged, to the
appellants. "3
J. Administrative Costs and Benefits.
If the Supreme Court were to entrust an open-ended for-
mulation of the liability/damages issue to the proposed pub-
lic law jury in the area of regulatory takings, it bears repeat-
ing that its verdict could always be set aside and a new trial
ordered, with or without a remittitur option. But a more im-
portant qualification on the suggested model is the fact that it
guarantees an ultimate, not an automatic, right to a jury. In
short, as the Court has previously held, 22 it would be consis-
tent with the Seventh Amendment to give a public law claim-
ant an administrative hearing in the first instance, with a
right to appeal for a trial de novo before a jury. Moreover,
that right to appeal could be suitably conditioned lest it be-
come simply a reflex. For instance, the claimant could be re-
quired to pay costs, including the government's attorneys'
fees, in the event the eventual jury verdict were no higher
absolutely or by some fixed percentage than the commission-
ers' original valuation. Modern Supreme Court doctrine of
course empowers Congress to create administrative excep-
tions to the Seventh Amendment at will, provided it is done
in the name of efficiency s2 (read, the putative inefficiency of
the jury'"). Following suit, the Department of Justice and the
Advisory Committee in their revised recommendations on
Rule 71A (h) rejected the predominant state compensation
model, consisting of commission plus de novo appeal to a
jury, as a "wasteful 'double' system."' 25 Yet such glib assump-
tions about the inefficiency of the jury system may reflect
more unrealistic realism. Even courts which must follow the
321. 2 All. E. R. at 394. See also id. at 362, 395.
322. See Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1 (1899).
323. See, e.g., Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 328-29 (1966).
324. See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970).
325. Fed. R. Civ. P. 71A, Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules
(Supplementary Report).
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Supreme Court's lead have been known to register a protest
by endorsing the general utility of de novo jury trials in maxi-
mizing equity and efficiency. As the Third Circuit noted:
Experience demonstrates rather conclusively that in cases of
this nature de novo review is seldom requested. It is the
availability of the remedy, not its infrequent utilization,
which is important to the cause of justice ....
. . . The necessity for an administrative agency on occasion
to submit its determination to the scrutiny of a jury of citi-
zens would be a healthful and disciplining experience.3 26
Not only has the de novo jury trial mechanism been
widely used by the states from 1791 through the present,32 7 it
consists fully with the present thesis that the public law jury
serve as a last resort for those who allege they have been
treated with "fundamental unfairness" and demand individ-
ual equity. Admittedly, that is a serious and expensive claim
to make, and one that cannot be costless. For those who sin-
cerely feel they are being victimized by the government, the
chance to make their case before a jury of their peers will be
worth any reasonable incidental costs imposed. And in the
area of economic liberties we are presumably talking about
individuals who can afford the risk if it is worth taking.
Moreover, as should now be clear, the proposed model
accords with the modern due process legacy of Nebbia v. New
York. 28 Even police power regulations which occasion sub-
stantial individualized harm may be condoned as provision-
ally "privileged" deprivations. But as with certain privileged
torts, the prerogative of policymakers to override the legiti-
mate expectations of citizens entails an implied-in-law post hoc
obligation to repair any disproportionate sacrifices actually
inflicted.3 2 9 And as the Supreme Court has only too recently
326. Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. v. OSHA, 519 F.2d 1200, 1205 n.11 (1975)
(Weis, J.), affid sub nom, Atlas Roofing Co., Inc. v. OSHA, 430 U.S. 442
(1977).
327. For instance, as of 1951 the Advisory Committee on Rules
noted that the condemnation procedure of roughly one-half of the states
could be classified as a commission system with a de novo jury trial right,
while the balance employed juries exclusively-save for a handful (five
states) employing only commissioners. Fed. R. Civ. P. 71A, Notes of Advi-
sory Committee on Rules (Supplementary Report). For discussion of the
wide use of the "double" system in 1791, see 1 NICHOLS ON EMINENT Do-
MAIN §1.22 (1981).
328. 291 U.S. 592 (1934).
329. See Hall and Wigmore, Compensation for Property Destroyed to Stop
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acknowledged, this broad implied-in-law obligation is af-
firmed by the Taking Clause. " ' But thus far the Court, given
the Eleventh Amendment, its chronically narrow view of the
substantive extent of its own jurisdiction under the Tucker
Act, and its reluctance to blaze new jurisdictional trails under
28 U.S.C. § 1331,-a' seems genuinely in doubt over its au-
thority to award damages for consequential regulatory harm
short of total destruction of value. Nor is it anxious to tackle
the difficult linedrawing problem of which harm to compen-
sate from among the innumerable class of persons non-
trespassorily and incompletely harmed by governmental regu-
lations. Thousands are affected, and the degree of regulatory
harm fades by insensible gradations of degree from one to
another. The Court has perceived its only practicable alterna-
tive as a Hobson's choice between upholding general police
power regulations in toto or striking them down. The gradual
abandonment of sovereign immunity (both in the context of
§ 1983 and through the recognition of federal constitutional
common law claims against state and federal officers or their
principals sounding in quasi-contract under either the
Tucker Act or § 1331332) and the use of the public law jury
the Spread of a Conflagration, 1 ILL. L. REv. 501, 514-20 (1907).
330. See, e.g.,Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 16 (1933); United
States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980).
331. See, e.g., United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 590 (1941).
332. Preferably the Court will choose the §1331 route, allowing a
public law jury action for regulatory harm against either the responsible
officials or the responsible government. That may be true even in the case
of an action against the United States, since the Court construes narrowly
any waiver of sovereign immunity like the Tucker Act, which is backed up
by a general appropriation for funding verdicts. It seems committed to the
view that Congress impliedly waived its immunity from constitutional
claims by reference to the highly formalistic physical invasion/total de-
struction of value interpretation of the Taking Clause. In short, the Court
seems reluctant to rock ungratefully the Tucker Act boat. Under a § 1331
nonstatutory jury action, as applied to both state and federal governments,
a verdict would trigger no automatic appropriations of funds. Rather the
Court could properly entrust the political issue of the feasibility of current
payment to the respective legislature involved, leaving the verdict out-
standing as a silent reproach. Of course, any such dormant verdict should
accrue interest. But what happens if the Court's worst fears materialize and
Congress responds to such a use of the jury and more open-ended, equita-
ble standards by restricting § 1331 jurisdiction over such claims through its
Article III power to regulate the scope of federal jurisdiction? In that
event, the Court could retort that all exercises of Congressional power are
subject to the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., General Motors v. Battaglia, 169
F.2d 254, 257 (2d Cir. 1948); R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT
303-14 (1969). As a result, at least as long as the district court system is not
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can and should alter all that.
Furthermore, even if the Supreme Court itself were in-
stitutionally suited to make myriad ad hoc adjudications of the
as applied fairness of governmental actions, there would re-
main the well-founded prejudice against the competence of
five of nine unelected jurists to embody the contemporary
moral sense of the people. Those of a "liberal" persuasion
fear the court will subscribe to a "conservative" view of the
equities-and vice versa. By contrast, the jury has always en-
joyed majoritarian credibility.333 And the use of a local jury,
as in Miller, allows for a salutary regional diversity in the im-
plementation of federal constitutional guarantees, especially
as applied to state action, a diversity that promotes individual
liberty at the same time that it advances the cause of federal-
ism.33" Consequently, jurists like Justice Rehnquist who are
reluctant to see five fellow judges in Washington, D.C. mete
out justice to a diverse nation on the basis of a vague stan-
dard like "fundamental fairness" may be perfectly content to
see such a standard administered by a local jury," 5 subject to
altogether abolished, its preexisting jurisdiction cannot be selectively and
discriminatorily reduced to deny vindication of a constitutional claim to
"just compensation." That would be especially so since Congress' legiti-
mate sovereign immunity concerns will have been served by the recom-
mended concession that the ultimate collectability of any such verdict be
left in Congress' own hands.
333. Moreover, contemporary research indicates both that juries feel
a positive need to be fair-minded and that they gravitate towards the equi-
ties of a case and not necessarily towards a sympathetic plaintiff. See Kalven
& Zeisel, supra note 158, at 495; Note, Towards Principles of Jury Equity, 83
YALE L.J. 1023 (1974).
334. See Powell, The Complete Jeffersonian: Justice Rehnquist and Feder-
alism, 91 YALE L.J. 1317 (1982).
335. Compare Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) with Hamling v.
United States, 418 U.S. 87, 105 (1974). It is noteworthy that this institu-
tional model of the jury might be susceptible of full implementation with-
out the necessity of applying the jury trial guarantee of clause one of the
Seventh Amendment to the states, because of the paradox that clause two
of the Seventh Amendment has been held to protect all state jury findings
from general federal appellate review. See, e.g., Chicago B. & Q.R.R. Co. v.
Chicago, 116 U.S. 226, 242-46. Thus the Supreme Court may be in a posi-
tion to induce states to adopt voluntarily the use of public law juries to
resolve the mixed question of constitutional fairness through cessation of
its own policy of according "excessive deference to [non-jury state] triers of
fact." Griswold, Of Time and Attitudes-Professor Hart and Judge Arnold, 79
HARv. L. REV. 81, 86-91 (1960). See also 16 WRIGHT, MILLER, COOPER &
GRESSMAN, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 780-81 (1977). Deference
would be accorded mixed findings of fact by a non-jury state factfinder in
the economic area only if the claimant had available but declined a suitably
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constitutional minima and the presiding judge's right to or-
der a new trial.
The practical result of reenfranchising the historic public
law jury in the area of economic expectations will be to force
some members of the appellate branch of the Federal Judici-
ary to articulate for the benefit of jurors-and the rest of us
as well-persuasive, non-institutional reasons for their appar-
ent underlying conviction that no degree of continuous regu-
latory harm visited upon a citizen (short of "total destruc-
tion" of value) can rise to the dignity of an actionable
constitutional inequity.'" Not surprisingly, therefore, the
persistent leitmotif of the balance of the article concerns what
active role, if any, the concept of individualized equity should
play in our majoritarian democracy.
III. AN IMPRECISE CONSTITUTION
One cannot help coming away from a reading of the
original United States Constitution, together with the Bill of
Rights, with the disappointed sense of a rather meager and
lackluster pantheon of basic substantive liberties. The fram-
ers and the members of the first Congress were not alone in
their inattention to detail. Professor Bailyn has touched on
the general political paradox that the American Revolution-
ary generation seemed strangely uninterested in reducing to
parchment their luminous notions about the essential rights
of man:
But what was the ideal? What precisely were the ideal rights
of man? They were, everyone knew, in some sense Life,
Liberty, and Property. But in what sense? Must they not be
specified?8 7
Yet no truly comprehensive catalogue was forthcoming.
conditioned right to a de novo jury trial.
336. There is also the possibility that the Fourteenth Amendment
was intended to apply the civil jury guarantee to the States. Compare
Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1876) (the Seventh Amendment is not a
"privilege or immunity" of national citizenship), with Inman v. Baltimore &
0. Ry. 361 U.S. 138, 146 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting). And if the Sev-
enth Amendment were extended to the States, it would mark an end to the
hoary argument that non-jury Article III adjuncts look good beside the
potential non-jury state court factfinder to whom original jurisdiction
might be relegated consistently with Article III, § 1. Cf. Redish, supra note
159, at 225-26.
337. B. BAILYN, THE.IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLU-
TION 188-189 (1972).
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Bailyn notes that James Otis, who introduced Coke's opinion
in Bonham's Case'38 into colonial jurisprudence, positively
"fulminated" at the impertinence of the idea of itemizing in-
dividual rights, remarking laconically the "[t]he common law
is our birthright."'3 9 To be sure, we can find anecdotal asser-
tions of such absolute liberties as the right to brew beer for
home consumption,3 0 but nothing on the state or federal
level to rival the official affirmation of Article Four of the
1789 French Declaration of Rights of the Citizen that "lib-
erty consists in the power to do anything that does not injure
others."' For that matter, contemporary scholarship co-
gently suggests that what seemingly absolute guarantees
there were in the Bill of Rights, such as "freedom of speech"
under the First Amendment, are illusory. Even Jefferson gave
the First Amendment an absolutist interpretation, if at all,
only for relativistic reasons of federalism. He was happy to
see state governments punish abuses of a citizen's necessarily
338. 8 Coke 114a, 118a, 77 Eng. Rep. 647, 652 (1610). For a cogent
exposition of the clear influence of Dr. Bonham's Case on the founding gen-
eration, see Berger, supra note 177, at 24-25, 371-393 (Appendix A). For a
comprehensive view of the influence on the ideology of the American
Revolution of Sir Edward Coke, judge, commentator, and treatise writer,
see E. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT 1-57 (1948) and Bailyn, supra
note 337.
339. See Bailyn, supra note 337, at 189.
340. See, e.g., C. ROSSITER, SEEDTIME OF THE REPUBLIC 57 (1955).
341. Nonetheless-and not surprisingly-there was a distinctly posi-
tivist cast to the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citi-
zen (August 26, 1789), there being after all no judicial body designated to
second-guess the legislative decrees of the popular National Assembly:
4. Liberty consists in the power to do anything that does not in-
jure others; accordingly, the exercise of the natural rights of each
man has for its only limits those that secure to the other members
of society the enjoyment of the same rights. These limits can be de-
termined only by law.
5. The law has the right to forbid only such actions as are injuri-
ous to society. Nothing can be forbidden that is not interdicted by
law and no one can be constrained to do that which it does not
order.
6. Law is the expression of this general will. All citizens have the
right to take part personally or by their representatives in its for-
mation. It must be the same for all whether it protects or
punishes.
7. Property being a sacred and inviolable right, no one can be de-
prived of it unless a legally established public necessity evidently
demands it, and on the condition of a just and prior indemnity.
J. BRISSAUD, A HISTORY OF FRENCH PUBLIC LAW 543-544 (1969) (emphasis
added).
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qualified freedom of political speech. 4" From this Professor
Ely, among others, would deduce that the true constitutional
protection accorded liberty consisted in the creation of a gov-
ernment electorally responsive to the people, who were them-
selves assumed to share a homogeneous moral view of the le-
gitimate ends of government. 4  Beyond policing the
constitutional division of powers, the federal judiciary had no
charter to second-guess the fairness of legislative enactments.
By contrast, the most influential modern deduction from
the limited number of substantive guarantees in the Constitu-
tion was based on the assumption of a necessarily heterogene-
ous moral universe within the fledgling Republic, given the
different factions and the regional differences that had to be
composed in Philadelphia. Under this view the framers were
a sober, realistic group that appreciated the necessarily sub-
jective nature of any good faith legislative attempt to draw a
statutory line between conduct that is purely private (and
hence part of an individual's residium of natural liberty) and
the conduct which arguably "harms" the public interest. As a
result, they largely eschewed substantive protections in favor
of procedural protections and guarantees-like the system of
separation of powers, interdepartmental checks and balances,
and a bicameralism. Furthermore, as Madison developed in
Federalist No. 10, the very size of the nation and the division
of the House of Representatives into districts would make
tyranny difficult by increasing the transaction costs for a hy-
pothetical majority to organize itself on principles narrower
than "the public good, the real welfare of the great body of
the people."34 While Madison was interested in political pu-
rity and deathly afraid of majoritarian tyranny, this modern
school of thought-as expounded by Justices Holmes and
Frankfurter-stood Federalist No. 10 on its head as a celebra-
tion of the rough and tumble of special interests politics. It
remolded the framers in its own image as pragmatic posi-
tivists. Although the very structural "filters" Madison hoped
would purify the majoritarian will lay in ruins, Olympian
Washington, D.C. having become a political hothouse of lob-
bying and logrolling, Federalist No. 10 was adduced by these
positivists for the proposition that political truth is to be pro-
342. Compare L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION 190-191 (1976) with W.
Mayton, Seditious Libel and the Lost Guarantee of the Freedom of Expression, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 91 (1984).
343. See Ely, supra note 194.
344. FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 145, at 81-84.
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cedurally defined as what emerges as statute out of the consti-
tutional process.
In the best pragmatic fashion, political truth was emptied
of any a priori normative content and subjected to the
method of experimental verification-testing the power of an
idea to get itself enacted as law in the political marketplace.
Under this analysis, the one express Constitutional guarantee
of "liberty," contained in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, 45 was interpreted as simply a right of summary
judicial oversight to ensure the orderly imposition of the sub-
stantive rules of law generated according to the procedural
master rule or Grundnorm or the Constitution. Beyond the
inestimable "ordered liberty" of living under the rule of
standing laws, the citizen's only substantive liberty lay in
those residual privileges of his as yet unregulated by positive
law-or those few substantive liberties specifically guaranteed
by the Constitution. The Due Process Clause-that emblem
of the ancient English liberties confirmed in the Magna
Carta-was emptied of all substantive content, except for an
evolving number of non-economic "fundamental freedoms."
Ironically, these two disparate views of the moral uni-
verse of the founders coalesced to support the due process
revolution of the 30's, at least insofar as it affected economic
liberties. For instance, Professor Corwin, our most prolific
modern student of the clause, approved the mid-twentieth-
century reversion to a largely procedural notion of due pro-
cess as recapturing the original understanding of the "law of
the land" guarantee in Chapter 29 of Magna Carta (1225)."1
As definitively interpreted by Coke in his Second Institutes,
due process was equated to the privilege of trial by jury. 47
To be sure, Coke waxed eloquent about the jury being the
"undoubted Birth-right and the best Inheritance of every En-
glish man, '" 8 but Corwin impliedly dismissed this as the pe-
culiar ravings of an earlier time that for some reason at-
345. "[No person shall] be deprived of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law ...... U.S. Const. amend. V. The reference in the
text is of course to the original Constitution and Bill of Rights; the Four-
teenth Amendment provides similarly-worded protection against state gov-
ernments. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
346. Corwin, supra note 338, at 41-42, 103; Chapter 29 provided
that no free man shall be "deprived of his freehold or of his liberties or
free customs. . . except by legal judgment of his peers or by the law of the
land." Id. at 23-24.
347. Id. at 41-42; 2 Co. Inst. 51-56.
348. 2 Co. Inst. 56.
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tached almost mystical significance to the numerology and
fact-finding abilities of the jury. His point is made by the fact
that even for Coke essential due process was merely proce-
dural. It did not involve the peculiar substantive notions of
"right reason" and "natural equity" which Coke had invoked
earlier in Dr. Bonham's Case; even though, according to John
Adams," 9 James Otis had launched the American Revolution
on the basis of those ideas, declaiming in 1761 in the Writs of
Assistance Case that:
As to Acts of Parliament, an Act against the Constitution is
void; an act against natural equity is void; and if an Act of
Parliament should be made, in the very Words of this Peti-
tion, it would be void.350
More particularly, Corwin embraced a post-Murray's Lessee
brand of due process that excluded juries or any other judi-
cial fact-finder from the adjudication of public law matters.
A. Natural Equity versus The Inflexible Rule of Law
1. Procedure as Substance
For Coke, however, the very nature of the judicial pro-
cess entailed the power of the common law courts to inter-
pret statutes equitably in particular cases to "round off their
angles." '51 The classic Aristotelian theory of the inherent eq-
uitable powers of a court to contract the literal scope of statu-
tory language is based on the inevitable over-inclusiveness of
generalized statutory language. In other words, courts must
dispense equity because the ideal of isonomia, equality of all
before the laws, should constrain the legislature to embody
its will in general terms. Rousseau, capturing the sense of this
popular pre-Revolutionary ideal of impartial legislation, as-
serted that to be legitimate the general legislative will must
be "general" or "universal" in its objects, promulgating laws
that apply to all in a meaningful sense and do not lay a
greater charge on one citizen than another.352 Especially in
view of this assumption about isonomia, it is easy to see the
appeal of Aristotle's assertion that equity is better than strict
349. 10 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 247-248 (C. Adams ed. 1856).
350. 2 id. at 522 (1850). Otis specifically cited Dr. Bonham's Case for
this proposition.
351. Mcllwain, supra note 180, at 309.
352. J. Rousseau, The Social Contract, in 38 GREAT BOOKS OF THE
WESTERN WORLD 397 (R. Hutchins, ed. 1952). Cf. J. Madison, Federalist No.
10, supra note 145.
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legal justice, though both are identical in genus:
What causes the problem is that the equitable is not just in
the legal sense of "just" but as a corrective of what is legally
just. The reason is that all law is universal, but there are
some things about which it is not possible to speak correctly
in universal terms.3 5 3
Coke enlarged the technical Aristotelian concept of eq-
uity, in which the judge selflessly attempts to implement true
legislative intent as revealed by the general terms of the en-
actment. Borrowing from Plowden, he may well have rea-
soned that the true meaning of statutes is ambiguous for the
additional reason that words are only the imperfect image of
thought; and when multiple legislators ostensibly agree on
the same statute, who but the courts are to say what the gen-
eral legislative will behind the language of the statute truly
is.3  The final step for Coke, which he appeared to the
American Revolutionaries and Framers to have taken in Bon-
ham's Case, was to hold Parliamentary statutes up to a canon
of judicial construction based on principles of "common right
and reason" or "natural equity."" 8 Coke appeared to be say-
ing that there were certain immutable liberties enjoyed by
the people, supposedly derived from Magna Carta, which
constituted a fundamental law to which the general Parlia-
mentary will had to conform-and would thus be equitably
construed to do so. Ellesmere, Bacon, and Hobbes considered
Coke's position a quaint, but irksome vestige of medieval
scholasticism.
Using virtually the same arguments which Governor
Hutchinson would later employ against James Otis, Bacon
and Hobbes noted the paucity of actual substantive guaran-
tees in Magna Carta and the lack of any "agreed-on, absolute
and objective definition of morality" 356 on which to found a
jurisprudence of "natural equity." By default, then, Bacon,
Hobbes, Hutchinson, and later Holmes subscribed to the nec-
essary "certainty of the [positive] law," as reflecting the best
efforts of a presumptively well-intentioned centralized admin-
353. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, 141 bk. V, § 10. (Bobbs-Mer-
rill 1962). See also Chroust, Aristotle's Conception of Equity, 18 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 119 (1942).
354. See Mcllwain, supra note 180, at 268-269.
355. 8 Coke 114a, 118a, 77 Eng. Rep., 647, 652 (1610).
356. This is Professor Bailyn's paraphrase of Hutchinson's position in
response to James Otis in B. Bailyn, The Ordeal of Thomas Hutchinson 70-77
(1974).
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istration to promote the common good in a relativistic
world.3 57 These efforts should not be subject to second-guess-
work by various and sundry common law judges, using the
cognate claims of "natural law" and "common right and rea-
son" to "mutilate the law"-often in favor of clamorous spe-
cial interests. After all, the example of common law judges
would encourage others to insist that laws comport with their
own inescapably selfish moral calculus, which they dignified
with the appellation, Right Reason. Therefore, Bacon and
Hobbes favored placing all public law litigation into the
hands of centralized "equity" courts, whose definition of eq-
uity (or distributive justice), as "the equal distribution to each
man of that which in reason belongeth to him," would be
drawn strictly from statutory law.3 58 However laudable the
ideal of equity or "perfect reason," in practice the very no-
tion of an entitlement to individualized equity would foment
discontent and dissent in society. People must respect and
obey the written law.
Understandably, Bacon, and Hobbes thought they saw
through Coke's paeans to "natural equity" as attempts to
camouflage the assertion of a naked power on the part of
common law judges to bend statutory enactments to their pri-
vate will. For instance, Coke spoke of the fundamental En-
glish law being merely the reflection of "common reason."
But when James I called his bluff by asserting the right to
apply his own considerable intellect in the personal disposi-
tion of cases pending in his royal courts, Coke seemingly
changed his tune. Now he insisted that:
Causes which govern the Life, or Inheritance, or Goods, or
Fortunes of his subjects are not to be decided by natural
Reason but by the artificial Reason and Judgement of the
Law, which requires long Study and Experience before
than a man can obtain to the cognizance of it . .. ."
Like Bacon, Hobbes interpreted Coke to mean that substan-
tive individual rights, proof against Parliamentary invasions,
were themselves the product of an "Artificial perfection of
Reason." 3 0 In other words, they were the product of a legal
scholasticism, whereby common law judges mysteriously de-
357. See G. McDOWELL, EQUITY AND THE CONSTITUTION 27 (1981).
358. T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (1909).
359. 7 Coke Rep. 63-65 (1609).
360. Hobbes, supra note 358, at 207. Cf Allen, Learned and Un-
learned Reason, 36 JuR. REV. 254 (1924).
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duced fundamental rights from the unlikely feudal text of
Magna Carta and the musty, medieval Plea Rolls and Year
Books. But an altogether different interpretation of Coke is
possible.
Perhaps by "artificial Reason" he was simply defending
the fundamental adjective law of the Kingdom, that is, the
ancient jurisdictional prerogatives of the common law courts,
with the jury as their procedural centerpiece. On that theory
the Levellers chose to view Coke's persistent interventions on
behalf of the common law, through writs of prohibition is-
sued out of Common Pleas and King's Bench against juryless
bureaucratic or prerogative courts, as intended principally to
vindicate the right of jurors to apply the open-ended princi-
ples of "natural equity" in public law cases involving an indi-
vidual's life, liberty, or property. After all, in most difficult
public law cases, as the Levellers recognized long before
Chief Justice Hughes, questions of how legal principles apply
to the facts were more important than pure questions of law.
In confirmation of that insight, Chief Justice Hale, a contem-
porary of the Leveller movement, wrote in his De Portibus
Maris concerning the highly sensitive political issue of the
Crown's right to license obstructions to public navigation:
In the case therefore of a building within the extent of a
port in or near the water, whether it be a nuisance or not is
quaestiofacti, and to be determined by a jury upon evidence,
and not quaestio juris.3 1
Thus, jurors were empowered to second guess the
Crown's own utility calculations and to find in favor of collec-
tive public rights. Similarly, in the private law nuisance action
known as William Aldred's case,"' Coke rejected the plea by
the defendant hog raiser that the social utility of his enter-
prise should be accepted as an adequate defense as a matter
of law. Upholding the jury verdict of the Norfolk Assizes,
Coke affirmed that the ancient "rule of law and reason, . . .
sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas [so use your own property as
not to injure your neighbors] . . .," was for the jury to ad-
minister.3 63 The open-ended common law standard of
"neighborliness" was entrusted to the "common reason" of
jurors by the "artificial Reason" of the English constitution.
361. M. HALE, De Portibus Marls, in A COLLECrION Or TRACTS 85 (F.
Hargrave ed. 1787).
362. 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (K. B. 1611).
363. Id. at 821.
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Analogously, therefore, it can be argued that the Seventh
Amendment impliedly entrusts the articulation of equitable
standards, like that of "disporportionate sacrifice" under the
Taking Clause, to the arbitration of a democratic or cross-
sectional jury. In this way, law is not defined on the basis of
one individual's reason, as in the Hobbesian caricature;
rather it is a sort of ideal average empirically verified by the
concurrence of twelve disinterested parties.
2. Law Without Equity: Excusable, Incidental Tyranny
The predictable response of modern pragmatic positivists
to the inherent vagueness of the demands of natural equity
has been to limit the operation of the principle to areas in
which normal political processes cannot be presumed to oper-
ate efficiently. Professor Ely as a principled positivist, how-
ever, rejects this "double standard" of judicial review, under
which natural equity is allowed to operate in the area of per-
sonal, but not economic, liberties. That is, he denies any role
whatsoever for the undemocratic federal judiciary to pour
moral content into the open-textured notion of "liberty" in
the Due Process Clause. For Ely judicial efforts to prick out
the limits of non-textual "preferred" liberties, as in the abor-
tion cases, are a discreditable reminder of the era of substan-
tive due process associated with Lochner v. New York-an at-
tempt to resurrect Cokean "natural equity" in trendy
attire.'" After all, such judicial attempts to dispense equity
may again turn "conservative."
Thus, the possibility of having a democratic jury dispense
equity in both the areas of personal and economic liberties
represents the "unexcluded middle." For that reason, Ely's
strict constructionist approach to the Bill of Rights and Four-
teenth Amendment draws only inconclusive support from
Gordon Wood's conclusion that the decision in favor of a
written Constitution and "codified" Bill of Rights was an im-
plicit concession by the framers to the modern positivist defi-
nition of law as the command of the sovereign will.36 Ac-
cording to Wood, despite the personal belief of many framers
in the notion of "natural equity," in immutable maxims of
reason and justice, they were unwilling to found a republic
on such vague principles, especially if it meant they could be
364. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1977); see J. Ely, The Wages of Crying
Wolf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L. J. 920 (1973).
365. G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787,
292-305 (1972).
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applied only through judicial discretion. For example,
Madison warned in 1788 that laws could not be subjected to
equitable review without making the "Judicial Department
paramount in fact to the Legislature, which was never in-
tended and can never be proper." '66 Other commentators
have agreed that the libertarian founders, like Jefferson,
seemed to prefer to reduce judges to the status of "mere ma-
chines" and take the calculated risk of life under the inflexi-
ble rule of positive law. This they are said to have done in
supposed confidence that, as "the great principles of right
and wrong are legible to every reader,"3 " political pressure
would promptly be brought to bear to correct obvious legisla-
tive abuses.This section will dispute the inference that either
Jefferson, Madison, or Adams embraced the ideal of a positiv-
ist rule of law, leaving no room for the judicial operation of
principles of natural equity unless clearly "codified" in the
Constitution. To take the most challenging example: al-
though Adams advocated "a government of laws, not of
men" in his influential preamble to Chapter II of the Massa-
chusetts Constitution of 1780, he clearly supported the tacit
orthodoxy establishing the constitutional jury as the dis-
penser of democratic equity. Hence he can hardly be said to
have contemplated the elimination of equity as an inherent
public law principle." But first a brief look at the modern
face of constitutional positivism is in order.
Hobbes did totally banish individualized equity from his
concept of public law, as both impossible to obtain and too
costly to boot. On that basis he justified any incidental private
harm or loss of liberty occasioned by a statute as a mere "in-
convenience"-an inevitable part of the ex ante bargain com-
366. Id. at 302.
367. Id. at 304.
368. See, e.g., III J. ADAMS, A DEFENSE OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN 56 (1788) (emphasis
added):
The laws alone can be trusted with unlimited confidence; those
laws, which alone can secure equity between all and everyone;
which are the bond of that dignity which we enjoy in the common-
wealth; the foundation of liberty, and the fountain of equity; the
mind, the soul, the counsel, and judgment of the city; whose min-
isters are the magistrates, whose interpreters the judges, whose
servants are all men who mean to be free. Those laws, which are
right reason, derived from the Divinity, commanding honesty, and
forbidding iniquity; which are silent magistrates, where the magis-
trates are only speaking laws; which, as they are founded on eter-
nal morals, are emanations of the Divine mind.
[ Vol. I
COMPENSABLE LIBERTY
pendiously known as the social compact.3 69 All liberty was
fair game for the incidental depredations of economic regula-
tions, since practically speaking there was no institution quali-
fied to second-guess the legislature's line-drawing efforts. So
long as the harm was "incidental," in the sense that the act
was not deliberately oppressive, the citizen had to content
himself with the reflection that Leviathan needed much good
faith elbow room in which to pursue the public good. Some
jostling of the citizenry was inevitable.
This same spirit of tough-minded positivism animated
the younger Holmes in The Common Law, where he argued
that society was "justified in sacrificing individuals to public
convenience," as when it marched conscripts "with bayonets
in their rear, to death," or ran a highway through an "old
family place" and paid only market value . 7 ' Likewise,
Holmes firmly rejected the notion that punishment or regula-
tory restraint should be proportional to the offense or
threatened harm. Positive law was purely an amoral matter of
strict liability-of external conformity to rules. If the legisla-
tive punishment or regulatory restraint appeared to embody
an element of disproportion, it was because the legislature
wanted to be doubly sure to deter such acts or to adopt an
extra margin of safety against the anticipated harm-or sim-
ply because the legislature found it to costly to tailor its law
to meet individual situations . 71 The affected individual suf-
fered not an inequity, but a mere inconvenience. Like taxes,
it was part of the price he paid for civilization. Yet, as Mahon
suggests, there was a healthy degree of deliberate iconoclasm
or realpolitik in these original observations.3 72
369. Cf. F. COLEMAN, HOBBES AND AMERICA 75-99 (1979).
370. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 37ff., (M. Howe ed. 1963).
371. Id. at 40.
372. Holmes' realism was centered in his matter-of-fact acceptance of
the inevitability of sovereign immunity:
Some doubts [, he noted,] have been expressed as to the source of the
immunity of a sovereign power from suit without its own permission, but
the answer has been public property since before the days of Hobbes. (Le-
viathan, c. 26, 2.) A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any for-
mal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground
that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law
on which the right depends.
Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907). That did not neces-
sarily mean he liked the situation. Cf. M. HOWE, JUSTICE HOLMES, THE
PROVING YEARS 72 (1963). But it did mean that compensation (a la Mahon)
could not be the ultimate solvent for the unfair redistributive impact of
legislative policies, since the legislature might refuse to go
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Speaking for the modern Supreme Court, however, Jus-
tice Frankfurter added a Mansfieldian gloss to Holmes' ear-
lier position, asserting that the risk of incidental inconve-
nience from uniform governmental rules could be assumed to
be equally distributed, like taxes, across the entire popula-
tion. Therefore, people should not view the materialization
of the risk as an individualized inequity. Frankfurter was jus-
tifying the Court's own use of an inflexible rule of law, the
same mechanical "fair market value" standard in just com-
pensation cases to which Holmes adverted, as a "working
rul[e] that will do substantial justice" in most cases, despite
harsh inequities in others:
In view. . of the liability of all property to condemnation
for the common good, loss to the owners of nontransferable
values deriving from his unique need for the property or
idiosyncratic attachment to it, like loss due to exercises of the
police power is properly treated as part of the burden of
common citizenship.373
Of course, Frankfurter's analysis would apply to one's
right to compensation for the property itself, save for the ex-
press provision of the Taking Clause. Accordingly, he sup-
ported a narrow construction of the Clause limiting its cover-
age to physical property, while excluding the intangible
liberties and expectational interests that give it value. Thus,
he turned the Aristotelian/Cokean theory of the relationship
of judicial to legislative due process upside down. If isonomia
constitutes sufficient justice in the legislative sphere, he rea-
soned, it should suffice in the judicial sphere as well. Unfortu-
nately, Frankfurter's analysis breaks down in practice. There
is currently no form of insurance available whereby citizens
may effectively spread among themselves the risk of dispro-
portionate loss from governmental regulation. 74 Hence the
losers do lose.
Nonetheless, Professor Dworkin, among other modern
scholars, has embraced this pragmatic positivist model of
public law. The legislature, like the finely-balanced English
Parliament so dear to the Whigs of 1689, will automatically
generate the best "possible" solution to our social problems.
Into the legislative hopper go all an individual's intangible
along-precipitating anew the crisis between economic liberty and political
expediency.
373. Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949).
374. Cf R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 41 n.1 (2d ed. 1977).
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liberties-with a few "important" exceptions-to be reor-
dered by the legislature according to its best cost-benefit cal-
culations. 7M And so long as the legislature treats each citizen
"as an equal" in its quest for the public good, with no at-
tempt to punish or oppress a particular individual or group,
then any economic "liberties" lost as a result of the process
are nothing to which anyone had a right. Losers in the legis-
lative process are, as it were, the victims of legislative acci-
dents, whose cost is stipulated by the social contract to lie
where it falls. But Dworkin's argument glosses over a critical
assumption. He employs a particular definition of "oppres-
sive" which countenances the deliberate imposition of sacri-
fice even on a narrow group of citizens-such as "bondhold-
ers"-so long as the legislature has treated them "as
equals. 3 7 6. In today's fractious world of pluralistic politics, it
seems a peculiarly naive or therapeutic notion of due process
to hold that one with a good deal more to lose than another
is treated "as an equal" by having his interests advertently
sacrificed to a majority, since those decreeing the sacrifice
had nothing personal against the victim. They merely cov-
eted what he possessed!
Professor Michelman has sought to justify this same re-
sult from the standpoints of both fairness and efficiency, rea-
soning that it would be fair and logical to suppose that the
original social contract contemplated that an uncompensated
sacrifice might be imposed on an individual where it could
reasonably be predicted that the individual would be better
off in the long run by submitting. 77 Refusal to submit would
mean that others similarly situated could also refuse and de-
mand compensation. The increased administrative costs to
government due to the mechanics of identifying, evaluating,
litigating, and paying all such claims could mean such an in-
crease in individual taxes and the loss or abandonment of so
many "efficient" projects that everyone would be worse off in
the end. To prevent this particular "tragedy of the com-
mons,"378 everybody may be reasonably assumed as part of
the implied terms of the social contract to have given up his
right to sue for alleged incidental infringements of intangible
rights or liberties. But the conclusion presumes that it is rea-
375. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, 323-324 (1978).
376. Id. at 270-273.
377. Michelman, supra note 4, at 1221-1223.
378. Cf. G. Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons 162 ScIENcE 1243
(1968).
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sonable to expect that one will in fact be better off in the
long run by virtue of accepting sacrifices in such situations.
For the answer to this critical politico-ethical question,
Michelman retreated to the specious quantitative haven of
complex cost-benefit formulae, whose results seemed to par-
allel in a general way the dictates of fairness. After all, ad-
ministrative costs are less and the sense of injustice greater,
the fewer who have been incidentally sacrificed as part of a
statutory scheme. Basing his analysis on the welfare econom-
ics' principle of "hypothetical ex post compensation,"
Michelman readily conceded that, with no neutral or objec-
tive judicial standards of fairness to differentiate one inciden-
tal sacrifice of liberty from another, the problem perforce be-
comes a political line-drawing problem for the felicific
calculus of the legislature." 9
Yet, Michelman's formulae defy practical application,
and he has since renounced this failed attempt to tackle head-
on the basic moral question of the fairness or acceptability of
particular regulatory sacrifies 380 Suffice it to say, neither
scholar addressed the possibility that an institution other than
the legislature or a bevy of unelected judges already exists to
resolve such an intractable quaestio facti, an institution with a
historic role in administering subjective moral standards like
"substantial harm" or "unfairly disproportionate sacri-
fice"-an institution able to reduce to manageable size the
class of those nontrespassorily and incompletely harmed by
governmental regulations. But many will argue that such a
legal solution is unavailable to us because it places too much
discretion in the hands of a few-that, in short, our system of
government embodies a critical historical choice of uniform-
ity over equity in such public law matters.
3. A Rule of Law Tempered by Equity
If positivism has a credo, it is the "rule of law." And con-
cededly the concept of the rule of law, in contradistinction to
the discretionary "rule of men," was a central theme of the
American constitutional period. But the rule of law is a two-
379. See Michelman, supra note 4, at 1245-1258; this is so because it
is difficult for judges to put themselves "in the position of the aggrieved yet
rational person who must objectively view his status over the long run" as
it will be affected by his submission (and that of others) to the species of
sacrifice in question.
380. See Michelman, Norms and Normatively in the Economic Theory of
Law, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1015, 1029 (1978).
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edged sword. On the one hand, it suggests the philosophy of
Hobbes and the younger Holmes, whereby a system of uni-
form, centrally-administered laws is venerated as "the struc-
ture of ordered liberty." To avoid the anarchical tyranny of
the state of nature, man had surrendered his natural liberty
to society; as a result, he owed implicit obedience to the posi-
tive rules of law as the small price paid for the compensatory
accession of "ordered liberty" gotten in return. The catch, of
course, is that the constituent liberties within that area of
negative freedom are by and large reflexively defined: "The
liberty of a subject," according to Hobbes, "lieth . ..only in
those things which in regulating their actions, the sovereign
hath praetermitted." 8 a Silentium legis, libertas civium. Even
though, Hobbes had distinctive and "fairly generous" ideas
about the limits of legitimate state regulatory concerns and
acknowledged that bad laws were unnecessarily restrictive
laws, the impossibility of imperium in imperio meant for him
that positive law could not be unjust. The rule of law was the
uniform rule of legislators.
But there is a decidedly different facet to the ideal of the
"rule of law," one associated with Lord Kames. Some confu-
sion arises because in his reflections on the impossibility of a
jurisprudence of "natural. equity," Hobbes anticipated many
of Kames' ideas. Those influential ideas were set out in his
Principles of Equity in 1766. In particular, Jefferson38 2 and Ad-
ams -embraced Kames' principle of the separation of law and
morals, which resembled Hobbes' own position save for one
fundamental qualification having to do with the critical insti-
tutional differences between judges and juries.8 ' Drawing on
Scottish moral sense philosophy, Kames warned that individ-
ual judges are not "angels" but are subject to error from un-
conscious bias, laziness, or negligence; therefore, the idea
that they should have discretionary authority to "determine
every particular case, according to what is just, equal, and sal-
utary, taking in all circumstances" is a formula for injustice and
381. Hobbes, supra note 358 at 149.
382. Jefferson owned three separate editions of Kames' work. See
Wills, supra note 171, at 201.
383. CJ' Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-156 (1968) (In the
opinion of the framers, "[i]f the [criminal] defendant preferred the com-
monsense judgment of a jury to the more tutored but perhaps less sympa-
thetic reaction of a single judge, he was to have it." (emphasis added)); Tay-
lor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 529 (1975) ("the professional or perhaps
overconditional or biased response of a judge.")
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tyranny.3 84 Concluding that the "idea of a court of equity in
its perfection" is unworkable, Kames asserted "the necessity
of establishing rules to preserve uniformity of judgment in
matters of equity as well as common law." ' He felt that a
single equity judge should dispense only technical equity, i.e.,
he should rule only according to a fixed body of substantive
rules. Otherwise, the concept of natural equity would place
"the whole rights and property of the community under the
arbitrary will of the judge, acting . . .it may be, ex aequo et
bono, according to his own notions and conscience; but still
acting with a despotic and sovereign authority."38' In short,
individual magistrates should never possess the discretionary
power to dispense equity in the true sense of natural equity.
One thrust of Kames' observations pointed away from having
specialized "equity" judges and toward a union of law and
equity in common law proceedings. The idea of such a
merger was embraced by Mansfield, Blackstone, and
Jefferson.
By the time of the American Revolution, therefore, an
apparent Hobbesian consensus had arisen even among liber-
tarians like Jefferson that the power to dispense natural eq-
uity should be taken away from magistrates, even at the price
of adhering strictly to the laws. But there was the critical dis-
tinction mentioned. As noted by Joseph Story, where a jury
was present, as in negligence and nuisance actions governed
by a reasonable man standard, then it was possible to adminis-
ter justice fairly according to the "most enlarged and liberal
384. H. HOMES, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 13 (1825) (emphasis added).
385. Id. Compare Hobbes' position:
[Tihat law can never be against Reason our Lawyers are agreed;
and that not the Letter (that is, every construction of it) but that
which is according to the intention of the Legislature, is the Lawe.
And it is true: but the doubt is, of whose Reason it is, that shall be
received for Lawe. It is not meant of any private Reason; for then
there would be as much contradiction in Lawes as there is in the
schools; nor yet (as Sir Edward Coke makes it) an Artificial perfec-
tion of Reason, gotten by long study, observation and experience,
(as his). For it is possible long study may increase and confirm er-
roneous [Opinions] . . .and therefore it is not Juris Prudential, or
wisdom of subordinate Judges, but Reason of his our Artificial
Man the Commonwealth and his Command, that maketh, Lawe:
and the Commonwealth being in their Representatives but one
person, there cannot easily arise any contradiction in the Lawes;
and when they doth, the same Reason is able by interpretation, or
alteration, to take it away.
Hobbes, supra note 358, at 207.
386. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 34 (1842).
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principles of decision":
[W]here the subject is such, as requires to be determined
secundum aequum et bonum, as generally upon actions on the
case, the judgment of Courts are guided by the most liberal
equity."'3
If twelve unrelated people unanimously agree on the applica-
tion of a general principle of equity to a set of facts, they
could hardly be accused of having fabricated the principle
out of thin air or having simply shoehorned the facts to fit an
accomodatingly vague standard so as to reach a preconceived
conclusion.
For that reason Jefferson temporarily convinced his na-
tive Virginia to turn all equitable jurisdiction over to the
jury-centric common law county courts (until presumably the
expense or the need for summary interlocutory relief caused
the Assembly to reconsider)."' 8 And modern historiography
confirms that even the Puritans in Massachusetts, great pro-
ponents of the rule of law, affirmatively wanted county courts
to act as courts of equity."8 9 Chancery courts were virtually
non-existent in seventeenth century America since colonial
legal practice was largely borrowed from the non-centralized
county courts in England, courts that exercised an ambidex-
trous jurisdiction in law and equity with the active participa-
tion of local juries. 90 As a result, Americans had grown at-
tached to the notion that discretionary equitable powers
could be responsibly exercised only through the mediation of
a jury of one's peers. As a result, the apparent opposition to
the concept of natural equity in eighteenth century America
in fact concerned only the constitution of the courts that
were to dispense the equity. 9' To paraphrase John Selden,
equity without a jury was "a roguish thing." '392
On the other hand, Mansfield preferred to see the com-
mon law judge simply supplant the chancellor, by adding the
387. Id.
388. See Dumbauld, supra note 167, at 152 & n.103.
389. Compare Flaherty, Law and the Enforcement of Morals in Early
America, and Haskins, Legal Heritage of Plymouth Colony, in AMERICAN LAW
AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER, eds. L. Friedmand and H. Scheiber 53-
66, 38-45 (1978) with Katz, The Politics of Law in Colonial America: Controver-
sies over Chancery Courts and Equity Law in the Eighteenth Century, in LAW IN
AMERICAN HISTORY, eds. D. Fleming and B. Bailyn 265-286 (1971).
390. Katz, supra note 389, at 263.
391. Id. at 286.
392. JOHN SELDON, TABLE TALK 52 (1821).
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flexible concept of equity to his quiver of principle for use in
authoritatively expounding the law to the jury. In both the
private and public law spheres, Mansfield rejected any role
for the jury as dispenser of equity.3 93 For him equity was sim-
ply part of the centralized, rationalistic construct known as
the Common Law, which was to be definitely expounded by
the hierarchical appellate courts.
On one level, Jefferson and others supported Mansfield's
efforts to reform and rationalize the common law. This
Mansfield accomplished, notably in the areas of commercial
law, quasi-contract, and estoppel, by an infusion of "broad
and equitable principles" drawn from the civil law."' Surpris-
ingly, perhaps, Jefferson admitted the superiority of the civil
law "as a system of perfect justice, 3 95 with its articulation
and development of principles, over the precedent-based
common law. In particular, Jefferson rejected the common
law rule of stare decisis as the keystone in a metaphysical
structure of illiberal doctrines through which wily Norman
lawyers and judges systematically entangled and undermined
native Saxon liberties. Jefferson felt that the common law
should consist of a body of principles accessible to everyday
common sense and capable of being tailored to fit the facts of
particular cases by a lay jury. Like the early American trea-
tise writer DuPonceau, Jefferson favored distilling out of the
common law "Republican and liberal principles" understand-
able to all.390 By contrast, as things then stood, the ideal
Saxon common law was too heavily encrusted with arbitrary
rules which enabled "Norman" judges and lawyers to lord it
over jurors.
Nonetheless, Jefferson opposed Mansfield's innovations
since he had arrogated for the court full responsibility for the
application and development of these new legal and equitable
principles. In the commercial law area, for example, he hand-
393. Cf. Dumbauld, supra note 167, at 17.
394. 7 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 44-45 (1926),
quoted in T. PLUCKNEr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 250
(1956).
395. VI T. JEFFERSON, THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 66 (Wash-
ington ed. 1861) (letter to Judge John Tyler in 1812).
396. Peter DuPonceau to James Madison, September 13, 1824,
Madison Papers, Library of Congress, quoted in G. McDOWELL, EQUITY AND
THE CONSTITUTION 65 (1982). For a discussion of the similar views of trea-
tise writers James Kent, James Gould, John Milton Goodenow, and Francis
Hilliard on the proper role of "common sense" principles in the common
law, see id. at 62-69.
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picked his jurors, socialized with them, and indoctrinated
them with his views."' Proudly calling themselves "Lord
Mansfield's jurymen," they willingly relinquished their his-
toric law-applying prerogative, acceding to his repeated re-
quests for "special verdicts" subject to a case for the opinion
of the full court; or else they applied by rote Mansfield's
preestablished rule.3 98 More seriously in the seditious libel
trial of John Wilkes, which so exercised the Colonies, Mans-
field had held that the jury had no right to pass on anything
but the facts of authorship and publication. 99 The seditious
nature of the speech was quaestio juris. In response to such
decisions, the English political radical "Junius" assailed Mans-
field for "destroying Saxon rights and the Saxon spirit of lib-
erty by his treatment of juries."400
As a result, Jefferson's attitude towards Mansfield and
Blackstone, whom he accused of embodying "the honied
Mansfieldism" of his patron, 01 was an ambivalent one. On
the one hand, he admired their attempt to reduce the law to
a set of understandable principles. But they were guilty in his
estimation of having done too elegant and aristocratic job of
rationalizing certain public law doctrines like Parliamentary
omnipotence and the alleged residual power of common law
courts to define as a matter of law new criminal offenses (in-
cluding seditious libel) alleged to be contra bonos mores.4°2
They made the common law out to be a self-regulating, ra-
tional mechanism like the Deists' clock-work universe that
could be safely entrusted to judicial technicians. ButJefferson
knew better. Anticipating the legal realists, he saw the irre-
ducible role for discretion in the application of legal princi-
ples and wanted that responsibility placed squarely on the
shoulders of jurors, especially in the public law area.
397. Plucknett, supra note 394, at 250-51.
398. BIRKENHEAD, FOURTEEN ENGLISH JUDGES 186.
399. Plucknett, supra note 394, at 248-49. See 19 State Trials 1075-
1138 (Howell ed.)
400. Waterman, Thomas Jefferson and Blackstone's Commentaries, 27
Nw. U.L. REV. 629, 644 & n. 89 (1933) (quoting in support I JUNIUS' LET-
TERS 308-09 (Wade ed. 1894)). Elsewhere Junius wrote:
The liberty of the press is the palladium of all the civil, political,
and religious rights of an Englishman, and the rights of juries to
return a general verdict in all cases whatsoever, is an essential part
of our constitution.
Quoted in STORY, COMMENTARIES, supra note 24, at § 1879, 737 n.3.
401. XII T. JEFFERSON, THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 456 (Ford
ed. 1895).
402. See, e.g., Delaval, 97 Eng. Rep. 913 (1763).
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Thus, when Jefferson spoke of uncanonizing Blackstone
and restoring the "uncouth" Coke, he may be understood in
part to mean, as he wrote elsewhere, that when equitable
principles of the public or private law have been rendered
"pure and certain" "by repeated decisions and modifications,
• . . they should be transferred by statute [if necessary] to the
courts of common law, and placed within the pale of juries."'03
Jefferson had no sympathy for Mansfield's aristocratic depar-
ture from the more democratic, jury-centric notions of due
process espoused by Coke. "Permanent judges" not only
tended to develop a sense of professional elitism,"' they were
also apt to be misled in their deliberations by a sense of devo-
tion to the legislative branch of government. Hence, Jeffer-
son saw Mansfield as "a back-stairs courtier, intent on de-
stroying political freedom."' 0-as being a daring legal
reformer only in a sinister way. Presumably, therefore, Jeffer-
son would applaud the nineteenth century American process
by which the equitable doctrines of waste, estoppel in pais,
and quasi-contract were incorporated into the common law
and came to be regarded as "generally a jury question" based
"upon the circumstances attending a particular case."40 For
that same reason, we may assume that Jefferson would look
askance at half-hearted attempts by the modern Supreme
Court to dispense ad hoc Article III equity in Taking Clause
disputes, without giving any thought to a requirement that
such principles be applied by a Seventh Amendment or
Tucker Act jury.
4. Nulla Poena Sine Lege
Especially in the public law area Jefferson and the other
libertarian framers advocated democratic, not aristocratic,
equity. Their insistence on the ideal of the rule of law must
not be confused with the belief that all legal rules be rigidly
enforced. Rather they felt that the existence of standing laws
was a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for their impo-
403. VI T. JEFFERSON, THE WRITING OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 66 (Wash-
ington ed. 1861).
404. See 15 JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 184, at 283 ("[e]spirit de
corps").
405. Plucknett, supra note 394, at 287.
406. Frost Motor Co. v. Pierce, 72 Ga. App. 452, 453 (1945) (estop-
pel in pais). Sherrill v. Connor, 107 N.C. 630, 633 (1890) (waste). See also
Conway Nat. Bank v. Pease, 76 N.H. 319, 82 A. 1068 (1012) (estoppel);
Cahill v. Hall, 161 Mass. 512 (1894) (Holmes, J.) (quasi-contract).
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sition. By contrast, the popular Aristotelian concept of equity
also contemplated the need to correct for the under-inclu-
siveness of the general terms of a legislative enactment, °7 not
just its over-inclusiveness. Thus it justified courts in expanding
the scope of a statute to punish those outside its literal reach.
The English King and his policies benefitted from many such
equitable exceptions from the normal course of statutory and
common law. 08 Hence, the libertarian principle of the non-
discretionary rule of law which arose out of the Puritan
Revolution responded to the specific reality that any excep-
tions by royal judges were likely to be in favor of the
state-not the individual. 0 9 At bottom, therefore, the revo-
lutionary ideal of "standing laws" in the Lockean sense trans-
lates as nulla poena sine lege." °
The experience of the Puritans in Massachusetts con-
firms that interpretation. Believers in a strict rule of law, but
only insofar as limiting the discretion of the magistrate to
punish was concerned, they favored 'the responsible exercise
of equity to mitigate the harshness of the law. As Locke ex-
plained in the Second Treatise, although the standards of "the
Law of Nature [which should guide our conduct] be plain
and intelligible to all natural creatures," they are unwritten
and hence can easily be manipulated or misapplied ex post
facto to the detriment of individual liberty. 1' Drawing on
Hooker and Harrington, Locke concluded (i) that the law-
making power should be placed in a "collective Bod[y] of
Men," so as to make it more likely that general, abstract con-
cerns will prevail over particularistic, partisan concerns, and
(ii) that they should govern by standing law, to prevent the
temptation to enact abusive ex post facto laws or "extemporary
Decrees.' 12 But even standing laws, he noted, had to con-
form to "the Law of Nature, i.e., to the Will of God, of which
this is a Declaration, and the fundamental law of nature be-
ing the preservation of Mankind, no Human Sanction can be
407. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, bk. V, §10.
408. See McIlwain, supra note 180, at 302.
409. See Rousseau supra note 352, at 403 ("All that the citizen wants
is the law and the obedience thereof. Every individual . . . knows very well
that any exception will not be to his favor. This is why everyone fears ex-
ceptions; and those who fear exceptions love the law").
410. Cf Spencer, Nulla Poena sine Lege in English Criminal Law, in
THE CAMBRIDGE-TILBURG LAW LECTURES 35 (3d Series 1980).
411. J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, §§ 123-126 (P. Las-
lett ed. 1960).
412. Id. at §§ 94, 131.
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good, or valid against it."41 Locke then quoted Hooker for
the proposition that "[t]o constrain Man to any thing inconve-
nient doth seem unreasonable. ' 414 If government exercised
"Power beyond Right," it was tyranny. 15 Government had
no legitimate Power "to impoverish, harass, or subdue" '416
citizens beyond what was necessary for the common good.4 1 7
Like Locke the libertarian framers viewed the sphere of
man's residual or negative liberty as his affirmative
right-not as the gracious gift of the sovereign, whose deci-
sions were not to be second-guessed. Just laws would not "un-
necessarily" curtail that liberty or inconvenience the citi-
zen. 418 Indeed, Locke asserted that man had no right to
confer on government the power to curtail unnecessarily his
natural intangible liberties-which made up his "unalien-
able" right to the pursuit of happiness. 4 9 And on the author-
ity of Chief Justice Coke, the framers conceived of this as a
fundamental proposition of the common law. Physical prop-
erty, by contrast, is alienable-since no man is born with a
natural right to a particular piece of property, but he does
have an inviolable second-order natural right to just compen-
sation. Government, therefore, may take such property so
long as it is willing to pay -"just compensation," even if its
need for property is not demonstrably clear. No man, how-
ever, has the moral or political right to allow government to
take more of his personal liberty than is necessary. English
Whigs were fond of saying that the only thing the sovereign
could not do-other than make a man a woman-was alien-
ate its sovereign power, even if it expressly purported to con-
tract it away. But in response American Revolutionaries as-
serted that the individual had no right to alienate in favor of
the government excessive power over his or her natural liber-
ties, and hence the social contract could not justly be con-
strued to imply otherwise.
413. Id. at § 135.
414. Id.
415. Id. at § 201.
416. Id.
417. A speculative argument that Locke viewed a right of jury
trial-or something near it-as a necessary means of redress for a citizen
who feels he is being individually oppressed can be fashioned out of his
conviction that "the proper umpire" for an important controversy between
the sovereign and "some of the people" should be "the body of the people."
Id. at § 242 (emphasis added). Trial per pals, or "by the country," was the
historic English synonym for jury trial.
418. Id. at § 242.
419. Id.
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Thus, an irony dwells in the inner chamber of western
democratic theory. The most essential individual rights are
intangible and innominate. Liberty for liberty's sake. This
should come as no surprise. The concept of free will dictated
that the shape of man's destiny be left essentially within his
own hands. But tangible property rights are easier to identify
and to defend. When it comes to delimiting the inviolable
sphere of individual autonomy-or free will-we have a fun-
damental boundary line problem. Abstract formulae, like
John Stuart Mill's distinction in On Liberty between actions
that affect only the actor and those that affect others, are sel-
dom helpful since they are subject to both sincere and sophis-
tical manipulation.420 By way of refinement, Professor Hayek
has suggested that not all third-party effects are legally cogni-
zable, only those which interfere with the rights-or "rea-
sonable expectations'"-of others.'2 ' The problem, however,
of what collective expectations are sufficiently reasonable to
justify cutting down an individual's residuum of natural lib-
erty defies strictly logical resolution. Pragmatically
recharacterizing certain liberties as alienable and hence com-
pensable relieves a great deal of the analytical pressure. If the
individual is content not to assert his technical Lockean right
to revolt by disobeying the law, but seeks compensation in-
stead, that fact confirms our recharacterization. Still, the all-
important question, as both Hobbes and Locke clearly appre-
ciated, remains: Who shall judge the legitimacy of particular
laws and by what standard?
B. The Libertarian Model of the Jury
1. Jury as Dispenser of Democratic Equity
As noted, modern positivists argue that even Jefferson
and the other so-called libertarian founders had yielded up
out of moral uncertainty any natural law claims to substantive
liberties which were proof against legislative interference.
The counter-thesis of this article is that there was a pantheon
of necessarily unspecified substantive liberties instinct in the
Constitution, whose existence was expressly confirmed by the
420. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 261-262 (1978).
421. Hayek, supra note 26, at 145. Hence Hayek endorsed the 1793
reformulation of Article VI in the French Declaration of Rights of 1789 to
read: "La libert6 est le pouvoir qui appartient 1 l'homme de faire tout ce
que ne nuit pas aux droits d'autrui." Id. at 145 n.17.
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Ninth Amendment. 22 Furthermore, it is argued, the as-
sumed mode of identifying and securing those liberties was
through the document's procedural guarantees of Cokean
due process, namely, the Sixth and Seventh Amendment jury
guarantees."23 Under the prevalent Scottish "moral sense"
school of philosophy, which Jefferson imbibed at Williams-
burg, it was assumed that the fundamental principles of lib-
erty establishing the legitimate extent of state regulatory au-
thority over the individual would be "self-evident" to the
jury.' 2 ' After hearing the facts of the case, having the rele-
vant principles of law argued to them by counsel from both
sides, and giving respectful attention to the judge's charge,
the jury could be trusted to grasp intuitively whether or not
the law was so unreasonable or unfair as applied to the indi-
vidual in question as to warrant nullification. Obviously, all
citizens have to expect to make certain sacrifices to the com-
mon good by putting up with laws they do not like. In that
regard the jury can be trusted to heed the judgment of their
elected representatives as to the general necessity for the law
in question, but they still have the right to decide in the con-
text of a particular case that the legislature has either inten-
tionally or inadvertently gone "too far" in imposing sacrifice
on an individual.
The "moral sense" necessary to make this qualitative
judgment was thought to require only "a small stock of rea-
son.' ' 425 In this respect "moral sense" philosophy was much
more egalitarian than even Locke's "intuitive rationalism,"
especially after the latter doctrine had been turned to con-
servative purposes in the eighteenth century. 26 Under the
rubric of a rule utilitarian "common sense," Thomas Reid
spoke of the need of most men to adopt their self-evident
422. U.S. CONST. amend. ix ("The enumeration in the Constitution,
of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others re-
tained by the people.") See Griswold v. Connecticut, 318 U.S. 479, 486
(1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973);
T. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 716
(1975). Cf. Rengold, The History of the Enactment of the Ninth Amendment and
its Recent Development, 8 TULSA L.J. 1 (1972).
423. U.S. CONST. amend. vi ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a . ..trial, by an impartial jury .. ."); U.S. CONST.
amend vii ("In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . .
424. See Wills, supra note 171, at 167-255.
425. 12 JEFFERSON PAPERS, at 15.
426. See M. WHITE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 9-
60 (1978).
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truths second hand via custom, example, or rule of law. By
contrast, "moral sense" jurors of whatever station in life
were qualified to make what was in essence an aesthetic judg-
ment about the inherent disproportion or unfairness in soci-
ety's treatment of an individual. In short, the tacit libertarian
orthodoxy of the founders regarded the jury as the an-
nointed dispenser of democratic equity, in those cases in
which the legislative process (for whatever reason) "lays an
egg." After all, otherwise valid general laws may impinge too
harshly on a single individual. Without invalidating the stat-
ute itself, the jury can silently and discretely except the indi-
vidual from its operation. In that way the jury operational-
ized the founders' basic Lockean notion that the implied
terms of the social compact did not require an individual to
accept stoically as the price of ordered liberty all economic
harm or "inconvenience" (to use the polite seventeenth-cen-
tury term) he might suffer at the hands of the legislature.
Rather than vainly petition Congress for individual redress or
openly rebel, the dissentient could take his case before a
mini-plebiscite of the people and plead the natural equity or
higher justice of his cause.
James Wilson, who was perhaps the most brilliant legal
theorist at the Constitutional Convention and the leading
draftsman next to Madison, as well as the first Supreme
Court justice to take office, captured this libertarian ortho-
doxy in his 1793 law lectures:
[I]n a free state, the law should impose no restraint upon
the will of the citizen, but such as will be productive of ad-
vantage, public or private, sufficient to overbalance the dis-
advantage of the restraint . . . . The proof of the advan-
tage lies upon the legislature. If a law is even harmless, the
very circumstance of its being a law, is itself a harm. " '
This same principle that the social contract embodied a "mu-
tual agreement [that government will] levy from any citizen
the least possible amount of freedom" consistent with the
public welfare had been derived from Locke by Cesare Bec-
caria in his influential Dei Delitti e delle Pene (1764), which Jef-
ferson also studied at Williamsburg. 428 But this still left unan-
swered the question of who decides whether the principle of
"least levying" had been violated. One response was Black-
stone's Hobbesion assertion that Parliament in making laws
427. II THE WORKS OF JAMES WLSON 287 (J. Andrews, ed. 1896).
428. See Wills, supra note 171, at 154.
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possessed the "supreme, irresistable, absolute, uncontrolled
authority" which must in all governments reside somewhere,
since logically it was the only final appellate authority over
the debatable reasonableness of a law. "'29 Wilson retorted that
the only such "supreme, arbitrary, absolute, uncontrollable"
discretionary authority in the American democracy resided in
the common law jury.4 30
In cases pitting an individual against the rest of society
and involving an alleged breach of the social contract, Wilson
noted, jurors stood in an unavoidable situation of potential
conflict of interest, being both parties to (and representatives
of) one side of the contract and judges of the breach. None-
theless, their "moral sense" ability to empathize with the de-
fendant or the claimant in such a situation, based partly on
the fact that as the designated representatives of the people
any injustice would properly rest on their conscience and not
that of society at large, and partly on their sense of there-but-
for-the-grace-of-God-go-I, constituted them "the palladium
of liberty. 431 Finally, Wilson affirmed that the jury, as the
sovereign democratic component of the judiciary, had the
solemn right, acting unanimously, to "decide the law as well
as the fact" according to their conscience.4 32
The English Whigs of 1689 accepted Parliamentary sov-
ereignty out of a belief in the necessity for the strong central-
ized administration of law. For them, imperium in imperio was
a political solecism. By contrast, the libertarian framers es-
poused the concept of the decentralization of political power
as essential to liberty-and in particular they embraced the
paradox of imperium in imperio in the form of the local com-
mon law jury. In this regard, John Adams averred that "the
common people . . . should have as complete a control, as
decisive a negative, in every judgment of a court of judica-
ture" as in other decisions of government. 433 Likewise, in
1830 de Tocqueville could still observe that in America the
jury was "above all, a political institution"- "as direct and
extreme a consequence of the sovereignty of the people as
universal suffrage.'' 4 34 In fine, like Otis before them, the lib-
429. I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES* 160.
430. Wilson, supra note 427, at 167.
431. Id. at 169-171, 187.
432. Id. at 220,
433. 2 LIFE AND WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 253-255 (C. Adams ed.
1856).
434. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 291-297 (P. Bradley
ed. 1945).
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ertarian framers saw no need for an exhaustive catalogue of
American liberties. They agreed with the Coke of Leveller
mythology that the true "birthright" of liberty inheres in the
substantive dimensions of trial by jury.""
Besides, while the framers believed in immutable princi-
ples of fairness and reasonableness, which set bounds on the
legitimate exertions of governmental power, they realized
that those principles were mutable or varied in their applica-
tion, depending on time, place, and circumstances. Rather
than an "eternal immutable law of nature," the framers be-
lieved in what Roscoe Pound has termed "a creative natural
law," with the jury serving as a "living instrument of jus-
tice. '436 As Jefferson observed, the reasonableness or "util-
ity" of an act, and hence its viciousness or virtue, will vary
from country to country.4 3 And Francis Hutcheson, the fa-
ther of "moral sense" philosophy, defended this ability of in-
dividuals to recognize when necessity justified an exception to
the ordinary rules of natural equity. He refused to consider
such exceptions to be violations of natural law, i.e., purely un-
principled concessions to expedience, since "great utility"
may be a legitimate overriding principle:
For the very question is, are not these cases ...made
known to us by the same use of reason by which the [ordi-
nary rule of] law itself is made known. If we are no compe-
tent judges of future tendencies, we are no judges about the
ordinary natural laws.""
As a qualification on these special laws of nature, however,
Hutcheson noted society's sacred second-order duty to repair
any special disproportionate sacrifice imposed on an
individual. 439
The upshot is that aside from trial by jury and just com-
pensation, there were no other absolute, inviolable individual
liberties for the libertarian framers, except perhaps habeas
corpus. (And even there Jefferson suggested the simple expe-
dient of repeated false arrests, paying whatever damages a
jury might assess under the circumstances.) Rather, like our lat-
terday pragmatic positivists, the framers espoused an experi-
435. Cf A. SCHLESINGER, THE BIRTH OF THE NATION 14-15 (1968).
436. R. POUND, LAW AND MORALS 86 (1924).
437. 14 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 143 (A. Lipscomb and
A. Bergh eds. 1903).
438. F. HUTCHESON, A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO MORAL PHILOSOPHY
242, (1747).
439. Id. at 245-246.
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mental, process-based concept of fundamental liberties. But
with the critical difference that for them liberty in the final
analysis was what emerged from the operation of the
jury-and not the legislature. The notion of when and under
what circumstances a person had the moral right to be free
from governmental interference, like other basic notions of
right and wrong, would be perceived by the jury through a
faculty of immediate and direct awareness. And the best evi-
dence of the validity of that perception was the empirical
data provided by the unanimous agreement of the twelve in-
dividuals that under contemporary moral standards a mate-
rial breach of the social compact has occurred.
It is wrong to suggest that the libertarian framers may
have shared Hobbes' underlying faith in the intelligence and
good will of the sovereign-regarding either its original ob-
ject or democratic legislatures. In the immediate post-Revolu-
tionary period, majoritarian state legislatures perpetrated
many abuses. In 1781 Jefferson specifically renounced the no-
tion that "173 despots [could not be] as oppressive as one."'4"
The legislature was not a magic black box. Aristotle had
warned that the true rule of law did not equal rule by a nu-
merical majority, since a majority's decrees tended to be too
specific in their operation. 4 ' Likewise, Rousseau warned that
the conscious will of all or of a majority did not equal the
authentic "general will," since the former considered particu-
lar interests and was merely the sum of selfish desires. 42 Like
Madison, he feared the legislative process because it was sub-
ject to manipulation by factions. To be legitimate the general
legislative will had to be "general" or universal in its objects,
promulgating laws that applied equally to all in a meaningful
sense and did not lay a greater change on one citizen than
another." 3 Because this ideal of isonomia,'" the rule by laws
of truly generalized applicability, was unobtainable in prac-
440. THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 222 (P. Leicester ed.
1894).
441. ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC 1345 ab.
442. Rousseau, supra note 352, at 396-400; cf. FEDERALIST PAPERS,
supra note 145, at 77-89 (No. 10).
443. See Rousseau, supra note 352, at 422.
444. See, e.g., Hayek, supra note 26, at 162-92, 234-49. For Hayek's
discussion of isonomia, see id. at 164-179. For a discussion of the due pro-
cess ideal of isonomia in nineteenth century American jurisprudence, see
Corwin, supra note 338 at 90-115. Cf. Van Zant v. Waddell, 2 Yerg. 260
(Tenn. 1829) (construing the state's due process clause to mean "a general
public law equally binding upon every member of the community .. .
under similar circumstances"). Id. at 93-94 & n.49.
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tice, Jefferson feared that even democratic legislatures would
tend to pass increasingly partial laws, if permitted to get away
with it.
As Professor Reid has noted, the American Whigs of the
Revolutionary era were not so much heirs to the Glorious
Revolution of 1688-1689, which substituted an arbitrary Par-
liament for a willful monarch,445 as they were restorers of the
democratic theories of the English Levellers of the Puritan
Revolution of the 1640's..' 4 The Levellers, who greatly influ-
enced Jefferson, embraced the ideal of a pre-Norman system
of English customary law in which artificial legal rules took a
back-seat to the local jury. Having experienced before
America the sting of arbitrary enactments by Parliament, the
Levellers, building upon Coke, first gave blunt expression to
the democratic constitutional theory that it was the ancient
prerogative of the jury to reject as null and void "an act of
Parliament contrary to the principles of reason. 44 7
In 1788 Jefferson proclaimed from France that trial "by
the people themselves," that is, by jury, as "the only anchor
ever yet imagined by man, by which a government can be
held to the principles of its constitution. '448 In a letter to
Thomas Paine he despaired of success in his efforts through
Lafayette and Gain to induce the unicameral "majority" of
the National Assembly to adopt the jury, even as he put civil
jury trial in all cases (if necessary) at the top of his list to
Madison of protections to be included in the Bill of Rights.4 4 9
As part of his campaign to induce the French philosophes to
adopt the ancient English jury, he sent the Abbe Annoux in
July, 1789, a list of Leveller or Leveller-inspired pamphlets,
including Walwyn's Juries Justified and Hawle's Englishman's
Rights. Discreetly suggesting that while juries had a right "to
judge the law as well as the fact," they exercised the right
only if they expected bias in the judge, he nevertheless
concluded:
Were I called upon to decide whether the people had best
be omitted in the Legislative or Judiciary Department, I
445. See Reid, supra note 169.
446. See Dumbauld, supra note 167, at 144-156.
447. T. PEASE, THE LEVELLER MOVEMENT 326 (1916); see also S. PRALL,
THE AGITATION FOR LAW REFORM DURING THE PURITAN REVOLUTION, 1640-
1660, 54-60, 78, 136-137 (1966) and D. VEAL, THE POPULAR MOVEMENT FOR
LAW REFORM 1640-1660, 158-159, 170 (1970).
448. 15 JEFFERSON PAPERS, 269.
449. Id. at 230-233; 14 id. at 442.
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would say it is better to leave them out of the Legislative.""
Elsewhere Jefferson made it clear that, wholly apart from any
suspicion of bias in the judge, "if the [legal] question relate to
any point of public liberty . the jury undertakes to decide
both law and fact."
451
Hence Jefferson doubtless would have endorsed the sar-
donic argument in favor of the law-finding jury by the Anti-
Federalist Aristocrotis:
Another privilege which the people possess at present, and
which the new congress will find it in their interest to de-
prive them of, is trial by jury-for of all the powers which
the people have wrested from government, this is the most
absurd; it is even a gross violation of common sense, and
most destructive to energy. In the first place it is absurd,
that twelve ignorant plebians, should be constituted judges
of a law, which passed through so many learned
hands;-first a learned legislature after many learned ani-
madversions and criticism have enacted it-Second, learned
writers have explained and commented on it.-Third,
learned lawyers, twisted, turned, and new modeled it, and
lastly, a learned judge opened up and explained it. 5
And, indeed, this may have been the absurd popqlist ideal
that the Sixth and Seventh Amendments were intended to
"'preserve."
2. Early Federal Practice
Accordingly, Professor Howe has documented the fact
that well into the nineteenth century the near universal prac-
tice in federal courts was to charge juries in both civil and
criminal cases as to their "right" to decide both the law and
the facts of a case."5" The Supreme Court, per Chief Justice
Jay, did so in the exercise of its original jurisdiction over a
civil action brought by the State of Georgia against a private
individual in 1794.454 This general role of the jury was rati-
fied in the Sedition Act of 1789 with its provision that the
450. 15 id. at 283.
451. VIII THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 372 (H. Washington
ed. 1853-54).
452. 3 COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note' 159, at 204-05.
453. See generally Howe, supra note 158.
454. Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 1 (1794). Justice James
Wilson and James Iredell endorsed this proposition in Bingham v. Cabot, 3
U.S. (3 DalI.) 18, 33 (1795).
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jury "have a right to determine the law and fact, under the
direction of the court, as in other cases." 4"5 And despite as-
sertions to the contrary, the debates over the Sedition Act
furnish no evidence that the jury was not intended to func-
tion as a constitutional safety net. When concern was ex-
pressed that the Act might be construed to give the jury the
right to pass on the admissibility of evidence or the constitu-
tionality of the statute, it is true that Albert Gallatin of Penn-
sylvania-who proposed the language that was
adopted-asserted that the jury would have the right to de-
cide only "the criminality of the act."'45 Yet this characteri-
zation was fully consistent with, indeed descriptive of, the
process by which a jury excepted a case from the operation of
an oppressive statute.
Gallatin was merely pointing out that it was one thing for
a jury to supplant the judge and make an articulate ruling on
the admissibility of evidence or the general constitutionality
of statutes, which would then be of precedential force in fu-
ture cases. But it was quite another for a jury to conclude
silently that a statute, at least as applied to particular set of
facts, could not equitably mean what it said. In short, it is
fully consistent with the thesis of "jury as dispenser of eq-
uity" to suppose that the jury could be bound by the judge's
ruling as to the general facial constitutionality of a statute,
but still be obliged to determine whether the statute as ap-
plied worked a special injustice. After all, as in the context of
modern substantive due process review, the judge's ruling of
facial validity merely meant that he had put on his "perfunc-
tory judicial hypothesizing ' '" 57 hat and conceived at least one
non-arbitrary application or justification for the statute. The
jury, tacitly accepting the judge's conclusion that the act was
not facially invalid because it was susceptible of at least one
constitutional application, under perhaps some as yet unspeci-
fied set of facts, merely concluded that the instant case was
not within that set of valid applications. It had no charter to
dispute the judge's characterization of the law as facially
valid.
The jury's acquittal in Henfield's Case458 in 1793 demon-
455. Act of July 14, 1798, 1 Stat. 596.
456. See Howe, supra note 158, at 586-587.
457. See Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Chang-
ing Court: A Model for a Never Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1972).
458. 11 Fed. Cas. 1099 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6,360). For a discus-
sion of the case, see Presser, A Tale of Two Judges: Richard Peters, Samuel
Chase, and the Broken Promise of Federalist Jurisprudence, 73 Nw. L. REv. 26,
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strated the significance of this distinction regarding the prec-
edential value of jury verdicts. The issue before the jury, as
charged by Justice Wilson, concerned the existence vel non of
a federal common law of crimes. He argued that such crimes
were punishable under that section of the Judiciary Act of
1789 which conferred jurisdiction on federal circuit courts
over "crimes and offenses cognizable under the authority of
the United States."' 59 Like Mansfield, Wilson was attempting
to get the jury to convict on the basis of the principles of an
unwritten common law. But true to his "moral sense" philos-
ophy, he asserted that the common law in question was of
"Saxon" and not "Norman" derivation.4 0 As a result, it was
made up only of principles that should be intuitively accessi-
ble to all men. With no spirit of ipse dixit, therefore, he at-
tempted to enter into a reasoned dialogue with the jury
about why Mr. Henfield had no right to declare private war
against England in light of principles behind Congress' exclu-
sive power in that regard.4" And unlike Mansfield he
charged the jury as to its right to decide both the law and the
facts of the case;"62 and the jury, under his mild tutelage, ac-
quitted. At that point Phillip Freneau's National Gazette of
Philadelphia, part of the growing anti-Federalist press,
crowed uncharitably that:
By this verdict, which according the charge of the court,
indicates a decision on the law as well as the facts, it is now
established that the citizen of the United States may by law
enter on board a French Privateer and it is presumable that
no other prosecution for this same cause can be
sustained .... 463
Of course, not only did the prediction about future prosecu-
tions prove factually incorrect,' it was also incorrect as a
matter of the theory of the functioning of the law-finding
jury.
Thus, jury nullification was qualitatively different than
judicial nullification, in that the law survived its encounter
with the jury formally intact. It remained more than a scare-
46-58 (1978).
459. An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, ch.
20, § 11, 7 Stat. 73 (1789).
460. 11 Fed. Cas. at 1106-07 (charge to the grand jury).
461. Id. at 1108-09 (charge to the grand jury).
462. Id. at 1121 (charge to the petit jury).
463. National Gazette of Philadelphia, Aug. 3, 1793.
464. See Presser, supra note 458, at 57-58.
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crow, since the judges apparently stood ready to exert their
considerable influence to see that the next jury applied it to
anyone foolhardy enough to follow the example of the first
defendant.
Furthermore, in the context of the passage of the Sedi-
tion Act the particular issue of constitutionality that some
legislators deemed it inappropriate for a jury to review did
not concern the substantive fairness of the Act. Rather it
dealt with a technical question of jurisdiction, concerning
whether Congress or only the individual states had the power
to pass such a statute. (Paradoxically, Albert Gallatin himself
agreed that the states had exclusive power to regulate the
subject matter; but if a federal law was to be passed, he
wanted it to provide clearly for the libertarian jury.) And it
was the one clearly appointed role of the Supreme Court
under Article III to act as supreme umpire of the boundaries
of federalism. Such technical questions were inappropriate
for a local jury since they did not implicate matters of natural
equity but of broad national policy. Ultimately, as we shall
see, the jury was deposed as the dispenser of democratic eq-
uity largely because of such latent issues of federalism.
Leonard Levy has made much of the fact that Jefferson
himself, as in his Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, opposed the
Sedition Act because of the issue of federal encroachment on
state's rights rather than out of concern for abstract liberty
of the press, or freedom of speech.4 5 Jefferson embraced the
Blackstonian concept that freedom of the press meant merely
freedom from prior restraint, i.e., no advance censorship, but
contemplated criminal liability for any abuse of the freedom
to speak or publish "freely." Levy grudgingly acknowledged
that Jefferson qualified Blackstone with the two "frail
Zengerian principles" codified in the Sedition Act: viz., (i) the
truth of remarks was admissible in defense and (ii) the crimi-
nality of an individual's words were to be determined by a
jury of his peers.4 Levy, who elsewhere underestimated the
465. Levy, Liberty and the First Amendment: 1790-1800, in L. FRIEDMAN
AND H. SCHEIBER, ED., AMERICAN LAW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 99
(1978).
466. Id. at 100. Although libertarians could conceive "no greater lib-
erty" than that assured by these provisions, Levy quickly dismissed the jury
as "a court of public opinion, often synonymous with public prejudice":
Granted, a defendant representing a popular cause against the ad-
ministration in power might be acquitted, but if his views were
unpopular, God help him-for a jury would not, nor would his
plea of truth as a defense.
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libertarian role of the jury, failed to appreciate (as Jefferson
clearly did) that unwarranted convictions under the Sedition
Act had less to do with the failings of the institution of the
jury than with the administration of the Act at the hands of
fiery and highly-partisan Federalist judges like Samuel Chase,
not to mention the packing of juries by partisan U.S. mar-
shals.467 These judges asserted a power to comment on the
weight of the evidence and to browbeat juries into rendering
prosecution verdicts by vehemently asserting that as a matter
of law the speech in question was seditious.'68
Chase himself was a committed Hobbesian. Asserting
that "Liberty and rights, (and also property) . . . must be for-
ever subject to the modification of particular governments,"
he believed in the necessity of a strong, centralized federal
administration. 69 An opponent of universal suffrage, his
analogous opposition to any "dispensing power" in a local
jury led him to prevent John Fries of Fries' (tax) Rebellion
fame from addressing the jury through counsel on the law in
his treason case.47 0 His Impeachment Articles recited that
this was done "in open contempt of the rights of juries, on
which, ultimately, rest the liberty and safety of the American
people. 47 1 Significantly, Chase defended himself before the
Senate by paying lip service to the "sacred . .. legal
privileg[e]" of juries to render unreviewable general criminal
verdicts in criminal cases. At the same time, he pointed out
that while he had restricted counsel's use of what he in good
faith deemed irrelevant authority, he "permitted [them] to
argue before the petit jury, that the court w[as] mistaken in the
law."' 72
Yet Chase would prove a key figure in the ultimate de-
struction of the Leveller ideal of the jury, even though it very
nearly resulted in his conviction. To his credit, he was consis-
tent positivist. His unlikely opposition to the idea of a federal
common law of crimes was part of his apotheosis of a system
Id.
467. See III A. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 42 n.1 (1919);
S. Presser, A Tale of Two Judges: Richard Peters, Samuel Chase, and the Broken
Promise of Federal Jurisdiction, 73 Nw. L. REV. 83 (1978).
468. See, e.g., U.S. v. Cooper, 25 Fed. Cas. 631 (C.C. Pa. 1800); U.S.
v. Callendar, 25 Fed. Cas. 239 (C.C. Va. 1800).
469. See S. SMITH AND T. LLOYD EDS., II TRIAL OF SAMUEL CHASE . . .
BEFORE THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, Appendix v-viii (1805).
470. I id. at 5-8.
471. Id. at 25-103 (emhasis added).
472. Id.
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of standing laws, impartially and invariably enforced, "whose
certainty and precision . . . is its greatest glory. ' 47 3 Accord-
ingly, in the 1800 case of United States v. Callendar47 4 he repu-
diated the "Virginia syllogism" that the jury's has a right to
decide the law of the case; the United States Constitution is
the supreme law of the land; therefore, the jury has a right to
pass on the constitutionality of the otherwise applicable statu-
tory law. Chase retorted that the jury's conceded right to
pass on the law of the case is limited to determining what
positive law was intended to govern the situation, not
whether a clearly applicable statute is binding law. To sup-
port his theory that a local Sixth or Seventh Amendment jury
has no "dispensing power" over the applicable law, Chase re-
lied on Hamilton's view in the The Federalist, No. 78 as to the
function of judicial review by the Supreme Court.
Hamilton asserted that the power of. judicial review
under Article III over cases "arising under th[e] Constitu-
"tion" springs from the clear need to have a single, binding
national interpretation of the Constitution. 47 5 That ideal is
frustrated if each local jury is entitled to arrive at its own
independent view of the meaning of various constitutional
provisions. Thus, Chase concluded that to the extent the
Federal Practice Act could be interpreted to require a federal
court sitting in Virginia to adopt the Virginia common law
rule as to the division of responsibility between judge and
jury, it would be unconstitutional as contravening the clear
plan of Article III. So holding, he laid the foundation for
much that is to follow. But two points bear current emphasis.
First, Chase did not consider the effect on Hamilton's view of
Article III of the embodiment of the jury trial guarantees in
the Bill of Rights, which Hamilton unsuccessfully opposed
due to the apparent assumptions of their proponents about
the proper division of responsibility between federal judge
and jury. Secondly, he ignored the possibility that the ideal of
a uniform system of precedent binding on judges might be
consistent with allowing equitable exceptions from the gen-
eral rule to be made by juries. It is still important to have
juries uniformly charged as to the guiding rules and princi-
ples of law. But it is clear that Chase, believing "the bulk of
473. I S. SMITH AND T. LLOYD, TRIAL OF SAMUEL CHASE (1805) [herein-
after, CHASE TRIAL].
474. 25 Fed. Cas. 239 (C.C.D. Va. 1800) (14,709).
475. FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 145, at (No. 78).
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mankind [to be] governed by a passion and not by reason,"4""
did not share the "moral sense" philosophy's sanguine view
of the capabilities of a unanimous lay jury.
Initially, Chase was an aberration. More enlightened ju-
rists, even those of a Federalist persuasion like James Wilson
and Chancellor Kent, affirmed the substantive right of jurors
to determine critical public law questions for themselves, like
the "immoral or illegal tendency" of seditious libel. In that
context, the people themselves would determine whether or
not a sufficient "public right" was threatened to justify the ex
post restraint on natural liberty-and only a unanimous ver-
dict would convict. In an 1804 New York common law prose-
cution for seditious libel,477 Kent, an acknowledged believer
in principles of natural equity, championed the right of the
jury to decide the law for itself. By the same token he noted
that the jury would and should give the judge's opinion "due
weight" and that in civil cases a verdict could be set aside and
a new trial ordered. At the same time, he rejected out of
hand the argument of Chase and Lord Mansfield-that a
jury had a mere de facto power to ignore the judge's view of
the law-as a perversion of basic American political princi-
ples, principles not confined to Jefferson's Virginia:
To deny to the jury the right of judging of the intent and
tendency of the act, is to take away the substance and with
it the value and security of this mode of trial.4 78
Who can doubt that implicit in Kent's view of the constitu-
tional jury is the more clearly revolutionary principle that if
the legislature itself (rather than the trial judge) should
clearly declare certain specific words or phrases to be punish-
able as seditious libel per se, the jury would still have the right
to second-guess the legislative line-drawing "as applied" to a
case at hand on the basis that the words as uttered did not.
pose a sufficiently "clear and present danger" to justify penal
sanction?
3. Dismantling the Model
The libertarian model of the jury was, however, system-
atically dismantled by "arrogant" state and federal appellate
476. I CHASE TRIAL, App. v (Chase's 1803 charge to the Baltimore
grand jury).
477. People v. Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. 336 (N.Y. 1804).
478. Id. at 365.
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judges during the middle part of the nineteenth century. 479 It
was sacrificed by its undemocratic judicial yokefellow on the
altar of the misunderstood Revoluntionary idol of "a govern-
ment of laws, and not of men." In denominating "the rule of
law" the special ward of the hierarchial appellate court sys-
tem, federal judges embraced three fallacies, which we shall
examine in order. They were (1) a formalistic/positivistic
conceit that all law, including constitutional law, should con-
sist of clear general propositions that are either made by leg-
islatures or discovered by judges according to certain authori-
tative techniques, (2) a fairness notion that a right of the jury
to dispense equity cannot be limited either logically or practi-
cally to one-way exceptions in. favor of the individual rather
than the state, and (3) a nationalistic concern that the right of
a local jury to review statutory law cannot be limited either
logically or practically to its "as applied" fairness as opposed
to its "facial" validity.
a. Professional Formalism. In the 1739 trial of John Peter
Zenger, Andrew Hamilton, counsel for the defendant, ar-
gued to the jury that "by law [it was] at liberty (without af-
front to the judgment of the Court) to find both the law and
the fact" in the case. 80 In line with "moral sense" epistemol-
ogy, the rightness or wrongness of a rule of law was not a
priestly or craft mystery. It was a moral phenomenon that
each man had to judge for himself. Thus Hamilton observed
that just as one man cannot see with "another's eye," he can-
not conscientiously seek truth through "another's under-
standing or reasoning"-so that a judge should take no of-
fense if the jury merely does its duty and finds the law
according to its own lights. 48' Even Blackstone noted favora-
bly that the jury brings the perspective of "the many" to the
judicial branch to counterbalance the narrower views of "the
few" likely to be held by appointed and life-tenured
judges.4 82
As we will see, however, Lemuel Shaw, the influential
Chief Justice of Massachusetts, did take umbrage at any sug-
479. See Howe, supra note 158, at 586.
480. J. ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF
JOHN PETER ZENGER, PRINTER OF THE NEW YORK WEEKLY JOURNAL, 95-96
(S. Katz ed. 1963).
481. Id. Hamilton borrowed his argument, language and all, from
the opinion of Chief Justice Vaughan in the famous Bushell's Case, 6
Howell's 999, 1011 (1670), which established that a jury may not be pun-
ished for ignoring the judge's instructions on the applicable law.
482. III W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES* 379.
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gestion that juries might serve to protect a defendant against
"biased" judges-dismissing it as an impertinent, if not irrev-
erent, reflection on the wisdom of the framers of the Massa-
chusetts Constitution, men who had taken careful steps to as-
sure judicial independence through those same tenure and
salary provisions.483 Due to his assumption that the rules of
public and private law could be scientifically discovered by
professionally trained judges, Shaw missed the point entirely.
If that assumption held, the only subjective qualities that
might deflect a judge from the discovery of objective legal
truth would be stupidity, dishonesty, or bias. Partisans of the
jury demurred. Anticipating the legal realists' critique of for-
malism, they denied that the shape of common law rules can
ever be dissociated from the moral sense of the judge, how-
ever objective he may be. Thus, it was not that Shaw's values
or those of other appellate judges were corrupt, they were
just different and aristocratic.
Among those values, as mentioned, was a professional
belief in the desirability and feasibility of deductive legal cer-
tainty. Not coincidentally, therefore, it was Shaw who first in-
troduced into American jurisprudence an inflexible version
of the harsh English "fellow-servant" rule.4 84 In so doing, he
not only adopted a certain uniform rule of law based on the
irrebutable legal presumption that employees (not employers)
are the least-cost avoider with regard to accidents caused by
their fellow servants and that their compensation had been
originally adjusted to reflect this division of risk, he took es-
pecial pains to preserve his rule from tampering by the
jury.485 Following Shaw's lead an aristocratic elegantiajuris, in
the guise of nineteenth century legal formalism, was to tri-
umph over the principle of individualized equity. As Jeffer-
son pointedly observed:
483. Commonwealth v. Anthes, 5 Gray 185, 230 (Mass. 1855); see L.
LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW 290-295
(1957).
484. Farwell v. Boston and Worchester Rail Road Corp., 45 Mass. (4
Metc.) 49 (1842).
485. In particular, Shaw invokes general policy considerations to jus-
tify interpreting the specific employment relationship to contain certain im-
plied in law features. Although one key consideration was the employee's
ability to quit his post if he noticed his fellow servants were guilty of mis-
conduct or negligence, Shaw refused to qualify his "practical rule" based
on whether or not the plaintiff was actually in a position to observe or
influence the conduct of the negligent fellow servant. Id. at 52. Such a
qualification would have required entrusting the implementation of the
rule to the impious hands of jurors. Id. at 55.
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State a moral case to a ploughman and a professor. The
former will decide it as well and often better than the lat-
ter, because he has not been led astray by artificial rules.4"
And as Karl Llewellyn would later write, the failure of nine-
teenth-century legal formalists to see through their own ra-
tionalizations-to see that the legal "certainty" they achieved
was "uncertainty for the non-law-tutored layman in his living
and dealing"-blinded them to the inevitable and legitimate
field of "free play" in the law for the operation of moral
sense. 48
Unhappily, although the legal realists were to realize that
"layman's certainty through law" can only come through re-
newed emphasis on the "fairness" of particular outcomes,
their devotion to centralized social experimentation meant
no serious thought was given to reviving the moral authority
of the decentralized jury. Instead, they ratified existing prac-
tice by formally entrusting the subjective job of balancing eq-
uities to the hierarchical elites of appellate courts and legisla-
tures, "with the primary governing institution being
administrative agencies, whose staffing and activities were not
subject to popular check." '88 In this way realism is said to
have "paved the way" conceptually for political absolutism in
America, at the direct expense of institutions of popular sov-
ereignty like the jury.48 9
b. Fairness and the Rule of Law. Shaw, building upon
Chase's foundation, was perhaps the key figure in the judi-
cially-orchestrated demise of the jury. He insisted that trial
judges instruct juries as to their "moral duty" to accept the
law as given them. In so doing Shaw was misled by John Ad-
ams' ambiguous verbiage in the Massachusetts' Constitution
of 1780 espousing the ideal of "a government of laws, not of
men." As already suggested, this ideal of the rule of standing
laws actually had less to do with the citizen's duty to obey
such laws than with the terms upon which he could be pun-
ished. Written laws were a necessary but not a sufficient con-
486. 6 JEFFERSON PAPERS, at 258.
487. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism Responding to Dean Pound,
44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, (1931).
488. White, From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence
and Social Change in early Twentieth Century America, 59 VA. L. REV. 999,
1025 (1972).
489. Purcell, American Jurisprudence Between the Wars: Legal Realism
and the Crisis of Democratic Theory, 75 AM. His. REV. 428, 438 (1969). Accord
R. POUND, CONTEMPORARY JURISTIC THEORY 9 (1940).
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dition to punishment, given the time-honored principle of
jury equity. A surprising number of modern scholars, how-
ever, reject the idea that juries should be allowed to make
one-way exceptions from harsh statutory or decisional rules as
founded on "an unprincipled distinction."4 90 But the con-
verse privilege to extend the scope of laws to punish activities
not within its letter would take an inordinate toll of liberty,
since no one could be certain what activities are lawful. The
distinction is historical and is captured in the phrase nulla
poena sine lege. One suspects that modern criticism of this self-
evident distinction is linked to the apotheosis of "law-abid-
ing" by pragmatic positivist/legal realist types, in order that
social experimentation may be smoothly and scientifically car-
ried out.49'
Still, it is disturbing that the first federal judge identified
by Professor Howe as having charged a jury on its "moral
duty" to take the law from the judge should have been Mr.
Justice Story, otherwise a champion of the jury. The case was
the 1835 circuit court trial in U.S. v. Battiste,"2 a Slave Trade
Act prosecution before a northern jury; and Story was argu-
ing for acquittal of the defendant as a matter of law. So it
turns out that Story's seminal argument is fully consistent
with the libertarian model that "a government of laws not of
men" properly translates as nulla poena sine lege.493 In the
case Story permitted Daniel Webster to argue to the jury that
had a "moral right" to decide the correct interpretation of
the law for themselves. Having allowed Webster his say, Story
charged the jury that he disagreed with Webster as to the last
point. Otherwise, if juries were truly entitled to decide cases
strictly "according to their own notions or pleasure," he
would "abstain from the responsibility of stating the law." 4 94
Continuing, Story asserted that his right to charge the jury as
to the law would not in any case "operate injuriously" to the
merits of the prisoner's case, since "an intelligent jury can
490. See, e.g., Redish, supra note 159, at 508, and Simson, supra note
158, at 515.
491. See e.g., United States v. United Mine Workers of America 330
U.S. 258, 307 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), in which Frankfurter
attempts to demonstrate how "the historic phrase 'a government of laws
and not of men' epitomizes the distinguishing character of our political
society."
492. See Howe, supra note 158, at 589. U.S. v. Battiste, 25 Fed. Cas.
1042 (C.C.D. Mass. 1835).
493. Accord, J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURE 230-32 (1977).
494. 25 Fed. Cas. at 1043.
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understand the principles of law applicable to the subject as
well'as the court; for they are the principles of common
sense[] '" '495 In other words, like Justice Wilson in Henfield's
Case he proposed to enter into a reasoned dialogue with the
jury-not engage in ipse dixit. So he explained to the jury
that balanced against their prerogatives was the "most sacred
constitutional right" of the defendant to have the jury take
the law from the judge and try him according to the "fixed
law of the land." Otherwise, if the jury could simply remodel
the law ad libitum, the defendant would be at the mercy of
their prejudice or mistake:
[In] case of error, there would be no remedy for the in-
jured party; for the court would not have any right to re-
view the law as it had been settled by the jury.496
That said, Story went ahead to take careful issue with
Webster's technical arguments, suggesting that they would
place an impossible burden of proof on the government and
would prescind from the operation of the statute a class of
cases where the "public mischief" was as great, even though
another "equally natural" interpretation of the statute would
avoid these counterintuitive results. Then he delivered his
true message to this northern jury. There was "no question
of fact" concerning the defendant's role in the transaction.
He merely transported the slave for hire. As a result, Story
argued that the defendant should be acquitted as a matter of
law, since it would confound all "moral distinctions" to treat
the mere act of transportation as a crime of piracy punishable
by death.
The problem of judicial review to which Story adverts
seems to reflect the existence of genuine confusion in federal
practice at the time as to the power of judges to order retrials
to review convictions in capital cases. Despite some English
precedent that the only relief for the prisoner in such a case
was delay until a pardon could be obtained from the King,49
the libertarian model (not to mention widespread state prac-
tice at the time) suggests the obvious solution that jury ver-
dicts in criminal cases are final only if favorable to the defen-
495. Id.
496. Id.
497. JOSIAH QUINCY ED., REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND ADJUDGED IN
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS
BAY BETWEEN 1761 AND 1772, Appendix II ("Powers and Rights of Juries"),
564-565 (1865).
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dant. The court should be free to order a new trial when it
feels that an unfavorable verdict is contrary to the law or
against the weight of the evidence. Modern rules of proce-
dure have added the power to direct a verdict or set aside a
conviction.9 8 Appellate review as to errors of law would still
be important, in the event of a conviction, to be sure that the
defendant had received the equal protection of a uniformly
favorable charge as to the law. That, however, was only his
first level of protection. Then came the decision by the jury
as to whether the law, as charged by the judge, could fairly
be applied under the circumstances of the instant case.
Story's opinion in Battiste was explicitly grounded in a liberta-
rian concern for the defendant, based on the apprehension
that a northern jury would turn the words of defense counsel
against his client and righteously convict irrespective of the
technical scope of the statute.
In 1771 John Adams himself, at a time when he was the
first lawyer of the province, wrote that "[tlhe great principles
of the Constitution are intimately known; they are sensible
felt by every Briton; it is scarcely extravagant to say they are
imbibed with nurse's milk and first air." '99 As a result, if the
judge should explain or interpret the law to a juror contrary
to these principles, "it is not only his right, but his duty" in
that case to find a verdict "according to his own best under-
standing, judgment, and conscience. "500 Obviously, for Adams,
the "great principles of the Constitution," which are
designed to constrain the operation of centralized govern-
ment, would induce jurors to disregard instructions only in
order to be more lenient than the law would otherwise dic-
tate. Likewise, it was said of John Dickinson that he viewed it
as the role of "veniremen" to "mitigate the inequity of the
law and resist practices inconsistent with America's new
republicanism." 501
c. Nationalism and Nullification. Most of all, Shaw was mis-
led as the proper role of the jury by the implications of the
raging controversy over the federal Fugitive Slave Laws. Fol-
lowing in Hamilton's footsteps, Shaw concluded that the
spectre of northern jury nullification threatened the entire
structure of American "ordered liberty"-namely, the fed-
498. See A. Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right to Say No, 45 S. CAL.
L. REV. 168, 178 (1972).
499. Quincy, supra note 497, at 566.
500. Id. at 567 (emphasis added).
501. G. ROWE, THOMAS MCKEAN 216 (1978) (emphasis added).
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eral Union. The Fugitive Slave Acts of 1793 and 1850 re-
flected Congress' belief that the fugitive slave clause of the
Constitution entitled southern slaveowners to a summary ex-
trajudicial method of retrieving runaways."' Although the
clause itself was one of the fundamental compromises struck
at Philadelphia, Abolitionists in the 1830's succeeded in get-
ting many northern states to make writs of homine replegiando
(personal replevin) available to alleged fugitives, in order to
supplement the summary federal procedure. °0 The writ car-
ried the right to a jury trial on the crucial factual question of
whether the individual was in fact a fugitive slave. Shaw in
the 1842 Latimer Case refused on federal supremacy clause
grounds to recognize the Massachusetts' statute affirming the
availability of the common law writ in such cases. Meanwhile,
a symmetrical phenomenon was occurring in the South,
where South Carolina States' Rightists and Anti-Unionists at-
tempted to get local federal juries to nullify the 1828 Tariff
of Abominations. In an unreported case Federal District
Judge Thomas Lee, sitting in Charleston, refused to allow the
question of the constitutionality of the tariff to be put to the
jury-but on technical grounds.'"
Other federal judges faced a similar dilemma. Forced to
try criminal cases against alleged aiders and abettors of fugi-
tive slaves before northern juries, they feared that the specta-
cle of sympathetic exonerations would further erode the sta-
bility of the Union. Jurors were repeatedly instructed that
they were not to follow their conscience, but rather the "arti-
ficial morality" of the law as laid down by Congress. 5 These
federal charges were by and large consistent with the liberta-
rian model of the jury. They represented reasoned attempts
by judges to persuade juries that the fugitive slave clause of
the Constitution embodied a specific, sacred pledge by "the
People" of the northern states to protect the southern posi-
tive law institution of slavery. 506 It was therefore a pro tanto
502. W. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN
AMERICA, 1760-1848, at 80 (1977). R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED (1975).
503. Cover, supra note 502, at 161, 171.
504. See D. MORGAN, JUSTICE WILLIAM JOHNSON 268-272 (1954).
505. Van Metre v. Mitchell, 28 Fed. Cas. 1036 (C.C.D. Pa. 1853) (No.
16,865) (Grier, J.); Norris v. Newton, 18 Fed. Cas. 322 (C.C.D. Ind. 1850)
(No. 10,307) (McLean, J.); Vaughn v. Williams, 28 Fed. Cas. 1115 (C.C.D.
Ind. 1845) (No. 16,903) (McLean, J.).
506. To be sure, convictions under the Fugitive Slave Laws were dif-
ficult to obtain, despite these "moral" promptings from the bench. See L.
FRIEDMAN, THE WISE MAJORITY 2850 (1971); Sax, Conscience and Anarchy:
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contractual waiver of the customary right of juries to serve as
a mini-plebiscite on the fundamental fairness of criminalizing
certain acts. In fugitive slave cases Northern juries had a
higher moral duty, namely, upholding their side of the consti-
tutional compact.
State and federal judges alike, under oath to support the
supremacy of the national Constitution, opposed the political
attempts by Nullifiers and Abolitionists to use local juries as a
wedge to split the nation apart. For similar reasons Samuel
Chase had rejected any inference that a jury's right to decide
the law of the case extended to the validity of applicable stat-
utes. 507 Employing the clearly erroneous assumption that
such a right would have to extend to all statutes or to none,
Chase dismissed the argument in the context of the Sedition
Act on the basis that the general principle would have a "di-
rect tendency to dissolve the Union."' 0 8 He confidently pre-
dicted, for instance, that the principle of nullification would
mean that federal laws "to impose taxes w[ould] be obeyed in
one state and not in another, unless force be employed to
compel submission"--and on its revenues the very existence
of the national government depends. Here we have shades of
The Federalist, No. 83.
Yet a broad middle ground was clearly open to Chase
and the others, short of excluding juries from any participa-
tion in-read, "interference with"-what they viewed as the
exclusive Article III structural role of federal appellate courts
in assuring uniform, unbiased review of the constitutionality
of federal laws. First, even if the Sixth Amendment were
read to entitle juries to share in the Article III judicial
power,50 9 it would still be possible to reject any putative right
to have juries entertain arguments that a federal statute was
void ab initio due to a general, unreconstructed opposition to
other specific provisions of the same Constitution, such as the
fugitive slave clause or the critical Article I power of a distant
The Prosecution of War Resistors, 57 YALE REVIEW 481 (1968).
507. United States v. Callendar, 25 Fed. Cas. 239, 256 (C.C. Va.
1800).
508. Id.
509. In fact Chase seems to have also been making the more subtle,
but for our purposes irrelevant, technical observation that the Judiciary
Act of 1789 made no allowance for a federal jury to play any role in the
appellate Writ of Error process by which a uniform national interpretation
of the Constitutional rule of law was guaranteed. See, e.g., id. at 255. That
is consistent with the distinction as to "facial" versus "as applied" review
being developed in the text.
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Congress to tax the people of the states directly. The Consti-
tution contained no such seeds of self destruction. More im-
portantly, it would have been possible to reconcile the nation-
alism concerns that animated Chase et al. and the libertarian
model of the Sixth Amendment through simple recognition
of the jury's right to find a statute, not facially void for gen-
eral reasons of policy, but rather "ineffective" as applied to
the case at hand due to a showing of particularized
unfairness. 10
In other words, the libertarian model being articulated
here concedes Chase's structural argument that Sixth
Amendment juries have no charter to protect states' rights by
deciding "what Uurisdictional] restrictions are expressly or
impliedly imposed by [the Constitution] on the national legis-
lature."' 51' For the clear Article III role of the federal appel-
late courts, in policing the general boundaries of federalism,
is to preserve the supremacy of national law against system-
atic local nullification. But that role can be vindicated, with-
out unnecessary sacrifice of the historic substantive dimen-
sions of trial by jury, through recognition of the ancient
distinction between "facial" and "as applied" review of stat-
utes-reserving the former only to the appellate courts.
Despite having adjured the U.S. Marshall "not to put any
of those creatures called Democrats on the jury," Chase, on a
self-described mission in United States v. Callendar to teach
uppity Virginians a lesson in the difference between "liberty"
and "licence," '512 refused to acknowledge even the con-
strained right of the jury to review the equitable application
of the law. He was not about to concede the jury a juridical
inch, for the practical reason that once any right is granted it
to nullify "no line can be drawn, no restriction imposed on
the exercise of such power."15 1' But Chase's argument proves
too much. His ultimate quarrel is with the finality of a jury's
general verdict of acquittal. Because of that power nothing a
judge either says or fails to say in his instructions to the ju-
510. The "void ab initio"/"merely ineffective" distinction, which par-
allels the facial/as applied dichotomy, lies at the heart of Professor
Thorne's widely accepted analysis of Coke's opinion in Dr. Bonham's Case.
THORNE ED., INTRODUCTION TO A DISCOURSE UPON THE EXPOSITION AND UN-
DERSTANDING OF STATUTES 77-88 (1942). see Bailyn, supra note 337, at 177.
For a contrary view of Coke's meaning, see Berger, supra note 177, at 371-
393.
511. Callendar, 25 Fed. Case at 255.
512. Id. at 258 (Editorial Note I).
513. Id. at 256.
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rors, or precludes counsel from saying, can completely con-
trol their ability to disrupt a national statutory scheme
through acquittal. 5 14
But it was left to Chief Justice Shaw to transpose the very
different arguments in Battiste and the federal fugitive slave
and tariff act prosecutions to the context of a locally-unpopu-
lar and state-imposed prohibition law. Massachusetts' juries
were in effect to be instructed to convict a defendant on the
basis of the supremacy of all statutory law. The only similar-
ity to the other cases lay in Shaw's specious argument that
Adams' paean to "a government of law, not of men," effec-
tively emended by Shaw to read "a government of legislators,
not of jurymen," conferred special sanctity on all legislative
acts. He read the phrase in the Massachusetts' Constitution as
if it were the fugitive slave clause writ large-a blanket
agreement by the people to submit to the artificial morality
of positive law in all matters and a renunciation of their cus-
tomary right to impose their moral sense on the application
of the law via participation on juries. It is perhaps not inap-
posite to note that one modern scholar of the period has
characterized the temperance movement in Massachusetts as
an attempt by a declining Federalist-Calvinist elite to "reest-
ablish its prestige by 'lifting' the rude mass to a style of life
enunciated by an aristocratic moral authority." 5
Shaw concluded that jury discretion over the law in any
case violated the fundamental republican notion of an appel-
late-based "rule of law." Shaw was not alone. Similar transpo-
sitions occurred elsewhere."' Despite prevalent early practice
to the contrary, as well as popular protest, such appellate rea-
514. On what principled basis, therefore, could Chase stop short of
holding that the appellate mission of the federal courts to make the nation
safe for national law required that the insufficiency of the evidence in a
criminal case to convict be deemed a matter of law (backed up by the power
to order a new trial), the "double jeopardy" clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment notwithstanding? By the end of the nineteenth century Mr. Justice
Brewer would cut this gordian knot in in re Debs. In that case the Court
held that the Sixth Amendment did not preclude lower courts from em-
ploying criminal equity, i.e., injunctions backed up by the contempt power,
as an auxiliary method of federal law enforcement in communities where
prosecutions "would be doomed in advance to failure," thereby eliminating
the jury altogether. Otherwise, Brewer reasoned for the Court, "the whole
interests of the nation ...would be at the absolute mercy of a portion of
the inhabitants of that single state." In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 582 (1895).
515. J. GUSFIELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE 42, (1963).
516. See Howe, supra note 158, at 590-616, and Note, The Changing
Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE L.J. 70 (1964).
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soning resulted in American juries being instructed increas-
Singly during the mid-to-late nineteenth century that they had
a "moral" duty to take the rule of law from the trial judge
and mechanically apply it to the facts of the case, however
grotesque the result. The jury was admonished to disengage
its conscience and submit to the "artificial morality" of the
legal system. Vociferous popular protests against such high-
handed judicial power plays eventuated as in Massachusetts in
statutes declaratory of the libertarian model of the jury, but
most influential appellate courts, like Shaw's, ignored such
sentiment and gutted the acts as contravening the constitu-
tional primacy of a uniform rule of judicially-administered
law. The Massachusetts' statute addressed the underlying
problem in Battiste by confirming that judges could overturn
convictions and order new trials. Yet in a critical conces-
sion to popular mythology, even Shaw (as Chase before him)
permitted defense counsel to argue the principles of law to
the jury and to contest the judge's view of constitutionality in
the teeth of an imminent instruction on the jury's duty to
accept the opinion of the court. 8' This judicial effort at
moral suasion proved no more successful in the area of state
prohibition law prosecutions than it had in Fugitive Slave
Law prosecutions. For that reason perhaps, judicial attitudes
began to harden in mid-century.
Pursuing Shaw's own inexorable logic of the "rule of
law," but conveniently rejecting his quaint procedural rule,
American courts (including the Supreme Court in 1894 in
Sparf and Hansen)' 9 eventually denied defendants the right
through counsel to argue to the jury the unconstitutionality
of the statutory law, either on its face or as applied. The issue
of constitutionality was to be left exclusively to the appellate
courts, which thereby secured for themselves the right to
have the final discretionary "say" in the American
democracy.
Professor Horwitz has criticized the analogous private
law process by which an "aristocratic" nineteenth century
bench displaced the jury's simply communal notions of justice
with a sort of class ideology.520 In the area of contracts, for
517. See Commonwealth v. Anthes, 5 Gray 185 (Mass. 1855). The
provision may have been modeled after Fox's Libel Act, passed by Parlia-
ment in 1792.
518. Id.
519. Sparf and Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1885).
520. M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-
1860 (1977).
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example, Horwitz traced how "procommercial forces" sup-
planted the eighteenth century theory of a "customary or fair
price" with the objective "will" theory of contracts. Follow-
ing Mansfield's lead, American judges looked only to the
"four corners" of the contract for its meaning, the extrinsic
circumstances of the parties being irrelevant. Any ambigui-
ties or gaps would be resolved according to artificial, instru-
mental rules of law, so that by mid-century the interpretation
of a contract was purely an objective question of law. Thus,
as in the public law area, American civil courts created dur-
ing the second quarter of the century
a great intellectual divide between a system of formal
rules-which they managed to identify exclusively with 'the
rule of law'-and those ancient precepts of morality and eq-
uity, which they were able to render suspect as subversive
of the 'rule of law' itself.62
Whatever the justification for that process in the private law
sphere, its public law manifestations are even more difficult
to defend.
4. Murray's Lessee Revisited
By the end of the nineteenth century the once noble jury
had been effectively reduced to the status of a menial, fact-
finding adjunct of the court. It is perhaps little wonder then
that when the Supreme Court got around to taking the "due
process" guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment seriously,
even so-called libertarian justices like Peckham and Field dis-
missed the idea that trial by jury was in any way essential to
implementing the notion of fundamental fairness they associ-
ated with the phrase. 22 They would have rejected as ludi-
crous any suggestion that the jury was in fact constitutionally
necessary to operationalize the meaning of "fundamental
fairness." (Otherwise, they might have spared themselves
their own later anti-majoritarian excesses.) By contrast, the
key libertarian framers of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which was ratified in 1867, clearly did consider trial by jury
to be one of the principal guarantees of section 1. Represen-
tative Bingham, framer of that section, described to the
House one aspect of the situation the Amendment was
521. Id. at 188.
522. See, e.g., Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 603 (1900) (Peckham,
J.): "Trial by jury has never been affirmed to be a necessary requisite of
due process of law."
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designed to redress as follows: "[The States] denied trial by
jury, and [the citizen] had no remedy. They took property
without compensation, and he had remedy."5"3 Nor was this
juxtaposition of the issues of juries and just compensation
necessarily coincidental.
In contemporaneous debate the scholarly Radical Repre-
sentative William Lawrence of Ohio, formerly a state judge
and legal editor, adduced the authority of Coke for the pro-
position that even in some public law matters the Due Pro-
cess Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments re-
quire "trial by a jury of twelve" and not simply "an act of the
Legislature" purporting to establish some conclusive adminis-
trative process. In particular, Lawrence opposed a bill that
authorized the federal condemnation of land through a pro-
cedure in which damages were assessed by "three disinter-
ested and discreet . . . commissioners." '52 4 He argued that
the right to jury trial, now guaranteed (as he assumed) at
both the state and federal levels, properly extended to all just
compensation actions:
But since the adoption of the fourteenth [amendment],
it may well be maintained that a common law jury trial is
secured. Its language is-
Nor shall any State deprive any person of. . . prop-
erty without due process of law.
This is broad and comprehensive. It is not limited to
ordinary law proceedings in courts, but it comprehends the
cases where a State may exercise the power of eminment
domain.
The condemnation of private property for public uses
is not a subject of equity jurisdiction, or one which can be
regulated by a statutory proceeding, so as to take it out of
that "due process of law" which secures a common-law jury
trial ....
Juries represent the impartial, honest judgment of en-
lightened people. Legislative or judicial commissioners may
represent special interests or be manipulated for special
523. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong. 1st Sess., App. 85 (1871) (hereinaf-
ter Globe App.). This and other of Bingham's explications of his handi-
work were recently adduced by the Supreme Court in Monell v. Depart-
ment of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 685 n.45,
for the proposition the Fourteenth Amendment "unequivocally prohibited
uncompensated takings." Id. at 687. Cf 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1956 (T. Cooley ed. 1873).
524. See CONGR. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3rd Sess., 1245 (1871).
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purposes.52 5
A century later these arguments again rang through the
House Chamber. In a successful effort to repeal the three-
man commissioner system employed on TVA condemnations,
Representative Quillen hailed the "traditional American
right to trial by jury" in eminent domain as the "soundest
and fairest manner so far devised for determining equity for
all parties concerned. '52 6 Joined by Senators Baker (Tennes-
see) and Cooper (Kentucky), Quillen got the Congress to
make Rule 71A(h), with its optional jury, applicable to the
TVA.5 2 7 There is a circular irony in this result that should
not be overlooked.
In the beginning the key justification given by the Advi-
sory Committee on Rules for making the Rule 71 A(h) jury
optional, rather than mandatory as demanded by the
A.B.A., 528 was the Congressionally-approved TVA system, to-
gether with glowing judicial endorsements of its effectiveness
in producing uniform judgments." 9 The latter "cost contain-
ment" concerns were of course dressed up in rhetoric about
the danger of "[d]isproportionate awards . . .creat[ing] dis-
satisfaction and ill will" among condemnees.530 But in the
TVA debates Senator Baker roundly asserted that in such ac-
tions juries and equity are "infinitely superior" to commis-
sioners and uniformity. 31 Nonetheless, it was Senator Baker
who introduced the successful substitute bill to place TVA
condemnations under Rule 71A(h). Indicating his own pref-
erence for an "absolute right to trial by jury" in such cases,
Baker in effect suggested that Congress bow to the Supreme
Court's apparent view that justice sometimes requires the ex-
clusion of a public law jury. Still, Senators Baker and Cooper
and others made it clear that the Rule 71 A(h) option not to
employ a jury should be exercised only in "extraordinary,
unique, and unusual circumstances," circumstances they
525. Id.
526. 114 CONG. REC. 26,948-26,949 (1968) (remarks of Representa-
tive Quillen).
527. Act of September 28, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-536, 80 Stat. 885,
amending 16 U.S.C. § 831x (1964).
528. See ABA, Report of the Committee on Amendment of Rule 71A of
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 81 A.B.A. REP. 463, 465 (1956).
529. Fed. R. Civ. P. 71A, Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules
(Supplementary Report).
530. Id.
531. 113 CONG. REc. 36,980 (1968) (remarks of Senator Baker).
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could not easily envision.5 " 2 Thus today the Court, by treat-
ing the condemnation jury as optional and severely curtailing
its equitable discretion over damages where employed, is act-
ing the part of a self-appointed protector of the fisc from
Congress' own sense that equity excels uniformity in such
matters-an odd judicial mission, to say the least.
In Lawrence's case, the former Abolitionist was attempt-
ing to nip in the bud the untoward, and apparently calcu-
lated, jury implications of Justice Curtis' opinion in Murray's
Lessee." 3 As noted earlier, Curtis, who was a protege of Chief
Justice Shaw, championed through dicta the counter-intuitive
proposition that the Seventh Amendment guarantee was in-
applicable in the precise public law arena where it was most
needed to mediate between citizen and state. Curtis
grounded that conclusion on (1) the observation that since
there was a Seventh Amendment guarantee of a civil trial by
jury, the separate Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause was
an implicit recognition of the permissibility of summary Arti-
cle I legislative courts and (2) the equally suspect assertion of
a doctrine of vicarious sovereign immunity for officials of the
government. That use of the Due Process Clause to under-
mine the Seventh Amendment, however, studiously ignored
the historical fact that the Seventh Amendment, with its ex-
press jury trial guarantee, was the more sought-after of the
two provisions in the Bill of Rights precisely because its pro-
ponents (following Coke) identified due process of law with
the common law procedure of trial by jury. The separate Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment was viewed as an af-
terthought, as innocuous window dressing.3 4
But Curtis' inattention to such inconvenient constitu-
tional detail was not necessarily induced by the merits of the
tax collection dispute before him. He had bigger fish to fry.
532. See, e.g., id. at 36,980-36,981 (remarks of Senator Cooper).
533. Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land Improvement Co., 59 U.S.
(18 How.) 272 (1855).
534. After all, where the jury trial and due process language ap-
peared together, as in Magna Carta and the Massachusetts' Constitution, in
provisions proscribing any deprivation of rights "but by the judgment of
his peers, or the law of the land," it was read on Coke's authority as imply-
ing a conjunctive "or" and meaning simply "a trial by jury in a regular
course of legal and judicial proceedings." Chief Justice Shaw so held in
Fisher v. McGirr, I Gray 1, 37 (1854), the first case to declare a Massachu-
setts' general statute unconstitutional. Shaw held that a summary statutory
proceeding in rem, by which stores of liquor were to be sequestered, for-
feited, and destroyed, was defective since it failed to guarantee a suitable
postdeprivation remedy, including a jury trial.
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A staunch nationalist, he was the Fillmore Administration's
point man for the enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act in
Eastern New England. As a result, he was an ardent foe of
those who claimed its summary procedure, which employed
commissioners to issue ex parte certificates of removal for cap-
tured fugitives, violated the Seventh Amendment. Likewise,
in a Fugitive Slave Act prosecution on circuit in 1851 he bent
Story's opinion in Battiste to his nationalistic will, charging
the jury that they had a duty under the Supremacy Clause to
convict aiders and abettors of escape.5 3 5 Where Story had rea-
soned with the jury as to the responsible exercise of its his-
toric prerogative, Curtis-like Shaw before him-demanded
that the local jury prostrate itself before the imperative de-
mands of the centralized administration of federal law. 6
Fighting rhetorical fire with fire, he responded to the incen-
diary suggestion by counsel that the jury could find the Act
unconstitutional on general principles537 by pointing to the
Article III role of the Supreme Court and denying that local
jurors could possibly enjoy any law-finding privilege, however
qualified.5 " As one biographer put it, "Curtis, who believed
in the elitist duty of the educated to lead the people, became
upset when the people talked back.""'
Yet in 1854 the people had talked back to Curtis
through the Wisconsin Supreme Court. With its decision in
In re Booth, it became the first American court to declare the
juryless removal procedures of the Fugitive Slave Act viola-
tive of the Seventh Amendment."0 Anticipating the inevita-
ble objection that the procedure to reclaim a fugitive did not
correspond to any specific "Sui[t] at common law" in 1791,
the Wisconsin court embraced Justice Story's position in Par-
sons v. Bedford 4' (and what would afterwards be Represen-
tative Lawrence's position before the House), namely, that
jury actions were intended to be the great residual due pro-
cess category for legal issues. As the court cogently reasoned:
"Were it otherwise, Congress need only to change the com-
mon law form of procedure, to nullify the right of trial by
535. United States v. Morris, 26 Fed. Cas. 1323 (C.C.D. Mass. 1851)
jNo. 15,8151.
536. Id. at 1334.
537. Id. at 1331.
538. Id. at 1334.
539. See Gillette, supra note 332.
540. 3 Wis. 1 (1854).
541. 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 434 (1830).
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jury in all cases. ' 542 To the counter-argument that the body
of the Constitution itself specifically contemplated a "sum-
mary mode of proceeding," the court responded that the
later adoption of the Seventh Amendment countermanded
any such inference. In an action originating in the federal
system, Congress could not authorize any entity other than
an Article III jury to render what was essentially a final judg-
ment in a legal dispute involving whether or not "services or
labor [was] due" from the alleged slave to the alleged master.
It was the very next year in Murray's Lessee that Curtis
went out of his way in dictum to affirm that in summary
"public right" actions involving the regulatory power of Con-
gress, no ultimate post-deprivation remedy need be afforded,
much less a jury. Still, it requires a moment's reflection to see
why this was not an act of supererogation on Curtis' part. Af-
ter all, the potent argument that the Seventh Amendment
constitutes a pro tanto repealer of any summary procedures
originally implicit in the Fugitive Slave Clause hinges on the
assumption that free unnaturalized black persons, though
born as slaves, have a constitutional right as citizens of the
United States to sue in federal courts in diversity of citizen-
ship cases.5 3 But as the Dred Scott decision would demon-
strate, Chief Justice Taney and other justices refused to buy
the Abolitionists' critical premise. 54" On the other hand, be-
cause Curtis did agree that Article III jurisdiction extended
to alleged free blacks, he must have deemed it a special chal-
lenge, given his role as Daniel Webster's cat's-paw, to defuse
the enthusiasm generated by In re Booth. (Curtis found him-
self on the "right" side in Dred Scott because he characteristi-
cally affirmed the power of Congress to impose a centralized
solution to the national problem of slavery on the territo-
542. In Re Booth, 3 Wis. at 15.
543. For evidence that Abolitionists were well aware before Dred
Scott of the centrality of this assumption, see, e.g., D. FEHRENBACHER, SLAV-
ERY, LAW, & POLITICS 152 (1981).
544. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1951). Given
that Taney's was the acknowledged opinion of the Court, the better as-
sumption is that all the justices save McLean and Curtis, who dissented on
the point, concurred in the basic alternative holding that no unnaturalized
free blacks (whether or not born as a slave) or slave can be a U.S. citizen
for Article III purposes. It is clear that Taney, Wayne, and Daniel ex-
cluded free blacks from the ranks of citizenship, while Campbell and Ca-
tron preferred to rest their jurisdictional vote on the substantive conclu-
sion that Scott was still a slave. See Fehrenbacher, supra note 543, at 177-
82.
19851
JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY
ries-and presumably the existing states as well." 5 ) He at-
tacked In re Booth in Murray's Lessee by denying that the nec-
essary condition of black citizenship would be sufficient to
invoke Article III jurisdiction with its attendant Seventh
Amendment guarantee. Instead, Curtis asserted that the sep-
arate Due Process Clause is, as it were, a monument to a
whole set of possible extra-judicial procedures that constitute
implicit, historically-grounded exceptions to Article III.
Ironically, the substantive holding in In re Booth was par-
tially vindicated by Justice Brandeis' 1922 opinion for the
Court in Ng Fung Ho v. White.5 46 In a case involving the de-
portation of aliens (not slaves) who claimed to be citizens (not
free), even Brandeis embraced for the occasion a concept of
due process of law which mandated a more expansive, albeit
appellate-administered, doctrine of "jurisdictional fact." In
short, Congress was denied the right to confer discretionary
authority to deport on the basis of a mere "suspicion" of
alienage:
Jurisdiction in the executive to order deportation exists
only if the person arrested is an alien. The claim of citizen-
ship is thus a denial of an essential jurisdictional fact ...
For where there is jurisdiction a finding of fact by the exec-
utive department is conclusive. . . . To deport one who so
claims to be a citizen, obviously deprives him of lib-
erty. . . . Against the danger of such deprivation without
the sanction afforded by judicial proceedings, the Fifth
Amendment affords protection in its guarantee of due pro-
cess of law. The difference in security of judicial over adminis-
trative action has been adverted to by this court."7
Unfortunately, Brandeis refused to acknowledge any consti-
tutionally-endorsed "difference in security" in factual review
by juries over judges in public law matters. The next subsec-
tion focuses on the comparative advantages of the former in
that setting, while the next section suggests how substantive
due process grew up out of this procedural unwillingness of
judges to turn public law fact-finding discretion back to the
jury. But first a word should be said about why the public law
545. It is noteworthy that Curtis' brother George T. Curtis, a con-
servative Massachusetts Whig, became at 'the last minute the second of only
two attorneys to represent Scott before the Supreme Court. See
Fehrenbacher, supra note 543, at 155.
546. 259 U.S. 276 (1922).
547. Id. at 284-85 (emphasis added).
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fact-finding prerogatives of juries are not necessarily subject
to the same balancing calculus used to curtail their discretion
in private law matters.
5. Commercial versus Constitutional Equity: The Compara-
tive Advantages of Juries
The libertarian model of the jury is not undermined by
the well-known fact that increasing nineteenth century com-
mercialization put effective pressure on the common law sys-
tem to generate formal rules in the interest of certainty and
predictability.548 Those early judges can to some degree be
excused for responding to such pressures by directing ver-
dicts in cases in which the jury's unique moral perspective
was simply irrelevant. Commerce is like checkers. Except to
the extent new judicially-crafted rules are retrospective in op-
eration (and they need not be), it is more important that such
rules be uniform and understood than that they be ideally
fair.54 9 Once an individual has voluntarily submitted to the
arbitrary rules of the game, it makes no moral sense to allow
him to protest later on to a jury that one of the ground rules
is unfair as applied to his situation. Under the "artificial mo-
rality" of the game, unfairness simply does not exist. Montes-
quieu, among others, recognized the need for special com-
mercial rules of law of peculiar inflexibility. 5 0 The same
basic logic would apply in certain public law areas, where, for
548. See Pound, Justice According to Law, 13 COLUM. L. REv. 696, 705-
709 (1913).
549. On the need for rigid rules to govern commercial transactions,
see Ralston v. Hamilton (1862), 4 MACQ. 397, 405 (Lord Westbury) ("Their
justice or injustice in the abstract is of less importance to the community
than that the rules themselves shall be constant and invoilable.") Compare
the rationale of the Supreme Court in recently deciding that henceforth
horizontal maximum-price agreements will be deemed per se violations of
the Sherman Act:
The costs of judging business practices under the rule of reason
... have been reduced by the recognition of per se rules. Once
experience with a particular kind of restraint enables the Court to
predict with confidence that the rule of reason will condemn it, it
has applied a conclusive presumption that the restraint is unrea-
sonable. As in every rule of general application, the match between the
presumed and actual is imperfect. For the sake of business certainty and
litigation efficiency, we have tolerated the invalidation of some agree-
ments that a fullblown inquiry might have proved to be reasonable.
Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 U.S. 332, 343-44 (1982)
(emphasis added).
550. C. MONTESQUIEU, L'ESPIRT DES Lois, liv., xx, chap. 18.
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example, an employee has been hired with the express under-
standing that he may be fired at any time-with or without
cause. He has submitted to a game in which his future success
hinges, as it were, on nothing more logical or fair than the
roll of the dice. That explains the result in the recent contro-
versial Fourteenth Amendment due process case of Bishop v.
Wood, 551 in which the Supreme Court upheld the application
of a rule of law that ambiguous contracts with the state to be
construed against the employee.
It is one thing to presume that a public employee walked
into his contract with his eyes open, since word soon filters
out that one must turn "square corners" in dealing with the
state-and quite another to presume that each citizen at ma-
turity walked into the social contract freely and with eyes
open. The latter presumption, so dear to the hearts of prag-
matic positivists and welfare economists of all stripes, rests on
the theory that as part of the social contract each citizen re-
ceived ex ante compensation for waiving the right to litigate
the substantive fairness of any future governmental depriva-
tions of his intangible expectations. Consequently, no one will
be heard to complain that the government is estopped to
frustrate individual expectations allegedly formed in reasona-
ble detrimental reliance on the pre-existing state of law.
551. 426 U.S. 341 (1976). The Supreme court noted that a local em-
ployee held office under a statute that could "fairly" be read to imply a
promise of dismissal only for cause. Looking to local state law to test the
substantive "sufficiency of the claim of entitlement," to see in other words
whether the employee had a "property" right which was subject to due
process protection, the Court deferred to the decision of a lower court,
acting without jury, that as a preliminary matter of law there had to be an
express "guarantee" of continued employment, otherwise the individual's
employment was "at will." Id. at 345. Here, again, perhaps we can excuse
the court for standing the libertarian model of the jury on its head, i.e., by
putting the substantive cart before the procedural horse-to mix meta-
phors. Under that model it is the product of procedural due process, the
jury's verdict, that determines the ultimate substantive issue. In Bishop
there was no right to have a jury arbitrate the issue of property vel non
since (i) nothing passes by implication in a contract with the government
and (ii) federalism dictates that the state (and local governments) retain im-
portant prerogatives over hiring and firing of their employees. With regard
to principle (i), it is an accepted doctrine of federal employment law that
employees' entitlements derive only from the express provisions of applica-
ble statutes and regulations, so that they are not entitled to rely on other
officially-fostered expectations which would give rise to implied-in-fact con-
tractual rights in a private setting. See, e.g., Kizas v. Webster 707 F.2d 524
(D.C. Cir. 1983); U.S. v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 869 (1977); Bell v. U.S.,
366 U.S. 393, 401 (1961); and Army Air Force Exch. Serv. v. Sheehan,
456 U.S. 728 (1982).
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Surely in this context of the citizen on the street, Justice
Brennan's protest in Bishop is more a propos: "the relevant
inquiry is whether it was objectively reasonable for the [indi-
vidual] to believe he could rely on [the continued benefit of
the pre-existing entitlement]. 5 5' After all, the libertarian
Lockean assumption is that individuals brought their prop-
erty and talents into society with them and therefore would
have been risk averse to giving government such broad pow-
ers. Brennan's suggestion that there should be a federal di-
mension to the definition of "property" for due process
clause purposes partly coincides with the present argu-
ment-but with the twist that this article has advanced the
Seventh Amendment jury, rather than the appellate Courts,
as the principal fount of a new federal common law of "prop-
erty" and "liberty." Juries can serve this role because the ap-
plicable rules of law are in fact generalized standards or prin-
ciples of fairness that they are particularly suited to
administer.
The use of juries for this purpose represents the choice
of a particular kind of justice, for in jury trials the law "loos-
ens its grip and allows the results to gravitate toward the ae-
quum et bonum. '553 Whether the values of equity or of uni-
formity and predictability are more important must be
evaluated, as Lord Devlin has noted, in relation to the type of
case. As just suggested, cases involving the concepts of "lib-
erty" and "property" under the necessarily implied terms of
the social contract are not like cases involving commercial
contracts. The statute of frauds and the parol evidence rule
embody the concept that in discrete commercial transactions
the parties have an opportunity to put everything clearly in
writing-and if they fail to do so, they will not be heard to
complain about the application to them of the artificial, but
uniform rules of the commercial common law. 55' The con-
cededly arbitrary "four courners" rule-associated with the
objective "will" theory of contracts-is designed to en-
courage individuals to work out the details of their dealings
in advance, so as not to tax the judicial system with the job of
supplying their omissions.
As symbolized by the Ninth Amendment, however, no
552. Id. at 353-354 (emphasis added).
553. P. DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY 155 (1966).
554. CJ: STAIR, INSTITUTIONS OF THE LAW OF SCOTLAND, Bk. 1, tit. x, §
4: "[Nlow when writing is ordinary, we allow no process for [oral]
promises, as a penalty against those who observe not so easy a method."
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parol evidence rule applies to the social contract. Because the
social contract regulates a complex, ongoing contractual rela-
tionship, most of the important areas of future conflict must
be left to arbitration according to certain prescribed practices
or principles of justice. John Rawls has called the decision
over what those practices or principles shall be "the 'solution'
of [the] highest order 'game' of adopting . . . principles of
agreement for all coming particular 'games' whose peculiarities
one can in no way foresee."' 555 Jefferson and the other liberta-
rian framers rejected the Hobbesian notion that "justice [can
be] founded in [the literal terms of] contract solely. ' 556 In-
stead, our collective moral sense had to be the basis for
"man's politics and political rights; '557 and what better insti-
tution to apply contemporary moral standards to the work-
ings of government than the jury?
By comparison, judges are not suited to such moral line-
drawing exercises, since there are no "neutral principles" for
weighing competing notions of right.55 8 As a result, judges
tend to seek the refuge of mechanical rules of simple applica-
tion, as we have seen in the Taking Clause area. There, for
all its talk of "fairness and justice," the Supreme Court's bot-
tom-line rule of thumb is a model of wooden simplicity: short
of a physical invasion, an individual is not entitled to compen-
sation for regulatory harm unless it renders his property vir-
555. Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 67 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW 164,
170 (1958).
556. Wills, supra note 171, at 204, quoting L. CAPPON, THE ADAMS-
JEFFERSON LETTERS 492 (1959). Compare Patrick Henry's assertion before
the Virginia ratification convention of the need for a Seventh Amendment
jury to "do equity" even in the context of private contract actions where
changed circumstances militate against literal enforcement-
I admit that the American Union is dear to every man. I admit
that every man, who has three grains of information, must know
and think that union is the best of all things. But, as I said before,
we must not mistake the end for the means. If. . . the rights of
the Union are secure, we will consent. It has been sufficiently
demonstrated that they are not secured. It sounds mighty prettily
to gentlemen, to curse paper money and honestly pay debts. But
apply to the situation of America, and you will find there are
thousands and thousands of contracts, whereof equity forbids an
exact literal performance. Pass that government, and you will be
bound hand and foot.
3 ELLIOT, DEBATES, supra note 22, at 318-19, quoted in Wolfram, supra note
143, at 684-85.
557. Wills, supra note 171, at 213.
558. See Kadish, Mythology and Criticism in Due Process Adjudication-A
Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319 (1957).
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tually worthless. With no jury feedback mechanism to indi-
cate just how far out of sync with our contemporary moral
sense the everday results of the such mechanical rules are,
little basis exists for their future refinement. As Holdsworth
has written, judges in their hubris tend to build elaborate
theories and rules, which all too often repress our fundamen-
tal intuitive notions of fairness and thereby "merely retard
the attainment of a [just] conclusion without assisting in its
formation." '559 By contrast, he noted, the jury has served for
hundreds of years to keep legal rules in touch with everyday
values as expressed through "contemporary common
sense."
560
The jury's task is to determine whether new statutory or
decisional rules of law have the retrospective effect of imper-
missibly trenching upon individual expectations legitimately
formed in reliance on the pre-existing state of the law. And,
of course, what constitute reasonable expectations in the first
place are a prophecy of what entitlements the ultimate
factfinder will validate. Individual liberty is, therefore, effec-
tively advanced to the degree that private actors are confi-
dent that they can intuit or otherwise predict the standards
by which their actions are to be judged. Without such confi-
dence individual enterprise (not to mention other forms of
expression) may be chilled or paralyzed. 561 And certainly for
the man on the street "the average man, applying contempo-
rary community standards,"5 ' is an easier factfinder to
"handicap" than the professional jurist, whatever standards
the latter may purport to apply. 563
559. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 349 (1922). Cf. W.
Shakespeare, The Tragedy of Hamlet (T. Brook and J. Crawford ed. 1947),
III, i, 83-88 ("Thus conscience ['the ability to think' (ed.)] does make cow-
ards of us all,/ And thus the native hue of resolution/ Is sicklied o'er with
the pale cast of thought,/ And enterprises of great pitch and moment/
With this regard their currents turn awry ...").
560. Cf Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REv. 605, 609
(1908):
[Ilt is the importance of the role of the jurors in tempering the
administration of justice with common-sense and preserving a due
connection of the rules governing relations with every-day needs
of ordinary men that has atoned for the manifold and conspicuous
defects of trial by jury and is keeping it alive.
561. Cf Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
562. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1972).
563. Cf People ex rel. Busch v. Projection Room Theater, 546 P.2d
733, 745-753 (1980) (Tobriner, J., dissenting). In particular, Tobriner
noted that
[c]entral to the Miller [v. California] test is whether "the average
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In a similar vein the U.S. Supreme Court has decisively
rejected any inference that there need be "uniform national
standards" governing "precisely" how necessarily general
constitutional standards are to be applied nationwide, com-
munity by community; since such application involves what
are "essentially questions of fact."5 4 Refusing to sacrifice re-
gional diversity to "the [appellate] absolutism of imposed uni-
formity," by holding "the people of Maine" to the same ef-
fective obscenity test that governs "Las Vegas," the Court
recently denied the necessary existence of a "provable 'na-
tional standard.' " In a tacit reappraisal of its own Article III
role, the Court declined to establish a generalizable constitu-
tional common law rule narrowly limiting regional diversity
in the implementation of guarantees under our federal Con-
stitution.5 5 One implication of this allowance for regional di-
versity is that individuals can deliberately seek out communi-
ties where their expectations are more likely to be
legitimated by their peers in the face of future exercises of
the police power. Equally important, the possibility of re-
gional diversity promotes inter-jurisdictional competition in
providing a climate hospitable to the recognition of such in-
tangible expectations against the competing claims of the
government. 56
Of course, as we have noted, the Supreme Court's rule-
bound approach in the taking area can be explained by its
policy of deference to by lower court determinations of the
essentially factual question of the "as applied" fairness of par-
ticular measures. But as things now stand, the lower courts
person, applying contemporary community standards" would find
that the work appeals to the prurient interest. The jury, as a mi-
crocosm of the community, is the only vehicle fit to conduct that
inquiry.
Id. at 746 n.l.
The fact that the public nuisance statutes relegate the decision [as
to what is obscene] to a judge, rather than to a jury, exacerbates
the chilling effect. A dealer in protected material who might have
been confident that no group of 12 jurors would unanimously con-
clude that his material offended the community standards might
find himself inhibited by the greater uncertainty of how a single
member of the community-the judge-would react to it.
Id. at 752 n. 1. See also Kingsley Books v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 447-48
(1957) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
564. See Miller, 443 U.S. at 30.
565. Id. at 32-33.
566. Cf. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. OF POLITI-
CAL ECONOMY 416 (1956).
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themselves, not being required to have a jury apply the fair-
ness standard to the case, must assume full "moral" responsi-
bility for second-guessing the legislative determination. With
no objective standard to guide them, they will usually recast
the dilemma as a "political" question and openly defer to the
legislative judgment by stretching the admittedly flexible
standard of fairness in its favor. The presence of a jury would
take much of this decisional pressure off judges and allow
them to assume a truly disinterested role as the expositor of
the various politico-ethical principles that should guide the
jury. The jury can then deal with the subjective complexities
of fact and the relative weights of competing constitutional
norms without the awkward institutional self-consciousness of
Justice Stewart's "I know it when I see it."
The vital intangible components of the notion of fairness
defy formulation as part of a rule."7 While a jury need not
attempt to explain a moral decision which necessarily defies
logical explanation, it is otherwise with judges. And the prac-
tical inability of the Supreme Court to spin out elaborate ver-
bal formulae, which would logically substantiate its ad hoc
perceptions of unfairness and which it would then be willing
to see applied in subsequent cases, has caused it to reach out
for mechanical props-like the mechanical Taking Clause
rule. Further, where the institutional or positive law offends
its collective sense of fairness, the jury need not tell the sort
of discreet lie that even positivists acknowledge may be neces-
sary to reconcile law and morals at the margins. s" 8 The gen-
eral verdict cloaks in technical silence the basis for the jury's
decision.5'9 As a result, the jury's verdict sets no firm prece-
dent. It can deal equitably with hard cases and still leave the
general statutory rule of conduct formally unimpaired.
567. See Pound, supra note 548, at 702.
568. See, e.g., Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71
HARv. L. REV. 593 (1958), and Dworkin, supra note 375, at 326-327.
569. See Wigmore, A Program for the Trial of a Jury, 12 AM. JUD. Soc.
166 (1929):
The jury, in the privacy of its retirement, adjusts the general rule
of law to the justice of the particular case. Thus the odium of an
inflexible rule of law is avoided, and popular satisfaction is pre-
served . . . . It supplies that flexibility of legal rules which is es-
sential to justice and popular contentment. And that flexibility
could never be given by judge trial. The judge (as in a chancery
case) must write out his opinion declaring the law and the findings
of fact. He cannot in this public record deviate one jot from those
requirements. The jury, and the secrecy of the jury room, are the
indispensable elements in popular justice.
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Finally, juries have majoritarian credibility.5 70 For that
reason judges who perceive that a state action is unfair will
be more willing to say so and explain why, so long as their
opinion must first find acceptance with twelve jurors before it
can become the law of the case. The jurors, who then take
ultimate responsibility for the verdict, fade invisibly back into
society. As things now stand, highly visible and elective state
judges (as well as federal judges) are understandably reluctant
to take personal responsibility for a subjective moral determi-
nation, which has the potential of imposing considerable fi-
nancial liability on an increasingly tax-conscious society. Def-
erence to the legislature has become a convenient,
"principled" way out of a self-inflicted moral dilemma-a di-
lemma created by the appellate sabotage of the democratic
element of the judicial department.
As Dean Pound noted in the 1940's, the public law leg-
acy of Brandeis and Frankfurter has been the notion that
even in cases pitting the individual against the state, it is
more important that "a rule of law be settled than that it be
settled right.''571 With that presupposition, the commercial
ideal of positive law invaded what was in truth the legitimate
domain of "justice without law."' 572 By way of explanation,
Pound suggested that the pragmatic positivists preferred a
mechanical public law jurisprudence, with no room for eq-
uity, because they assumed that a conservative bench, which
had wrestled equitable authority away from the jury, would
exercise any power left it to dispense justice without law in
favor of property interests, e.g., in labor disputes.573 The ap-
parent solution offered here of turning the power of equity
back over to the democratic jury did not go unaddressed,
however.
A counter-argument, advanced by Justice Harlan and Je-
rome Frank among others, was that the jury's random nullifi-
cation of a harsh rule of law was not necessarily better, in-
deed probably worse, than its total "enforcement." For
example, Frank speculated that the refusal by juries to apply
the inequitable judge-made fellow servant doctrine in torts
probably helped "perpetuate [the] unjust rule, [by delaying]
570. See Pound, supra note 548, at 700-702.
571. R. POUND, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 97 (1942) (quoting Justice
Brandeis).
572. Id. at 89.
573. Id. at 100-101.
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its eradication either by judges or legislators." '571 In other
words, the use of juries as an equitable escape valve takes sal-
utary pressure off the legislative and judicial rule-making
mechanisms. As a result, the unjust rule survives longer.
Meanwhile, since nullification itself is apt to be a random hit-
or-miss affair, it subverts our notions of the equality before
the law.
Suffice it to say, the current unsystematic nature of jury
nullification may be attributable to the modern judicial con-
spiracy of silence regarding the existence of this historic pre-
rogative. In the trial of the so-called "D. C. Nine," for in-
stance, Judge Leventhal justified his refusal to charge the
jury as to its right to nullify as the only way to preserve the
needed balance between jury equity and caprice, since as a
practical matter the jury knows through "informal communi-
cation" from our culture that it enjoys that prerogative in ex-
traordinary cases. 75 Dissenting, Chief Judge Bazelon argued
normatively that the responsible, informed exercise of jury
equity in the public law context is more important to our sys-
tem of government than the preservation of the inflexible
rule of law. Moreover, he disputed Leventhal's apparent as-
sumption that irresponsible or capricious nullification would
occur less often if left to spontaneity than if the product of a
"jury carefully instructed as to its power and responsibility"
by the judge-and counsel. 576
6. Jury as Constitutional Half-Way House
The ideal of the moral authority of the "well-instructed"
jury provides a tenable middle ground between pragmatic
positivists like Holmes and principled positivists like Justice
Rehnquist, on the one hand, and substantive due process ab-
solutists on the other. Both Holmes and Rehnquist have re-
jected in their own way the Lockean/Beccarian notion that
government punishment or regulatory restraint should be
proportional to the offense or threatened harm: Holmes, be-
cause he believed positive law to be purely an amoral matter
of "strict liability," of external conformity to rules; Rehn-
574. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (Harlan, J., dis-
senting) and J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 110-111 (1949); see also Skidmore
v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 167 F.2d 54, 59, n.14 (2d Cir.) (separate opinion
of Frank, J.), cert. denied 335 U.S. 816 (1948); G. WILLIAMS, THE PROOF OF
GUILT 226 (2d ed. 1958).
575. United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. (1972).
576. Id. (Bazelon, CJ., dissenting).
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quist, because (like Professor Ely) he denies the authority and
ability of a simple majority of five judges to draw principled
distinctions on the basis of the vague notion of disproportion-
ality. Ultimately, they will end up substituting their own po-
tentially subjective moral values for those of the legisla-
ture.5 " By contrast, modern civil libertarians like Justice
Marshall protest that there must be some core federal sub-
stance to the notions of property and liberty contained in the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments that defies legislative en-
croachment. 578 Like Brennan in Bishop v. Wood and Mr. Jus-
tice Jackson in the much earlier case of D'Oerch, Duhme & Co.
v. Federal Deposit Insurance Co.,1 7 1 Marshall proposes a sub-
stantive federal common law of property. In other words, his
call is for a rigid federal rule of law protecting certain core
intangible interests, which would replace equally rigid state
rules of law that now deny protection to virtually all such in-
tangible interests.
There is a like tendency on the part of more traditional
libertarians to want to reify the concepts of liberty and prop-
erty by establishing relatively rigid boundary rules designed
to protect them. Professor Epstein, for instance, believes that
an individual should be at liberty (at least from a common
law nuisance standpoint) to engage in any and all non-inva-
sive conduct." 0 He rejects Professor Ellickson's notion that a
physically self-contained activity can still constitute a nuisance,
if it is perceived as sufficiently "unneighborly" under contem-
porary community standards." 1 He does so in part out of
fear that such a vague rule would open the floodgates in a
judge-centric system to "standardless and unprincipled litiga-
tion." ' In addition, as Epstein keenly appreciates, should
courts decree that vague standard to be part of the common
law definition of private property, it would poison the stream
of public law. Legislators would demand the right to deter-
mine for themselves potential sources of such non-invasive
577. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274-275 (1980). See also
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 314 (1983) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
578. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 492 (1980)
(Marshall, J., concurring).
579. 315 U.S. 447, 470-472 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring).
580. Epstein, supra note 308, at 62.
581. Ellickson, supra note 11, at 731-32.
582. Epstein, supra note 308, at 84. Elsewhere Epstein indicates his
particular concern that if such manipulable standards are applied by judges
it will foster "the corrosive anti-intellectualism of legal realism." Epstein,
supra note 12, at 355.
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"unneighborliness" and to regulate or proscribe them free of
any possible Taking Clause implications. And, under current
standards of review, judges would have to accord their appli-
cation of the vague standard a presumption of correctness.
Professor Epstein pretermits the middle-ground possibil-
ity that a presumptively impartial, non-tyrannic constitutional
institution exists in the public law arena which could respon-
sibly administer the common law's moral standard of "neigh-
borliness," captured in the Cokean sic utere tuo maxim. At the
same time, however, Epstein may concede the inescapable
need for such an institution, when he points out that non-
invasive conduct may still violate some prior contractual obli-
gation ("special covenant") of the actor. Transposed to the
public law context, that means perhaps that the implied
terms of the social contract trump an individual's otherwise
valid claim to make such non-invasive use of his property as
he sees fit. Significantly, Mr. Justice Rehnquist himself seems
to have embraced the general ideal of the substantive dimen-
sions of trial by jury583 and the particular usefulness of the
jury as interstitial constitutional lawmaker.5""
Having suggested that a creditable constitutional com-
mon law of both property and liberty, sensitive to communal
values, can come only through the mechanism of the jury, in
the next section we will explore (1) how the nineteenth cen-
tury removal of law-finding juries from all public law actions
contributed to the discredited era of substantive due process
and (2) how the modern Supreme Court has turned to the
jury in the area of obscenity to draw the sort of "moral" line
between protected and unprotected liberties for which we
urge its general competence.
IV. THE ERA OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS: FILLING THE
JURIDICAL VACUUM
A. Misunderstood Origins
The phenomenon of substantive due process, commonly
traced in origin to the 1856 case of Wynehamer v. State of New
York685 on the authority of Professor Corwin, 586 may be seen
583. See Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v, Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 340-344,
(1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
584. See, e.g. Hamling v. U.S., 418 U.S. 87, 105 (1974).
585. 13 N.Y. 378 (1856) (opinions printed seriatim covering two dis-
tinguishable cases.
586. See Corwin, supra note 338, at 101-115.
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as a product of the dismantling of the jury as the dispenser of
democratic equity. Into the juridical vacuum they themselves
created stepped appellate judges ready to impose their own
sense of equity, or "fundamental fairness," on the legislative
Leviathan. Under that analysis, however, Wynehamer was not
even part of the process. Rather, like Holmes' opinion in
Miller v. Horton,8 ' it was an attempt to turn back the clock
and restore collateral review by jury over "constitutional
facts."
Substantive due process, on the other hand, developed in
the late nineteenth century when state appellate courts began
to chafe under the constraints of the doctrine of jurisdic-
tional facts. Paying lip service to the old doctrine, they
manipulated it to obtain for themselves an equitable right to
review all relevant facts in administrative proceedings. As a
result, one commentator has noted, the jurisdictional fact
doctrine became temporarily functus officio.5 88 At the federal
level this led in succession to the expansive view of jurisdic-
tional facts in Ng Fung Ho and later to Chief Justice Hughes'
doctrine of independently determinable constitutional facts
in Crowell. The irony of course is that Lord Holt was ulti-
mately right in Groenvelt v. Burwell.58 9 There administrators
had found Dr. Groenvelt guilty of malpractice. Lord Holt de-
nied the competence of appellate judges to make the as ap-
plied factual determinations necessary to second-guess the ad-
ministrative decision:
[The issue] must have been tried by a jury at last [until Par-
liament designated a constitutionally-adequate surrogate
fact-finder]; for Judges do not understand medicine suffi-
ciently to make a judgment, whether they were sound or
not.590
Accordingly, in light of New York's constitutional guarantee
of civil jury trial, the Wynehamer Court denied there could be
an adequate fact-finding surrogate for the jury in determin-
ing the as applied fairness of certain governmental regula-
tions-not even the legislature itself.
Professor Corwin was oblivious to this due process role
of the jury. For that reason he was precisely wrong in con-
587. 152 Mass. 540, 26 N.E. 100 (1891). See text accompanying
notes 233-35 supra.
588. Jaffe, supra note 229, at 964-67.
589. 91 Eng. Rep. 1202 (K.B. 1700).
590. Id. at 1213-14.
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cluding that the procedures in Wynehamer were "for the most
part unexceptionable""' and hence that the holding
amounted to a declaration that the legislature could not de-
prive an individual of his existing life, liberty, or property,
period, with or without due process. A careful reading of this
appeal of a prohibition act proceeding for the destruction of
liquor suggests that the Wynehamer majority was in fact con-
cerned with that procedural integrity of the jury process
under the libertarian model.5"' To be sure, the defendant
had received a jury trial, but the jury was instructed by the
trial judge that under the statute the character of the sub-
stance as a public nuisance had been definitively determined
by the legislature and that it had no right to decide other-
wise; accordingly, the judge excluded as irrelevant evidence
proffered by Wynehamer that he owned and possessed the
liquor prior to the time the law took effect.
Corwin notwithstanding, the majority did not hold that
the legislature could never criminalize the continued posses-
sion of existing property; rather, it insisted that when a legis-
lative act has a substantial retrospective impact on an individ-
ual, the individual be allowed to introduce evidence as to its
as applied unfairness and have a jury determine the accepta-
bility of such a -regulatory imposition under the flexible com-
mon law nuisance standard. Under the circumstances sic utere
tuo, as applied by a jury, governed the extent of
Wynehamer's legitimate "property" expectations. If the jury
decided that the sic utere tuo principle was not so clearly in-
voked as to justify the extent of the retrospective impact on
the defendant, then the legislature will have to pay to accom-
plish its regulatory purpose. Like Story in the federal con-
text, the New York court liberally interpreted its civil jury
guarantee-that "trial by jury [be preserved] in all cases in
which it has heretofore been used"-to extend generically
not only to specific instances of past use, but also "to such
new like cases as might afterwards arise." 93 Analogizing this
in rem proceeding to excise law procedures, the court noted
that at least since 1830 defendants in such cases had been
entitled to a jury trial. Because the statute did not provide a
satisfactory jury trial, in which the defendant could mount a
complete defense and contest the as applied fairness of its ret-
rospective impact, the majority was compelled to find the
591. Corwin, supra note 338, at 100.
592. Wynehamer, 13 N.Y. at 393-395 (opinion of Comstock, J.).
593. Id. at 426 (opinion of A. S. Johnson, J.).
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statute facially unconstitutional. In doing so, however, they
renounced any vague power on the part of the judges them-
selves to amend statutory law as being against natural right
and equity.59 4 The court was forced to strike down the stat-
ute in toto only because of (i) the procedural perversion of the
due process role of the jury and (ii) the clear presence of a
deprivation of property.
Overlooking the procedural infirmity under the liberta-
rian model of the jury, Corwin focused exclusively on the
finding of a deprivation of property. In that regard, the ma-
jority expressed an unwillingness to allow the legislature on
the basis of "theories of public good or public necessity . . .
so plausible, or even so truthful, as to command popular ma-
jorities"595 simply to destroy an individual's property without
making a full indemnity. In terms of what constituted a sub-
stantial enough deprivation of property to trigger the due
process guarantee, three judges in the majority asserted that
property was itself a complex or bundle of intangible rights
and that a "deprivation" could occur if a sufficiently impor-
tant right was legislatively excised, even though bare title and
possession were left intact. Applied to the case at hand, this
meant that an act of the legislature which retrospectively de-
stroyed the intangible "right to sell" valuable pre-existing
property could not itself qualify as adequate due process. Re-
pulsed by this, Corwin embraced what he considered the pro-
phetic dissent of Judge T.A. Johnson. " ' Johnson had won-
dered aloud why, if the "property" component of the due
process guarantee could be anatomized into parts, could not
"liberty" be treated in the same way:
[I]t might be argued with precisely the same pertinency and
force, that a statute which prohibits certain vicious actions
and declares them criminal deprives persons of their liberty
and is therefore derogatory of the Constitution."7
As Corwin observed, Johnson's reductio ad absurdum set
up an uncomfortable resonance with the earnest libertarian
musings of certain framers of the United States Constitution.
In particular, as previously noted, Madison had penned the
following paean to the concept of "property":
In its larger and juster meaning, it embraces everything to
594. Id. at 430-432 (opinion of Selden, J.).
595. Id. at 387 (opinion of Comstock, J.).
596. See Corwin, supra note 338, at 104.
597. Wynehamer, 13 N.Y. at 468.
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which a man may attach value and have a right; which leaves
to every one else the like advantage . . . . In [that] sense, a
man has property in his opinions and a free communication
in them . . . . He has an equal property in the free use of
his faculties and free choice of the object on which to employ
them. In a word, as a man is said to have a right to his prop-
erty, he may be equally said to have a property in his
rights. 9s
With that rhetorical assist from the past, Corwin ruefully
concluded, Wynehamer led directly to the discredited federal
doctrine of substantive due process. As a result, the Supreme
Court began in 1897 to expand both the notion of protected
''property" (beyond bare title and possession) and that of
protected "liberty" (beyond mere freedom from personal re-
straint) to encompass their essential constituent elements. For
instance, in Allgeyer v. Louisiana Justice Peckham wrote for
the Court that protected liberty under the due process clause
included "the right to be free in the enjoyment of all [one's]
faculties, . . . to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for
that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper,
necessary, and essential to carrying out to a successful conclu-
sion the purposes above mentioned." 5" And in Smyth v. Ames
the court held that rate regulation, by depriving one of the
essential right to earn a reasonable return on one's property,
could amount to a deprivation of property.6 0 0
Yet Corwin was arguably wrong on two critical counts in
concluding that the Supreme Court was simply federalizing
the substantive notion, allegedly implicit in Wynehamer and
Madison's essay, of an extensive, inviolable sphere of intangi-
ble property and liberty interests, which were to be proof
against legislative tampering.
First, as mentioned, Corwin ignored the significance of
the central focus in Wynehamer on trial by jury. Hence he did
not grasp the possibility that substantive due process was in ef-
fect a reaction to the failure of Wynehamer to restore the ac-
tive role of the common law jury in reviewing the administra-
tive process. It is ironic that Corwin, called our "most prolific
student of due process,"'601 should have openly confessed puz-
zlement at this very idea of a libertarian model of the jury.
598. VI J. MADISON, WRITINGS 101-103 (Hunt ed.), quoted in Corwin,
supra note 338, at 106-107.
599. 165 U.S. 578, 582 (1897).
600. 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
601. G. GurNTER, CONSTTuTIONAL LAW 507 n.3 (1980).
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He wondered aloud what Madison had had in mind in 1786
when he argued against a bill in the Virginia House of Dele-
gates to emit paper money on the basis that it "affects prop-
erty without a trial by Jury. ' 60 2 Instead, Corwin persisted in
viewing the jury's historic role as that of pure factfinder,
whose task it was to apply dutifully the positive law to the
case at hand. What real substantive help could a jury be?
Hence he saw no significant connection between the judge's
exclusion of the defense's evidence in Wynehamer as irrelevant
under the statute and the exclusion of Andrew Hamilton's
proffer of "the truth" in defense of John Peter Zenger as ir-
relevant under the common law. Rather than view the exclu-
sion as violating the defendant's fundamental right through
counsel to contest the "as applied" fairness of the statute,
Corwin, noting that a jury was physically present, blithely
concluded that the procedure in Wynehamer was
unexceptionable.
Well before 1897 and Allgeyer the precedent of Murray's
Lessee had guided the Supreme Court to the symmetrical con-
clusion in Munn v. Illinois°0 3 that the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment did not require a state jury in
any "public law" matter, such as rate regulation cases. State
legislatures were authorized to define and redefine "public
rights" (and in the process the appropriate residuum of indi-
vidual natural liberty at any given time) free from unwanted
second-guessing by the judicial department. In Munn a com-
mon law proceeding, in which the jury had determined the
reasonableness of a carrier's rate, was supplanted by a statu-
tory rate structure establishing mala prohibita in the form of
maximum rates. The facial reasonableness of these positive
rules codifying the sic utere tuo standard was not for the
court, much less a jury, to determine. The ballot box had
supplanted the jury box. "For protection against abuses by
the legislature," the Court reasoned, "the people must resort
to the polls. ' '' The people? Effective resort to the polls re-
quired majority support. Thus the ballot was apt to be no so-
lution for the key democratic political danger identified by
Madison, viz., majoritarian tyranny. Yet Munn is actually con-
sistent with the present thesis because the claimant was sim-
ply not entitled to attack the as applied redistributive conse-
quences of the rate structure. The Fourteenth Amendment
602. See Corwin, supra note 338, at 90 n.43.
603. 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
604. Id. at 145.
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had not yet been interpreted to incorporate the Taking
Clause. 6°' Gradually, by the 1890's the Court awakened to
the fact that the Fourteenth Amendment had been drafted
with wide libertarian support as a guarantee of individual
civil rights against oppressive state legislation-and extended
the right of "just compensation" against the states.
B. Courts As Dispensers of Natural Equity: The Doctrine of
Constitutional Fact
By the time the Supreme Court acknowledged the gen-
eral need to provide penumbral due process protection
around the central (but hollow) core concepts of physical
property and physical liberty, it had dismantled the one insti-
tution capable of drawing credible lines between permissible
and abusive uses of government power. The Supreme Court
drove the last nail in the coffin of the independent federal
jury in Sparf and Hansen v. United States,6 °6 just three years
before Allgeyer. To further complicate matters, it would be
difficult for the Supreme Court effectively to broaden constitu-
tional rules of law, rendering them more flexible and fact-
sensitive, when Murray's Lessee permitted the rules to be ap-
plied at the local level by "expert" commissioners (not impar-
tial juries), whose mixed findings of law and fact were then
usually adopted by the state courts under a very permissive
standard of review. At that point, as we have seen, the con-
straints of the federal Writ of Error procedure, designed pri-
marily to implement the guarantee of the Seventh Amend-
ment that findings of fact by a jury could not be revised on
appeal, meant the Supreme Court could only review the
mixed findings below to be certain that the commissioners
had paid lip service to the new rule. Thanks to Murray's
Lessee, the near sanctity of the jury's general verdict had been
replaced by the sanctity of the administrative ruling.
To overcome these hurdles in the area of rate regula-
tion, the Court attempted to obviate the need for ad hoc fac-
tual review of the "as applied" fairness of the rate making
process by promulgating an elaborate, multi-factored legal
rule, which purported to reduce the problem of the regula-
tory confiscation of property to a mechanical formula."' But
no such specious formula for quantifying permissible regula-
605. See Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97 (1877).
606. 156 U.S. 51, 80 (1894).
607. Smythe v. Ames, 109 U.S. 466 (1898).
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tory inroads on personal liberty could be devised. Conse-
quently, the Court creatively conceived the doctrine of "con-
stitutional fact"-to serve as the practical foundation for its
focus on more subtle intangible rights, whose deprivation
would be a "mixed question" of law and fact, a question of
degree, of the balance between private harm and public ben-
efit. The Court advanced the doctrine as the logical corollary
of its ultimate duty of judicial review over the constitutional-
ity of legislation. To carry out that duty effectively, it had to
have the right to make an independent determination of any
facts found below, where those facts were decisive of a mixed
question of constitutional law and fact. 08 Otherwise, consti-
tutional rights could be denied through deft manipulation of
facts. In any case, the Court left behind its protective quanti-
tative coloration as it ventured into the controversial qualita-
tive arena of "natural equity."
To return to Corwin's analysis of substantive due pro-
cess, he also failed to note that in Lochner v. New York609 (and
its congeners) the Court was essentially acting the part of a
jury. So-called libertarian justices, like Peckham and Field,
having actively colluded in the elimination of the jury as "a
necessary requisite of due process of law," voluntarily took
up the slack and began to dispense "natural equity" on their
own. In short, the Lochner Court did not, doctrinally speak-
ing, embrace "freedom of contract" as a new absolute lib-
erty. Rather it purported to evaluate whether or not legiti-
mate public interests like public health and safety were
sufficiently implicated by regulations to justify the resultant
diminution in private liberty. In doing so it mimicked the
jury in its application of Coke's flexible sic utere tuo maxim. In
Lochner, which involved a ten-hour work day rule for bakers,
the Court decided that there existed less restrictive means to
achieve the health purpose and that the principle of paternal-
istically redressing economic inequalities was simply not valid
under the nation's contemporary democratic standards.
The Lochner Court, in constitutionalizing what it per-
ceived to be the democratic "conceptions of the average
man '"610 as to the proper role of government, followed the
apparent lead of Justice Holmes. In The Common Law he ac-
knowledged the jury as the one true source of moral or equi-
table principles in the law, especially in tort cases where it
608. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
609. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
610. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 43 (M. Howe ed. 1963).
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applied the pervasive "reasonable man" standard; nonethe-
less, he positively encouraged judges in the private law field
to supplant jurors in all cases, through the application of ever
more particularistic, uniform rules of law. He pointedly sug-
gested that the submission of the general issue to a jury was
tantamount to a confession by the judge that he lacked "suffi-
cient practical experience" or "clear views of public policy"
"to lay down the rule intelligently." ' To those who reposed
special confidence in the jury, Holmes retorted that after sev-
eral years at nisi prius the typical judge acquired a sufficient
fund of experience "to represent the common sense of the
community in ordinary instances far better than the average
jury." ' 2 This hubristic sense of the judge as Herculean inter-
stitial legislator later led Holmes to adopt on behalf of the
Supreme Court a ludicrous contributory negligence standard,
which required that a man approaching a railroad crossing
actually stop, get out of his car, and look both ways before
continuing-a standard clearly "not in accord with the [con-
temporary] conduct of the prudent man."' 3 In that respect,
the Lochner Court did no worse than Holmes in guaging con-
temporary values-and some would argue, better.
Holmes in dissent, however, countered with the key
tenet of pragmatic positivism-the flexible right of a legisla-
tive majority to embody its conception of "public rights" into
law on an experimental basis. Having helped depose the dem-
ocratic component of the federal judicial department, the
Lochner majority was subject to being thus successfully
hoisted by its own anti-majoritarian petard. Still, even
Holmes made it clear that the Court did not owe the legisla-
ture absolute deference, that it still had an important role to
play in preserving certain unspecified "fundamental princi-
ples" of natural equity against legislative encroachment:
I think that the word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment
is perverted when it is held to prevent the natural outcome
of a dominant opinion, unless it can be said that a rational
and fair man necessarily would admit that the statute pro-
posed would impinge fundamental principles as they have
understood by the traditions of our people and our law. 1 4
611. Id. at 98.
612. Id. at 99.
613. See Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 69-70 (1913)
and Pound, Book Review, 44 HARv. L. REV. 1303, 1304 (1931).
614. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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Hence, the doctrinal division between Holmes and the major-
ity may have been less than met the eye. Both believed in
appellate courts as the ultimate dispensers of equity. They
differed only as to which subjective principles they perceived
to merit judicial protection. Out of deference to the legisla-
ture Holmes had a shorter list. But neither placed any stock
in the substantive role of the jury as the articulator of such
democratic principles.
With the help of Brandeis, Frankfurter, Cardozo, and
the Great Depression, Holmes' basic vision of the right of the
majority to work its will in the economic arena prevailed. Oth-
erwise, as Cardozo warned, "in the clash of jarring rivalries
the pretending absolutes will destroy themselves and ordered
freedom too."6 15 Unfortunately, Holmes' successors refused
to pursue his suggestion in Mahon that the fundamental prin-
ciple of compensation be used as a means of "deabsolutizing"
conflicts among economic liberties. Instead, they focused
their efforts on enhancing the ability of individuals and
groups to have their interests included in the legislature's ex-
perimental cost-benefit calculus. Hence freedom of thought
and expression was deemed "the matrix, the indispensable
condition, of nearly every other form of freedom," '616 be-
cause without it there could be no "intelligent experimenta-
tion" in self-government. Social progress, like truth, was a
"process of trial and error"-legislative trial and error.
And if the legislature chose, the process of trial and er-
ror in social rulemaking could be carried out administra-
tively.6" ' In that event, as noted earlier, Justice Brandeis as-
serted that "supremacy of the law" requires only that the
administrative agency pay lip service to a vague statutory
standard of "reasonableness". An Article III court had no
warrant to review the fairness of the agency's application of
the standard to the facts:
If it did, the power of the courts to set aside findings of fact
by an administrative tribunal would be broader than their
power to aside a jury's verdict.618
Thus pragmatic positivists in the post-193 7 era succeeded in
615. B. Cardozo, Mr. Justice Holmes, 44 HARV. L. REV. 682, 687-688
(1931).
616. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).
617. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944), and Bowles v.
Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944).
618. St. Joseph's Stockyards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38 (1936).
[Vol. I
COMPENSABLE LIBERTY
setting up administrative agencies with the essentially unre-
viewable power of the gothic jury-a power to apply vague
standards of "reasonableness" to important matters of eco-
nomic concern to the citizenry. Indeed, they imputed to the
decisions of these "expert" tribunals the same "moral sense"
ability earlier have ascribed to the jury to "express an intui-
tion of experience which outruns analysis and sums-up many
unnamed and tangled impressions-impressions which may
lie beneath consciousness without losing their worth." '19
Hence the "mystic" tribunal of experts took its place as the
annointed new dispenser of American equity.
C. Courts As Quasi-Administrators.
To be sure, under the stewardship of Justices Frank-
furter and Cardozo, the Supreme Court in the 1930's and
1940's continued to assert its own prerogative of dispensing
''natural equity" in the area of civil liberties under the rubric
of "due process." But ironically, as we shall see, the majority
regarded its task of squaring the operation of general statutes
with the constitutional equities of an individual case as a dele-
gated quasi-legislative rather than a judicial function. It was
qualitatively different than the idealized role of a common
law jury. The judges' first allegiance was to the faithful im-
plementation of the legislative policy behind the act. The
principal antagonist to this approach was Mr. Justice Black,
whose "incorporationist" view of the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment the majority resisted in large
measure so as to restrict the extension of the requirement of
criminal and civil jury trials to the states. And to this day the
Seventh Amendment-alone-remains unincorporated.
Frankfurter and Cardozo repeatedly cited the 1791 guar-
antees of trial by jury as Exhibit "A" for their claim that fun-
damental rights were historically determined. It would have
been highly improbable for the same set of rights, perceived
as essential to protect individual liberty in 1791, to have been
included in a similar catalogue in 1867. As a result they con-
cluded that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment delib-
erately chose the open-ended notion of "due process," with
the intent that its flexible command be applied by appellate
judges based on their "fund of experience" as to what was
required by contemporary "canons of decency and fairness
619. See Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Babcock, 204 U.S. 580, 585 (1907)
(Holmes, J.).
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. . . [expressing] the notions of justice of English-speaking
people. 61 2 0 In short, appellate judges-not jurors-were to
be the exclusive conscience of democracy and to decide cases
on the unavoidably subjective basis of what "shocks [their]
conscience. '62 1 With the late nineteenth-century ideal of a
compliant, fact-finding jury as a model, it is no wonder that
Frankfurter and Cardozo met little resistance in their asser-
tions that trial by jury was self-evidently an antiquated, ineffi-
cient process. By no stretch of the imagination could it be
considered "of the essence of a scheme of ordered liberty,"
since it implicated no "principle of justice so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as funda-
mental. 6 2 And yet once upon a time the jury had been the
very embodiment of the "conscience" of the people.
In their assumed role as balancer of constitutional equi-
ties, however, Frankfurter, Cardozo and the majority kept a
thumb on the scale in favor of the legislature. In the Palko
and Adamson cases, 63 for example, in which they locked
horns with Justice Black over the right of judges to dispense
natural equity, the majority dismissed the concepts of free-
dom from double jeopardy and freedom from self-incrimina-
tion as no longer absolutely essential to modern notions of a
"fair trial." Having reduced these concepts to the status of
non-absolutes, they were free to balance them against the
myriad of other competing principles at play, assigning to
each such weight as they "felt" appropriate. The Court re-
fused to find the state action in either case so qualitatively
unreasonable, so shocking to the conscience, as to warrant in-
validation. Both decisions were later reversed.6 2 "
Even in the special area of speech, Frankfurter and the
majority displayed a willingness to balance away the interests
of individual liberty. Dennis v. United States6 25 involved a pros-
ecution under the Smith Act of 1940. In the Act Congress
had determined to its own satisfaction that certain fairly spe-
620. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
621. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
622. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 325 (1937).
623. Id. (freedom from double jeopardy not guaranteed by Four-
teenth Amendment due process clause); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S.
46 (1947) (freedom from self-incrimination not protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment).
624. Palko was overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784
(1969), and Adamson by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
625. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
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cific types of speech, such as "knowingly . .. advocat[ing]
. . .the .. .desirability . . .of overthrowing .. .any gov-
ernment in the United States by force," sufficiently
threatened the public to warrant criminal punishment. In
Dennis the Court declined to second-guess the legislative
judgment "as applied," despite its nominal adoption of "the
clear and present danger" test propounded by Holmes in his
dissent in Gitlow v. New York (1925).""'
Dennis exemplifies the essential doctrinal process by
which the modern federal judiciary allied itself with Congress
to vindicate national interests against possible local interfer-
ence. Both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, in
treating the "clear and present danger" issue as a question of
law, simply took judicial notice of generalized legislative facts
to support the application of the law to the case at
hand-facts such as the "inflammable nature of world condi-
tions." Beyond that there were no significant adjudicative
facts of record to prove the imminence of any danger from
the defendants' conduct."' Writing for the Second Circuit in
Dennis, Learned Hand explained that the "clear and present
danger" determination is really legal shorthand for a necessa-
rily subjective legislative choice between conflicting, incom-
mensurable interests. It is the choice of whether "the mis-
chief of the repression is greater [in some indefinable sense]
than the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability
.... ,"8 While Hand acknowledged that such ad hoc legisla-
tive choices as to the proper standard to be applied in resolv-
ing legal conflicts are sometimes left to the jury in private law
matters like negligence, he denied that the practice embodied
"a universal principle." Instead, he argued that when a nec-
essarily generalized federal statute dealing with "momentous
public interests" raises equitable questions as to its "as ap-
plied" constitutionality, as inevitably it will, the federal courts
should treat the required ad hoc value judgment in resolving
the dispute as "a question of law"-that is, the courts should
treat the question as a quasi-legislative decision impliedly del-
egated to them by the legislature.2 9
Hand was championing the special institutional role of
the federal appellate courts in keeping policy decisions con-
626. 286 U.S. 652 (1925).
627. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 587-91.
628. United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 215 (2d Cir. 1950)
(Hand, J.).
629. Id. at 216.
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cerning important pieces of national legislation out of the
provincial hands of juries, by performing themselves any nec-
essary tailoring of statutes to local conditions. 3 Conversely,
ascribing a similar institutional role to state courts vis-a-vis
state legislative policies illuminates some of the federalism
considerations underlying the Supreme Court's deferential
attitude towards non-jury state factfinders. In both cases,
pragmatic positivists sought to recharacterize the equitable
adjustment of statutes to fit individual cases as essentially leg-
islative in character, despite the historic ideal of isonomia
which suggests that application of the general law to specific
facts is emphatically part of the judicial power. The familiar
result is to sacrifice equity to uniformity.
One will recall that the libertarian model of freedom of
speech in the area of seditious libel was predicated on the
right of the jury to decide for itself the true tendency of cer-
tain speech to harm public interests; to balance that threat
against the individual liberty interests at stake; and finally to
determine the criminality of the act in question. Under the
statute in Gitlow, the state legislature purported to have estab-
lished conclusively the "bad tendency" of certain types of
speech; and following the late nineteenth-century model of
the jury, the trial judge admonished the jury of its moral
duty to rubber-stamp the legislature's conclusion "as applied"
to the facts at hand."" With no thought to reviving the liber-
tarian jury, Holmes embraced in dissent the substantive due
process doctrine of constitutional fact and asserted that the
reviewing Court itself had to make an "as applied" determi-
nation in each case involving the so-called "preferred" liberty
of speech. In lieu of the displaced jury, the Court was to de-
cide whether the conduct in question really posed a suffi-
ciently "clear and present danger" to public interests to jus-
tify its criminal suppression. As the Dennis case demonstrates,
however, the difference between having judges and jurors
performing this essential libertarian balancing function in-
heres in the generally greater institutional tendency of
unelected judges to defer to majoritarian legislatures. In any
630. To support his argument, Hand pointed weakly to the familiar
alternatives-
Were it not so, there would be no chance for review, for the ver-
dict would be final; moreover, different juries might give different
verdicts, and any approach to uniformity, short as that can be in any
event in this field, would be impossible.
Id. (emphasis added).
631. 268 U.S. at 672-73.
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case, if both perform the task, the defendant gets his historic
"two bites" at the cherry.
D. A Modern Reinstatement
The dissents in Dennis by Justices Black and Douglas, the
two great modern protagonists of the jury, capture one as-
pect of the present thesis in a nutshell. First, they argued in
effect that the role of judges was to promulgate relatively
fixed rules of right, not to dispense equity on an ad hoc basis.
Secondly, they argued-in partial vindication of Jefferson
over Professor Levy-that if the Court chose not to confer
on speech an absolute protection, the inevitable mixed ques-
tion of constitutional fact in free speech cases, regarding the
presence of "clear and present danger," should be left to the
jury to decide-as in olden days.6 " After all, we have Chan-
cellor Kent's matter-of-fact assertion that the "value and se-
curity" of the right of trial by jury in this context inheres in
its substantive right to "judg[e] of the intent and tendency of
the act."6' 3
The two points in Dennis are not mutually exclusive, as
evidenced by subsequent developments in the-speech area it-
self. While the protection of political speech under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments was being absolutized, the
Court gradually turned the integrally-related but unprotected
area of obscenity over to the local jury. Despite die-hard pro-
tests from Frankfurter that the determination of "contempo-
rary community standards" was really a question for the re-
viewing court which defied reduction to a "generalized"
formula, being "an individual constitutional problem," 3 4 the
majority realized that the jury, in applying certain genera-
lized constitutional formulae to the facts, plays an important
judicial role of its own in determining what the individualized
rule of law should be in the case at hand.3 ' In stark ideologi-
cal contrast, Frankfurter, by loudly protesting the possible in-
equities a jury might conceal beneath a general verdict,
sought to assert exclusive appellate sway over the articulation
632. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 580, 587 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing
Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239, 244 (1920), which held that the
question of the "clear and present danger" of speech was for the jury, as a
statement of the law "as it has been and as it should be.")
633. See text accompanying note 478 supra.
634. See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957) and Bran-
denburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 44 (1969).
635. Roth v. United States, 254 U.S. 476, 497-498, 502-503 (1974).
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of the applicable rule of constitutional law so as to ensure in
effect substantial nationwide deference to the legislature's de-
cision to prohibit certain forms of allegedly obscene speech,
etc.
With Miller v. California636 the Supreme Court returned
to a libertarian model that allows the jury to apply its collec-
tive moral sense on an ad hoc basis to a determination of the
"prurience" and "offensiveness" of the work in question
under local contemporary community standards, as well as to
the work's social "value" under national standards. A jury
verdict on these issues which is favorable to the defendant
would be conclusive. But where, as in certain other First
Amendment areas, the ability of the jury to vindicate na-
tional constitutional norms or to serve as a sufficiently disin-
terested factfinder is in doubt, the Court might promulgate
more particularized, prophylatic rules with the effect of
"overprotect[ing]" free speech in order, as Professor Kalven
has put it, "to assure that [it is] not underprotected."6 3 For
instance, before an obscenity case can reach the jury the ma-
terial must have been found to meet minimal guidelines as to
what constitutes hard-core pornography.638 This exemplifies
the ratchet effect. Moreover, despite the positivist ideal of a
uniform national rule of law, the Miller court found no con-
stitutional dilemma in the fact that different juries might
reach different results."3 9 Perhaps true liberty requires the
possibility of such regional diversity, with freedom of exit for
the individual.
This article has argued that the equitable dispensing
power of local juries was intended to be a critical constitu-
tional component of that regional diversity. To be sure, ur-
gent nationalistic concerns, implicating the very survival of
the Union, may have justified Mr. Justice Chase in strongly
admonishing local juries against strangling the infant Repub-
lic through nullification of its hard-won power of direct taxa-
tion-and other federal judges during the sectional crisis in
counseling juries, North and South, against inflammatory acts
of nullification. But with omnipotence of the central govern-
ment, not its impotence, the fundamental political issue of
636. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
637. Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning
of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191, 213. Cf. Monaghan, First
Amendment "Due Process," 83 HARv. L. REV. 518, 526-32 (1970).
638. Miller, 413 U.S. at at 28-29.
639. Id. at 26 n.9. Accord, Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 492
n.30 (1957).
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our time, restoration of the intended status of the jury may
be overdue. Yet not surprisingly the Supreme Court has re-
cently justified denying a compensation jury the "open-en-
ded" equitable power to depart from an objective market
value standard in a "condemnation contest . . .between [a]
local community [or presumably any other local condemnee]
and a national government that may be thought to have unlimited
resources."' 0  Uniformity once again triumphs over eq-
uity-lest local juries imperil the Union by awarding "wind-
falls" against the fisc. Instead of employing change of venue,
remittitur, or the power to order a new trial to hem in the
legitimate equitable power of the jury over damages, lest it
occasionally lead to overgenerous awards to individual con-
demnees, the Court affirmed a rule that is systematically biased
in favor of the state.
CONCLUSION
This article has suggested that under the stimulus of the
Ninth Amendment the Due Process and Taking Clauses, to-
gether with the Seventh Amendment, be read as a conceptual
unit, providing a legal action for compensatory damages
whenever the government violates intangible economic liber-
ties in which, as Madison asserted, we have a "property."
Behind the suggestion lies an analysis of individual lib-
erty as contained within three concentric circles. The first in-
ner circle, setting off centermost inviolable liberties from sec-
ond-order compensable liberties, is drawn and policed by the
appellate court system and by juries in criminal cases. Inviola-
ble liberties are liberties in the strong anti-utilitarian sense
that it is wrong for government to deny them even in the
general interest. They are protected by an inalienability rule.
Constitutional liberties of this sort, we have argued, were
conceived by the libertarian framers as being principally pro-
cedural guarantees-and chief among them was the right to
trial by jury. The institution of appellate judicial review was
designed to preserve these guarantees against legislative en-
croachment; indeed, the earliest American examples of judi-
cial review were in aid of the jurisdiction of the jury.
Drawing the second circle involves a more difficult equi-
table determination of when a regulation, assumptively fair in
general, would be unfair "as applied." Ideally, this should be
the constitutional task of the public law jury. Since the court
640. United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 105 S.Ct. 451, 458 (1984).
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presumably has already ruled that the intangible interest is
not inviolable, a favorable jury verdict will mean that under
the pre-existing state of the law the claimant had a reasona-
ble expectation of being able to pursue certain activities with-
out societal interference of the sort or degree in question un-
less it were accompanied by in-kind or cash compensation.
These fungible liberties are protected by a damages rule. In
such a case, the state has the choice of whether to except the
claimant from the operation of the statute or condemn his
liberty or expectation interest and pay for the excessive
amount of his sacrifice. The superiority of this approach to
Lochner-era substantive due process should be clear. Far from
being totally ousted from regulatory jurisdiction over a par-
ticular area, the state simply must pay its way." 1
In addition to arguments from history, a potent modern
rationale exists for making the disportionate regulatory sacri-
fice of "fungible" liberties compensable." 2 It is provided by
the need for surrogate structural protection to replace the
loss of the ideals of a police power of essentially limited scope
and of isonomia. With respect to the expansive scope of to-
day's police power and the consequent proliferation of eco-
nomic regulation, both state and federal, even the conserva-
tive members of the founding generation acknowledged tacit
641. Accordingly, this approach is consistent with the recent decision
in New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976), in which the Supreme
Court struck a final blow at the ideal of isonomia in the economic area by
upholding a New Orleans ordinance excluding all pushcart food vendors
from the French Quarter, while grandfathering in those who had operated
there for eight years or more. Dukes overruled Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S.
457 (1957). The vendor in question was seeking a declaratory judgment as
to the facial invalidity of the ordinance, as if she had an "inviolable" right
to pursue her livelihood in the French Quarter. (Perhaps her litigation was
being financed by other interested vendors.) Our model suggests that nor-
matively she should have fared better by merely challenging the particular-
ized unfairness of any application of the ordinance to her without appropri-
ate compensation. She would have had to argue to the jury that she had a
legitimate reliance interest in being able to continue to operate in the
Quarter and that her loss of that interest constituted a greater involuntary
sacrifice to the public good than the government should be able to exact
under contemporary circumstances without compensation. (Under wartime
draft conditions, for instance, the perception of the average level of per-
missible, noncompensable sacrifice might be raised.) At the same time she
would have had to anticipate the counter-arguments of the city by demon-
strating that her activity did not pose a sufficient "harm" to the reasonable
expectations of others to warrant its uncompensated abatement and that
she could not just as profitably pursue her livelihood elsewhere.
642. For a clear anticipation of this theory of compensable liberties,
see Michelman, supra note 4, at 1201 n.77.
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limit on the citizen's duty of cheerful submission. They spoke
of the general duty to put up with the inconvenience of mala
prohibita given the compensatory in-kind benefits from having
others obey laws they could do without, but they invariably
observed that such regulations seldom affected an individual
except incidentally in "one or two particular points."6 3 To-
day, with individuals and corporations subject to a plethora
of bureaucratic obstacles and frustrations, the private/public
accounting sheet can swing wildly out of balance. A system of
administrative compensation, based on sensitive payment
schedules for loss of business good will and other consumer
surplus and backed up by a suitably-conditioned right of ap-
peal to a jury, offers one promising solution. Furthermore,
with its discretion over damages, such a jury would provide
true surrogate "public purpose" protection, by increasing
awards to regulatory "condemnees" who are perceived to be
the victims of frivolous "public" projects or ones of dubious
utility.
In the same vein, the liberalization by the Supreme
Court of the implicit equal protection constraints on the rule
of law in the economic area has allowed legislatures to tackle
smaller and smaller aspects of a larger problem. Without the
structural protection of isonomia, disproportionate inconve-
nience or sacrifice may be visited on one sector of the popula-
tion, or even on one citizen, with no comparable sacrifice be-
ing exacted of others. Not only is such unequal sacrifice in
itself a possible constitutional wrong, the focused nature of
the sacrifice makes it easier for rent-seeking factions to work
their will and harder for the sufferers to mobilize effective
political opposition to the law. 4' Holmes, however, who
643. I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 126. The entire quotation is as
follows:
[I]f any public advantage can arise from observing such [regula-
tory] precepts, the control of our private inclinations, in one or two
particular points, will conduce to preserve our general freedom in
other of more importance[-]by supporting that state of society,
which alone can secure our independence.
Id. (emphasis added).
644. Cf Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-
113 (1949) (Jackson J., concurring) ("[tihe framers of the Constitution
knew and we should not forget today, that there is no more effective prac-
tical guarantee against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to re-
quire that the principle of law which officials will impose on a minority
must be imposed generally. Conversely, nothing opens the door to arbi-
trary actions so effectively as to allow those officials to pick and choose only
a few to whom they will apply legislation and thus to escape the political
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termed the equal protection clause "the last refuge" of every
constitutional argument, subordinated the ideal of isonomia to
the need for the legislature to experiment with solutions to
social problems. Pragmatically speaking, it was insanity to re-
quire that an experimental drug be administered to the
whole population-or to no one at all. Others eventually
agreed. For that reason isonomia as a structural protection for
individual liberty gave away to the doctrine that the legisla-
ture is free to experiment with only part of a larger prob-
lem. 64 5 Underinclusiveness, therefore, is no longer perceived
as a fault in general economic legislation-opening the door
wide to legislative discrimination or heavy-handedness.
Not coincidentally perhaps, Holmes (and later even
Brandeis) settled upon the ideal of compensation as a more
appropriate surrogate structural protection for the individual
liberties in twentieth century America than the all-or-nothing
approaches to legislative competence embodied by the equal
protection ideal of isonomia and the so-called Lochnerian ideal
of inviolable substantive rights. 6 Holmes rejected the for-
malistic physical invasion test for takings, correctly perceiving
that there is "no qualitative difference between traditional
[physical] takings and traditional exercises of the police
power, but only a continuum in which established property
retribution which might be visited upon them if larger numbers were af-
fected") and Ervine's Appeal, 16 Pa. 256, 268 (1851) (Coulter, J.) ([wihen
individuals are selected from the mass, and laws are enacted affecting their
property, without summons or notice, at the instigation of an interested
party, who is to stand up for them thus isolated from the mass in injury
and injustice, or where are they to seek relief from such acts of despotic
power?").
Regarding the demise of isonomia, it is interesting to note that Lochner
itself is perhaps most accurately read as an equal protection case, in which
the majority defended the rights of bakers and their employees not to be
singled out for a sacrifice of their share in "the general right to make a
contract." Lochner, 198 U.S. at 60. Cf. Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE
L. J. 455, 470 (1912) (suggesting the importance of an Illinois case, Miller
v. People, 117 III. 294 (1886), as a way station on the road to Adair and
Lochner-a case which clearly turned on the fact that the statute was re-
stricted to a certain class of employers only). Had the sacrifice been more
generalized or the special classification uniquely justified, the result might
have been different. Accordingly, three years later in Muller v. Oregon,
208 U.S. 412 (1908), and twelve years later in Bunting v. Ohio, 243 U.S.
426 (1917), the Court upheld ten-hour laws for women and for all factory
workers, respectively.
645. See, e.g., Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106
(1949).
646. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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interests [made up of intangible expectations] are asked to
yield more or less to pressures of public demands." 47 Of
course, Holmes would have given the appellate courts (not a
jury) final discretionary say as to whether the state had ex-
acted too great a sacrifice of an individual intangible liberties.
In Brandeis' mind, this ideal of compensation became espe-
cially important in the case of the expanding, centralized fed-
eral police power.6" 8 Increasingly specialized laws from a dis-
tant federal capital have a greater tendency to be
oppressive-and their trans-jurisdictional federal character
makes them a greater threat to liberty than the former exer-
cise of such powers by the several states.
In any case, both Holmes and Brandeis perceived that, as
Justice Brennan has recently written, a requirement of com-
pensation for oppressive regulations will cause the regulators
to tend "to err on the constitutional side of [the] police
power." '49 It will help forestall the overproduction of puta-
tive public goods at the expense of intangible liberties. 50
Professor Hayek's self-sufficient ideal of isonomia,51
founders on his own concession".2 of the inevitable need in a
complex society for legislative rules for special classes-and
hence of the correlative need for a responsible moral judg-
ment by someone, first, that the majoritarian decision in
favor of such specialized rules was not influenced by the iden-
tity of those who happen to constitute the affected group, 53
and, secondly, that the decision did not frustrate legitimate
individual expectations formed in reliance on the pre-existing
647. Sax, Takings and the Police Power 74 YALE L.J. 36, 41 (1964).
648. Louisville Joint Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935). See also
Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405 (1935).
649. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S.
621, 661 n. 26 (1981).
650. Cf Johnson, Planning Without Prices: A Discussion of Land Use
Regulation without Compensation, in B. SIEGAN ED., PLANNING WITHOUT PRICES
63-111 (1977) and J. BUCHANAN, FISCAL THEORY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY
105-124 (1960), reprinting Positive Economics, Welfare Economics, and Political
Economy, 11 J. OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 124-138 (1959).
651. See F. HAYEK, THE ROAD OF SERFDOM 54 (1944):
Stripped of all technicalities [the ideal of a rule of law] means that
government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and an-
nounced beforehand-rules which make it possible to foresee with
fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive power in given
circumstances, and to plan one's individual affairs on the basis of
this knowledge.
652. See Hayek, supra note 26, at 153-154.
653. Cf Raz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtues, in LIBERTY AND THE
RULE OF LAW 3-21 (R. Cunningham ed. 1979).
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state of the law. Short of unattainable society-wide unanimity
on the desirability of a change in the law, de novo jury trial
arguably provides the workable, historically-grounded, inde-
pendent ratification device needed to ensure that
majoritarian rule provides adequate compensation to minori-
ties who are the victims of unfair statutory "changes in the
law." The jury will be charged with distinguishing such
changes from mere codifications of the reasonably implicit
terms of the social contract. 65 4 It is a difficult moral line-
drawing responsibility, for which there can be few a priori
guideposts, but it should be a perennially necessary job for
some disinterested party in all modern dynamic democratic
societies.
The institution of an inverse condemnation remedy for
the loss of intangible economic liberties would involve claim-
ant, court, and counsel in a long-overdue dialogue with the
jury-centering around the contemporary meaning of liberty
under the evolving terms of the social compact. That way the
state will be given the opportunity to put to a moral road test
the refined "reasonable man" theories developed by judges
and scholars to justify the noncompensability of serious intan-
gible regulatory harms - on the theory that the affected citi-
zen has already received "just compensation" in the form of
hypothetical ex ante or ex post benefits.
654. Cf Buchanan, supra note 650, at 115-120.
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